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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the impact of populism on democratic quality in 
post-Communist Europe. It focuses on three dimensions of democratic quality 
evaluating the effect of populism on responsiveness in the Czech Republic, on 
participation in Poland, and on protest mobilization in Ukraine. It finds that populism’s 
impact on democratic quality ranges from positive to negative and may also be 
indistinguishable from that of other parties, depending on populism’s type – radical 
right/left populism or centrist populism – and its relationship to government – populism 
in government or in opposition.  
Although populism in opposition has little leverage to influence the policy 
agenda, it shows high levels of impact on political participation, inclusion and protest 
mobilization. Polish populist parties in opposition were successful at expanding the 
presence in politics of provincial politicians, farmers and blue-collar workers. Ukrainian 
populist party Svoboda had an impressive record of mobilizing citizens to participate in 
protest activities and showing higher ability to increase the level of political 
engagement among citizens. Along with positive effects, populism in opposition 
contributed to retrogressions of democratic quality because of the large share of violent 
protests fueling discord among various social groups instead of creating a constructive 
challenge to the ruling party.  
Populism in government demonstrated mixed results based on the evidence from 
Poland and the Czech Republic. The Polish case shows unintended consequences of 
populism’s negative discourse. High level of conflict and radical policies exhibited by 
the populist government compromised the institutions of horizontal accountability and 
xi 
led to a dramatic increase in voter turnout. Citizens mobilized at higher numbers to 
defend liberal democratic institutions voting two radical populist parties out from the 
parliament.  
Finally, the Czech case demonstrates that centrist populism in government has 
been successful at raising important questions ignored by the elites. The Czech 
populists politicized the issue of corruption showing higher degree of mandate 
responsiveness. Their ability to stick to their central electoral promise of addressing 
corruption indicates positive record of populism on policy responsiveness. Additionally, 
the Czech case shows positive externalities from populism’s anti-corruption campaign 
on discourse of other parties. Corruption became a more prominent issue following the 
election campaign in response to a continued emphasis on the issue by populists. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This dissertation examines the impact of populist parties on democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In a seminal work on party development, Herbert 
Kitschelt argued that socio-economic cleavages influenced by historical legacies of the 
communist past would be primary determinants of party development in CEE. He has 
suggested that the social bases of party competition would be reinforced over time, as 
“marketization proceeds” (Kitschelt 1992, 7). Two decades after the breakdown of 
communism, the transition did not produce strong, what Kitschelt called, 
“programmatic” political parties. Instead, a number of non-programmatic parties 
emerged – hostile to representative politics, ideologically amorphous, chameleonic in 
nature, and often described by negation (anti-Western, anti-democratic, anti-liberal). 
These political parties have been analyzed in the literature as diminished forms of 
programmatic, Western-style politics and analyzed under the labels non-programmatic, 
clientelist, populist, anti-establishment, unorthodox, anti-system, radical challengers, 
etc. (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Abedi 2004; Mudde 2007; Ucen 2007; Pop-Eleches 2010).  It 
is clear that programmatic parties that serve the fundamental purpose of interest 
aggregation and representation in democratic polities are not inevitable. At the same 
time, the literature describes political parties as an indispensible element of the 
performance, stability and quality of democracy; they are one of the core institutions of 
democracy (Diamond and Gunther 2001). 
 
 
2 
Research Questions 
If parties are an essential component of democratic quality, what is the 
relationship between populist parties and democracy? What are the consequences of 
weak ideological and programmatic linkages for the quality of democracy? Specifically, 
what are the effects of party populism on various dimensions of democratic quality? Is 
populism’s impact uniform across countries and across dimensions of democratic 
quality?  
The Puzzle: Populism’s Dual Nature 
There are ample reasons to analyze the connection between populism and 
democracy. Previous scholarship has demonstrated that populism and democracy are 
closely tied together, as analyses of populist discourse, rhetoric and policies are 
accompanied by how it relates to democracy – in normative or positive terms. The 
puzzle surrounding populism is related to the dual nature of populism (Rovira 
Kaltwasser and Mudde 2012). On the one hand, populism is a means to fix the 
shortcomings of the representative democracy by giving voice to marginal groups that 
feel left out from the political process. By claiming to eradicate corruption and rent-
seeking by the elites, populist parties and politicians are expected to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the political system (Canovan 1999, Hayward 1996, Meny and Surel 
2002, Taggart 2002). On the other hand, populism is seen as “pathology of democracy” 
(Mény and Surel 2002, 3) and therefore, a threat to liberal democratic institutions (Jones 
2007, Mair 2002, Urbinati 1998). Having little experience with institutions of 
representative democracy, populists are often unwilling to compromise and tend to 
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elevate the level of conflict in politics, undermining horizontal accountability (Levitsky 
and Loxton 2012).  
The impact and development of populist parties over time is instructive of the 
relative resilience of the democratic systems to populist impact. Polish populism, where 
populist parties have gone through a full life cycle of development, is a case in point: 
they came to prominence and passed the electoral threshold in 2001, became a part of 
coalition government in 2005, and finally, failed to return to parliament in a snap 2007 
election. The radical discourse used by Polish populists did not withstand the test of 
time. Other cases of populism, such as Meciar’s Slovakia, show more continuity and 
endurance of populism effects. Meciar’s ability to change the framing of political 
debate along a national dimension had a profound impact on the nature of governing 
coalitions; leftist and rightist parties alternated in government without crossing the party 
line for over a decade (Deegan-Krause 2012). 
In one of the most recent assessments of the relationship between populism and 
democracy, Rovira Kaltwasser and Mudde (2012) find evidence that populism can be 
both a threat to and a corrective of democracy depending on degree of democracy’s 
consolidation and the actual power of populist forces: its impact is more pronounced 
when populism is present in government but even presence in government has little 
impact on democracy when the democratic regime is consolidated.  
Like these scholars, I argue that populism’s dual nature results in the double-
edged impact on democracy, contributing to both desirable and undesirable outcomes, 
depending on the type and strength of populist parties. This dissertation shows that the 
effects of populism vary – and may be indistinguishable from other parties, positive or 
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negative – even when we disaggregate democratic quality into individual dimensions. 
The evidence suggests that in Poland, populism in opposition positively effected 
participation by mobilizing new voters at higher rates compared to other political 
parties; by opening up space to politicians representing marginalized groups of the 
Polish society, particularly, blue-collar workers and farmers. Populism in government 
also contributed to higher participation in the 2007 election, albeit due to unintended 
consequences, as citizens rallied to vote against radical populist partners because of 
negativism, radical discourse and disregard of democratic norms and institutions 
displayed by populists. 
Similarly positive was the impact of centrist populism in government on 
mandate responsiveness in the Czech Republic: populist party Public Affairs featured 
corruption-related press releases with higher intensity than other parties.1 Furthermore, 
Czech populists positively affected policy responsiveness by putting corruption firmly 
on the policy agenda by introducing a number of anti-corruption initiatives and by 
prompting other political parties to address corruption more prominently through oral 
questions on the floor of the parliament than parliamentary parties did in the past.  
The Ukrainian case of radical right populism in opposition demonstrates both 
positive and negative impact on another dimension of democratic quality - protest 
mobilization. Constructively, populists organized protests more frequently than other 
major political parties becoming a strong tool of accountability channeling public 
dissatisfaction with governing parties, and being an outlet of unvoiced attitudes related 
to Ukrainian language, national history and identity. Destructively, the number of 
                                                
1 Mandate responsiveness captures a party’s capacity to “make… clear campaign promises and fulfill… 
these promises once in office” Roberts (2010, 37). This aspect of mandate responsiveness includese press 
releases published on party websites. 
5 
violent protests organized by populist Svoboda was also the highest among major 
parties. 
Most research emphasizes direct effects of populism: the discourse used by 
populists is expected to mobilize previously passive citizens (Schmitter 2007, in 
Krastev 2007), who will support populist candidates based on common economic status 
or ethnicity.2 Often, these citizens are referred to as “have-nots”, or, in the context of 
post-Communist politics, they represent the “losers” of democratic transition. I also 
argue that populism has a direct impact on mobilizing citizens. In Poland, for example, I 
show how populist parties brought to the polls citizens who were disenchanted with the 
political process and were thus likely to disengage politically if not for the populist 
mobilization. However, this dissertation shows that populism can create backlash and 
serve as a mobilization tool in opposition to and in support for populist parties. Chapter 
4 demonstrates how higher participation in the snap 2007 election in Poland was related 
to higher degree of negativism and disregard of liberal democratic procedures exhibited 
by populist governing coalition. Negativism became a mobilizing factor for citizens 
who viewed as illegitimate government’s encroachment on the institutions of horizontal 
accountability. A 30% increase in the turnout in the 2007 election became detrimental 
to the success of radical populist parties.  
Importance of the Research Question 
The question of populism’s impact on the quality of democracy is important for 
a number of reasons. First, it is a good opportunity to reaffirm the assumption that 
                                                
2 In terms of economic status, Jasiewicz (2008) describes the activities of Self Defense in Poland in early 
1990s. The party, transformed from the labor union, supported and mobilized the farmers who lost their 
money in 1992. In terms of ethnicity, Vladimir Meciar of Slovakia represented unvoiced attitudes 
contributing to high politicization of national ethnicity issues (Deegan-Krause 2012). 
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political parties are central to the concept of democracy despite populism’s frequent 
assertion to the contrary. Most academic literature agrees with the assessment of E. E. 
Schattschneider (1942, 1) that democracy is unthinkable without political parties. A 
growing number of studies on regions, such as Latin America, Eastern Europe and on 
established democracies suggest that political parties remain essential for the 
performance, stability, and quality of democracy. Historically, political parties have 
served as vehicles of representation and articulation of societal interests, being 
indispensible elements of democratic institutions. However, the relevance of parties and 
their ability to perform traditional functions of representation has declined over the last 
decades.3 The growing disaffection of citizens with many institutions of democracy – 
especially political parties – is troubling.4 Even in established democracies, confidence 
in governments, parties, and individual politicians and partisan attachments are in 
decline. In many parts of Central and Eastern Europe, where party systems are only two 
decades old, political parties are among the least trusted democratic institutions (Webb 
and White 2007). For populist parties, low levels of internal and external political 
efficacy represent a window of opportunity. By focusing on leaders’ personality and 
direct unrestricted rule, they de-emphasize the importance of compromise and avoid 
partisan obligations and political responsibility, possibly contributing to a further 
decline of institutionalized party politics. Studying populism is important to emphasize 
the continuing usefulness of political parties that remain a central and indispensible 
                                                
3 See for example, Diamond and Gunther (2001). 
4 Gamson (1968, 45-46) argues that public confidence is necessary for governments to operate effectively 
without resorting to coercion. Trust is also important for development of civil society, which fosters links 
between citizens and their governments (Almond and Verba 1963). However, a healthy skepticism of 
government is important. Gamson warns about excessive trust leading to political apathy and low control 
over government. 
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ingredient of democratic quality; to understand alternative and sometimes contentious 
ways of citizen mobilization; to establish which elements and subtypes of populism are 
constructive and which are destructive for democracy; to identify policy solutions in 
order to minimize populism’s harmful effects and maximize its positive effects. 
Second, the literature posits that political parties are a necessary condition for 
democratic stability because they serve as constraints against potential abuse by social 
forces. Samuel Huntington suggests that parties perform a stabilizing function tying 
social forces together and creating “regularized procedures for leadership 
succession…[and] assimilation of new groups” (Huntington 68, 405). Whereas parties 
are seen as safeguards of democratic stability, they “themselves must be constrained” 
(Bermeo 2003, 18). Giovanni Sartori identifies polarization as the main challenge to 
democracy: polarized political forces are likely to contribute to the loss of the votes to 
the extreme ends of the political spectrum (Sartori 1976).  
Polarization is not the only challenge that arises from unrestrained parties. 
Abuse of power, low responsiveness, and lack of accountability by the elites produces 
cynicism among citizens limiting electoral turnout and political engagement and 
creating a danger of protest and extreme politics, which can result in defections from 
democracy. Bermeo (2003), for instance, attributes breakdowns of democratic regimes 
to the elites. Bermeo’s argument is consistent with Huntington (1968) who warned that 
future challenges to democracy would come from the elites. Given that populist parties 
challenge democratic institutions, understanding the dangers and opportunities of these 
challenges is imperative. 
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This research is motivated by the problems of governance in Ukraine occurring 
in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution. Following the 2004 events, public 
enthusiasm about positive changes in democratic institutions was replaced by 
disappointment of disorganized and dysfunctional Orange coalition. The media and 
academic experts labeled the coalition government as populist because of its tendency 
to use oversimplified, exaggerated and unrealistic promises (Maksymiuk 2005). In fact, 
all major political parties running in the 2006 and the snap 2007 parliamentary elections 
participated in what became labeled the “race of electoral promises” using catchy 
campaign slogans such as "Ten Steps Towards the People" (Yuschenko in 2004), 
“Improvement of Life Today” (Party of Regions in 2006), “Ukrainian Breakthrough” 
(Tymoshenko’s Bloc in 2007).5 Because most political parties use elements of 
populism, it is easy to conflate any direct appeal to the people by the elites with 
populism. However, using a clear-cut example of populism helps avoid this problem. In 
the Ukrainian case, I evaluate populism’s impact on democratic quality, specifically on 
protest mobilization, examining the case of radical right party Svoboda (Freedom). 
Svoboda’s case demonstrates the impact of populism on the sub-national level. The 
party has been mobilizing higher levels of support nationally since 2004 but it received 
high prominence in regional (oblast) and municipal elections since 2009. Svoboda’s full 
impact on democracy is yet to be seen but the Ukrainian case is insightful because it 
shows the impact of populism on protest mobilization at earlier stages of populist party 
development. 
The experience of other Central and Eastern European countries with parties 
featuring populist characteristics is illustrative of the variety of potential outcomes 
                                                
5 Field Research, Kiev, Ukraine, 2009. 
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which affect different dimensions of democratic quality. The case of Poland is a 
paradigmatic example of populism, where populist parties have gone through a full life 
cycle of development – from getting into parliament in 2001 to failing to clear the 
electoral threshold in 2007. Not only does the Polish case show variation over time, but 
it also shows differences among populist parties that include the radical right, 
xenophobic League of Polish Families (LPR), radical agrarian Self Defense (SO) and 
center-right Law and Justice (PiS), which obtained populist features over time.  
The Czech Republic represents a more benevolent example of populism. 
Populist party Public Affairs (Veci Verejne, or VV) exhibited strong anti-establishment 
stance in its opposition to rampant corruption and fiscal irresponsibility as well as by 
advocating measures of direct democracy. However, Czech populists are non-radical 
challengers to the establishment; they do not display xenophobic features or advocate 
violence; rather, they channel disillusionment among citizens with the political process, 
lack of responsiveness and accountability among the elites in ways consistent with 
liberal democratic values and norms. The presence of the populist party in government 
since 2010 helps trace its impact on public policies.  
Studying Democratic Quality 
Democratic quality is a relatively new subfield in the study of democratization. 
The studies on the “third wave of democratization” have dealt with the questions 
concerning transitions and the consolidation of new democracies, as well as institutional 
designs, historical legacies and their implications for newly created regimes 
(Huntington 1991). The recent switch in focus to analyze the quality of democracy – 
which has preoccupied the scholarly interest over the last decade – is in large part due to 
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the varied nature of democratic advances of transitional regimes and the belief that 
democracy is “the only game in town” (Linz 1990, 143–164). This new agenda aims to 
move beyond the dichotomous notions of consolidated versus non-consolidated 
democracies and offer possible avenues for improvement and strengthening of 
democracy.6 
One of the fundamental challenges faced by the studies on the quality of 
democracy has to do with conceptualization and ambiguity about which dimensions 
should be included in the concept. Marc Plattner notes that the inherent complications 
with studying democracies prevent from identifying dimensions of democratic quality 
that would not be controversial. For instance, the literature is not always specific on the 
definition of democratic quality. Many authors conflate the concept of democratic 
quality with that of democracy, using the two terms interchangeably and simply 
associating democratic quality with good governance and normative assessment of “all 
the good things about the society” (Roberts 2010, 24). Roberts (2010) correctly points 
out the need to distinguish the two conceptually and identify distinct measures for both 
democracy and democratic quality.  
Rather than assess the general impact of populism on democracy, I disaggregate 
democratic quality into individual dimensions to establish conditions under which 
populist parties affect each dimension. In this dissertation, I analyze three dimensions of 
democratic quality – political participation, democratic responsiveness, and protest 
mobilization – using a case study approach. I identified these dimensions using elite 
interviews with political party representatives and academic experts during my 
fieldwork in Poland, the Czech Republic and Ukraine. The Polish interviews helped 
                                                
6 See, for instance, Schedler (1998, 91–107).  
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establish how populism impacted mobilization of new voters supporting populist 
parties; and later, how radical discourse and policies exhibited by populist parties led to 
higher electoral turnout in the 2007 parliamentary election. I therefore focus on 
electoral participation and mobilization of new voters and politicians in the Polish case. 
In the Czech case, I analyze democratic responsiveness following the electoral promises 
by the Czech populists to be responsive to popular concerns about corruption. Finally, 
in the Ukrainian case, I examine protest mobilization by Ukrainian populists who being 
a relatively small opposition party showed an exceptional ability to organize protests.   
These three dimensions are not the only criteria of democratic quality affected 
by political parties. Political parties also affect such dimension as accountability and 
competition. Further research is needed to determine populism’s impact on these 
dimensions in a broader comparative perspective.  
Findings 
This dissertation evaluates the relationship between populism and democratic 
quality. The effect of populism on individual dimensions is examined through a case 
study analysis. I evaluate the effect of populism on responsiveness in the Czech 
Republic, on participation in Poland, and on protest mobilization in Ukraine. The 
central findings of this causal analysis suggest that populism’s impact on different 
dimensions of democratic quality is mixed and varies from positive and negative to 
indistinguishable from that of other parties. Centrist populism in government (the Czech 
case) has largely positive impact on policy responsiveness, whereas its impact on 
mandate responsiveness is mixed. It shows lower degree of mandate responsiveness 
compared to other Czech parties based on voter perceptions of parties’ left-right 
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ideological positioning. At the same time, populist Public Affairs used web 
communication as a tool of mandate responsiveness more intensely than other parties 
when addressing its core campaign issue, namely corruption. Radical populism in 
opposition may have positive and negative impact on democratic quality dimensions, 
for example, on participation and protest mobilization, like the Polish and Ukrainian 
case studies indicate.  
The analysis of democratic responsiveness in the Czech Republic suggests that 
populist party Public Affairs displayed higher degree of ideological incoherence 
compared to other Czech parties, signaling its lower mandate responsiveness.7 Turning 
to specific campaign promises, the concerted effort by Public Affairs to focus on anti-
corruption rhetoric politicized the issue of corruption, drawing both public and elite 
attention to the problem, thus indicating high degree of mandate responsiveness. Public 
Affairs also exhibited higher mandate responsiveness by showing higher intensity of 
featuring corruption in its web press releases.  
Populism had largely positive effect on policy responsiveness. The legislative 
record suggests that Public Affairs stuck to its central electoral promise, namely 
combatting corruption. Numerous anti-corruption initiatives introduced by Public 
Affairs serve as a useful example of policy responsiveness even though the party’s 
credibility was damaged by corruption scandals within the government coalition and 
reached as high as the leadership of Public Affairs. Based on the frequency of 
corruption-related questions as the overall share of oral questions asked from the floor 
                                                
7 Mandate responsiveness reflects clarity of electoral programs according to voter perceptions. A mandate 
responsive party would offer a clear and distinctive electoral message to the electorate. It is measured as 
standard deviations of voters’ left-right ideological self-positioning. Higher standard deviation indicates 
lower agreement among voters (party constituents or all voters) on what a party stands for and signals 
weaker-defined ideological profile. Chapter 5 discusses this aspect of democratic quality in detail. 
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of the parliament, members of parliament affiliated with Public Affairs displayed higher 
degree of policy responsiveness, compared to other parties, even though the deputies of 
the populist party used this channel of policy responsiveness less frequently in reference 
to issues other than corruption. I also find positive externalities from Public Affairs’ 
anti-corruption campaign on other political parties. Specifically, the populist rhetoric 
focused on corruption prompted mainstream parties to address the issue of corruption 
more prominently than parties did in the past.   
The examination of the Polish case study finds a largely positive impact of 
populism on electoral participation. I show that populism has had a positive effect on 
the inclusion and mobilization of disenchanted voters. Following corruption scandals 
among mainstream parties in 2001, the populist Self Defense and League of Polish 
Families mobilized close to a third of their voters from citizens who previously did not 
participate in elections. Despite the fact that both populist and mainstream parties 
mobilized new voters, the survey data indicates that it was populist parties that 
mobilized a larger share of new voters. Populist parties also had positive impact on 
expanding the presence of marginal groups (farmers, in particular) in politics: Self 
Defense, for instance, brought a larger share of provincial politicians, farmers and blue-
collar workers to the parliament, compared to other parties. Overall, citizen 
participation increased as a sign of support of populist parties.  
Additionally, high level of negativism displayed by the populist governing 
coalition between 2005 and 2007 had unintended consequences: I show that negativism 
worked as a mobilizing factor, bringing to the polls citizens who perceived that the 
populist government showed disrespect for liberal democratic procedures, institutions 
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and rule of law. In other words, participation increased in opposition to, rather than in 
support of populism. The increase of participation was largely the result of higher 
degree of negativity brought by populists into political life. By launching an attack on 
institutions of horizontal accountability, the populist coalition created a backlash against 
an illiberal style of government.8 Thus, the positive impact of populism on participation 
was an indirect result of populism’s negativism and high level of conflict brought by 
populists to political life. 
The findings from the Ukrainian case study suggest that radical right populism 
in opposition has a strong potential to affect protest mobilization and participation. 
First, I find strong positive correlation between the support for populist party Svoboda 
on the one hand and higher electoral turnout and contacts with politicians, on the other 
hand. Second, populism’s ability to mobilize protest activities are particularly 
impressive, especially given the small size of the populist party and its limited electoral 
success at the national stage. The data suggests that in regions where populism’s 
electoral support was higher, the frequency of participation in demonstrations was also 
higher. Citizens who feel closer to populist Svoboda are 12.5% more likely to 
participate in lawful public demonstrations than other parties’ constituents, on average. 
Being cautious about spurious nature of this relationship, I analyzed the data on protest 
activities in Ukraine in 2009-2011. I find that populist Svoboda organized protests more 
frequently than other political parties, opposing policy proposals of pro-presidential 
coalition government. Svoboda’s collaboration during protests with other mainstream 
parties and organizations sends voters an important signal that even radical right 
                                                
8 O’Donnell (199, 117) argues that in addition to vertical accountability, when elected officials are held 
answerable to the ballot box, horizontal accountability implies that “state agencies must stay within their 
own boundaries, and not encroach into other agencies’ areas of operation.” 
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populism may be a viable partner for mainstream parties to challenge the uncontrolled 
power of the political establishment using unvoiced nationalist attitudes related to 
language, identity, and national history. Whereas these protests are valuable, their 
largely symbolic nature is secondary to socioeconomic or power struggle protests which 
are more constructive and critical of concrete actions of the authorities. 
Populism’s engagement in political protest has a largely positive impact on 
democratic quality. This type of political participation gives citizens and social groups 
an opportunity to express collective grievances and hold their governments accountable. 
Yet, the violent nature of protest has been negatively viewed in the literature. The 
Ukrainian case study shows that populist Svoboda engaged in violent protests more 
frequently than other parties. The majority of Svoboda’s violent protests were 
ideological, focusing on issues of Soviet legacy, World War II and the role of 
Communism. These issues are quite controversial in the Ukrainian society today and 
they reflect a deep regional, or civilizational, according to Huntington (1996), divide. 
These kinds of political protests may fuel discord, deny certain groups from effectively 
practicing their rights subverting democratic rules and norms.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 engages in the 
review of literature on democratic quality, political parties and populism. Chapter 3 
describes the research design, case selection criteria, the methodology and the data 
sources used in the study. In addition to analysis of existing data and secondary 
literature, this research incorporates several different types and sources of data that 
include the semi-structured elite interviews conducted during the six-month fieldwork 
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in the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine, the data from the European Social Survey, 
the Polish National Election Study, the Czech National Election Study, and Protest and 
Coercion data collected by the Ukrainian Center for Society Research. Chapter 3 also 
describes the justification of the case selection as well as the selection of three 
dimensions of democratic quality.  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 offer case studies of populism’s impact on three dimensions 
of democratic quality – electoral participation, democratic responsiveness, and protest 
mobilization. Chapter 4 explores causal mechanisms linking populism and participation 
in Poland combining within-case analysis with qualitative data from elite interviews; 
Chapter 5 evaluates the effect of populism on three dimensions of responsiveness in the 
Czech Republic; Chapter 6 examines populism’s impact on protest mobilization in 
Ukraine. Chapter 7 draws conclusions linking the results from the case studies and 
addresses the implications of the findings for the future study of populism.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This chapter looks at the current state of the literature on populism and 
democratic quality. Analysis of the relationship between these two variables requires 
bridging together several bodies of literature and addresses works on political parties, 
democracy, and populism. The literature on populism can be broadly divided into 
conceptual and causal. Conceptual literature deals with definitional clarity of populism 
and applies chosen definitions to individual case studies or in the comparative context. 
The causal literature analyzes the causes of populism and its outcomes for society. As 
far as the effects are concerned, it has been viewed as a threat to democratic procedures 
and institutions, as well as a remedy of democracy’s shortcomings. Scholars 
emphasizing populism’s positive impact focus on populism’s ability to raise previously 
unvoiced attitudes, to mobilize constituencies and to be highly inclusionary by engaging 
politically marginal groups. Engagement can take the form of encouraging them to 
contest office positions and bringing to the polls disenchanted voters (Roberts 1995, 
2012, Levitsky and Loxton 2012, Hanley 2012).  
Scholars describing negative consequences of populism, point to institutional 
encroachment, marginalization of the role of the opposition, and undermined 
independence of the media, the courts, and the police. For instance, Vladimir Meciar 
attempted to eliminate institutional restraints using national appeals in Slovakia 
(Deegan-Krause 2012). Hugo Chavez used state spending to reward loyalists and punish 
opponents “crowding out the opposition” in Venezuela whereas Alberto Fujimori 
launched an autogolpe shutting down regional governments and the legislature 
(Corrales and Penfold 2007; Roberts 2000). These accounts share an underlying 
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condition: to have such an effect, populists must be either a governing party, be 
represented in coalition government or hold the executive office. Overall, the existing 
tension in assessments of populism’s positive or negative role in the literature implies a 
need for further study and new case analyses, which this examination aims to 
accomplish.  
Populism and Democratic Quality 
Throughout the 1990s, significant attention among students of democratization 
was focused on questions of democratic transition and consolidation.9 More recently, a 
number of scholars have questioned the usefulness of the “transition paradigm,” which 
categorized the democratizing regimes of the third wave as transitions to democracy, 
and called for turning attention to new concepts and debates.10 Studies of 
democratization turned to questions of democratic deepening and democratic quality.11 
In these studies, democracy has been analyzed as something normatively good, a regime 
type that is preferable to authoritarian regimes. The democratization literature has also 
developed causal arguments demonstrating empirically the benefits of democratic form 
of governance. Taking a normative preference for democracy as a given naturally 
makes the concept of democratic quality an important dimension of analysis and highly 
value-laden concept for policymakers. As a result, empirical methods aimed at 
identifying objective factors that explain the quality of democracy have become active 
avenues of research. 
                                                
9 O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Diamond 1999; Schedler 1998. 
10 See Carothers (2002) critique of the “transition paradigm”. See O’Donnell (2002) offering a counter-
argument. 
11 Altman and Pérez-Liñán (2002); Diamond and Morlino (2005); O’Donnell (2004); Roberts (2010) 
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Democracy 
In order to analyze the relationship between populist parties and the quality of 
democracy, we first need to establish a clear definition of democracy. I define 
democracy following Robert Dahl’s definition of polyarchy (Dahl 1971, 3). Dahl’s 
minimal definition is commonly used in the literature to distinguish democracies from 
non-democracies.12 Dahl writes in Polyarchy that “a key characteristic of a democracy 
is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens” 
(Dahl 1971, 1). Dahl’s understanding of democracy follows procedural minimal 
conditions: democracy is seen as a set of procedural norms that need to be followed to 
allow citizens to select their representatives in competitive elections. According to 
Dahl, polyarchy is defined along 8 dimensions: 1) freedom to form and join 
organizations; 2) freedom of expression; 3) right to vote; 4) eligibility for public office; 
5) right of political leaders to compete for support; 6) alternative sources of 
information; 7) free and fair elections, and 8) institutions for making government 
policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference. These eight conditions are 
mutually necessary. Individually, they are not sufficient to call a regime a polyarchy. If 
one or more of the eight dimensions are not met, a regime is not characterized as 
polyarchy.  
Democratic Quality 
There is no generally accepted metric for the quality of democracy available in 
the literature. Democratic quality became an important area of scholarly interest over 
the last decade, after the slowing down of the “third wave of democratization” described 
by Huntington (1991). The notion of democratic quality came to prominence partially 
                                                
12 See, for instance, Collier and Levitsky (1997); Altman and Pérez-Linan (2002); O’Donnell (1996). 
20 
due to the emergence of diminished subtypes of democracy - “gray zones,” hybrid 
regimes, competitive authoritarianism and other “democracies with adjectives” (Collier 
and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 2002). Often these regimes did not even meet the minimal 
democracy criteria but they were still considered democracies. However, some scholars 
and practitioners have argued against the assumption that these diminished types of 
regimes are moving towards democratic consolidation (Carothers 2002; Levitsky and 
Way 2002). Studies focusing on the quality of democracy offered a useful avenue of 
inquiry examining these diminished subtypes of democracy focusing on quality in terms 
of procedure, content and results (Morlino 2004).  
As it exists, the concept of democratic quality suffers from a large amount of 
ambiguity in the literature, and research on democratic quality has found several 
resulting limitations. The first group of limitations impacts studies that discuss 
democratic quality as an extension of democracy and therefore use such concepts as 
democracy, democratization, democratic quality, institutionalized democracy, and good 
governance interchangeably.13 Berg-Schlosser (2004), for instance, chooses not to 
define the concept of democratic quality but instead uses a wide array of indicators – 
including institutional, social, and economic dimensions – to measure it. In her 
assessment of the quality of democracy in Belarus and Ukraine, Korosteleva (2006) 
acknowledges democratic deficiencies of two countries and describes them as “’quasi-
democracy,’ offering a democratic façade accompanied by less democratic practices, or, 
using Aristotle’s words, a ‘demagogical democracy’.”14 Korosteleva’s argument, after 
all, fits better with studies explaining the presence and persistence of “democracies with 
                                                
13 Berg-Schlosser (2004); Korosteleva (2006). 
14 Korosteleva (2006, 140). 
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adjectives”, rather than in the “democratic quality” framework.15 Roberts (2010) and 
Altman and Pérez-Liñán (2002) correctly point out that we need to distinguish the 
concept of democracy from that of democratic quality. “Every analysis of the quality of 
democracy,” write Altman and Pérez-Liñán, “should share a minimum degree of 
democratization, namely Dahl’s procedural minimum.”16 For example, if the concept of 
democracy, as defined by Dahl, requires the right to participate in free and fair 
elections, the concept of democratic quality should be characterized by the rate, or 
intensity of citizen participation – electoral turnouts, memberships in voluntary 
organizations or participation in protests and demonstrations.  
If a given country does not meet the criteria of democracy, it does not mean this 
country has poor democratic quality. In other words, a country has to meet the 
minimum criteria of democracy if we want to analyze its democratic quality. Therefore, 
while the scales and minimum thresholds for democracy used by various indices can 
show which countries are more democratic, they are of less value when studying 
democratic quality.17 As Altman and Pérez-Liñán (2002) suggest, by addressing the 
quality of democracy, “we are analyzing in which countries democracy performs better 
given some normative standards”, rather than asking which countries are more 
democratic.18 
The existing literature of the quality of democracy discusses a variety of 
individual dimensions of quality and sometimes offers specific measures. Lijphart 
(1999) includes four indicators of democratic quality – female representation, electoral 
                                                
15 Collier and Levitsky (1997). 
16 Altman and Pérez-Liñán (2002, 87). 
17 Berg-Schlosser (2004) discusses various aggregate indices of democracy.  
18 Altman and Pérez-Linan (2002, 87). 
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participation, satisfaction with democracy, and corruption. Altman and Pérez-Linan 
(2002) use three elements – civil rights, participation, and competition – which 
represent a degree of polyarchy to measure the quality of democracy in Latin America. 
Using the panel data, Altman and Pérez-Linan compare democracies in 18 Latin 
American countries during the Third Wave. Diamond and Morlino (2005) identify eight 
dimensions to measure democratic quality: the rule of law, vertical and horizontal 
accountability, responsiveness, freedom, equality, participation, and competition. These 
dimensions “provide citizens a high degree of freedom, political equality, and popular 
control over public policies and policy makers” (Diamond and Morlino 2005, xi).  
In the most recent study of democratic quality in post-communist Europe, 
Roberts (2010) conceptualizes democratic quality as a set of linkages between citizens 
and rulers. Roberts suggests that three linkages characterize this relationship best – 
accountability (the ability to punish or reward office holders), mandate responsiveness 
(politicians should present distinctive and recognizable programs in their campaigns) 
and policy responsiveness (when elected governments follow people’s preferences). 
Robert’s argument offers a definite advancement for our understanding of democratic 
linkages in new democracies in a systematic and coherent way. His measures of 
democratic quality are a useful point of reference because he clearly differentiates what 
constitutes democracy on one hand, and democratic quality, on the other hand, and in 
his measurements of the latter he remains faithful to his conceptualization of democratic 
quality as linkages between citizens and elites.  
Other research discusses democratic quality in more general terms using it 
interchangeably with democracy and associating it with other positive characteristics, 
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such as quality of governance or level of democratization (Korosteleva et al. 2006). The 
value of these studies cannot be denied but given their less clear conceptualization of 
the quality of democracy, there is a danger to equate democratic quality with all positive 
outcomes in a country, which may be desirable, thus not accurately reflect the nature of 
democratic quality. Additionally, some undesirable outcomes may not necessarily 
produce clear signals about poor democratic quality.  
Populism 
It is not a novelty to state that populism is a highly contested, illusive and 
ambiguous concept. The term is often used in daily language by ordinary people and 
elected officials to describe a highly emotional and simplistic discourse by politicians 
targeted towards the “ordinary people”, aiming at invoking “gut feelings” of the 
people.19 Populism describes simplistic and often unrealistic policies that include but 
are not limited to economic redistribution policies, direct or indirect payments prior to 
elections aiming to buy support of the voters. While these policies benefit some voters, 
they are seen as irresponsible and inefficient from an economic perspective. The 
meaning of populism is more complex in the academic literature, as the concept is 
contingent on the historical period (Popular Party in the US in the 1860s, Import 
Substitution Industrialization in Latin America of the 1960s-70s), on the domain 
(political, economic, social populism), geographical region (the US, Latin America, 
Western Europe, or Eastern Europe).20  
                                                
19 Mudde (2004, 542). 
20 On the US agrarian populism see Ostler (1993); McMath (1995); Miller (1987). Cunningham (1968). 
On populism in Latin America see Weyland (1999; Roberts (1995). On populism in Western Europe see 
Taggart (2004); Mudde (2010). 
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Since one of the earlier attempts to clarify the term by Ionescu and Gellner 
(1969), populism has received a lot of academic attention. Often carrying a negative 
connotation, populism seems to be a poorly defined concept for social science scholars 
seeking to conceptualize it in a normatively neutral way. Scholars have taken many 
approaches to define populism framing it in political, economic, and social terms, or a 
combination of those.21 
One of the central conceptual disagreements in the literature on populism has to 
do with debates on whether populism constitutes an ideology, strategy, discourse and 
political style, or an organizational form.22 Mudde (2004, 544) treats populism as a 
“thin-centered ideology” that borrows from and “can be easily combined with very 
different (thin and full) other ideologies”, such as liberalism, nationalism, or socialism. 
Stanley (2008, 95-96) writes that populism should be seen as a distinct but thin ideology 
because it is “unable to stand alone as a practical political ideology… [and] it lacks the 
capacity to put forward a wide-ranging and coherent programme for the solution to 
crucial political questions…[it therefore] inflects with contextually hospitable ‘full’ 
ideologies.” Other scholars have shown that populism can be combined with 
nationalism (Deegan-Krause 2012), with neoliberalism (Weyland 1999), and even with 
socialism (Sachs 1990).  
Canovan (1999) suggests three reasons not to treat populism as a distinct 
ideology: 1) populists lack comprehensive ideology; 2) populist movements are merely 
reactive and do not constitute positive vision; 3) populism is better treated as discourse 
(kind of language, rhetoric, or strategy). She claims that the strength of populist 
                                                
21 Roberts (1995); Weyland (1999). 
22 Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009); Mudde (2007), Stanley (2008). 
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discourse lies in its lack of content, as it is ready to use different context at different 
times. Others argue that populism is largely characterized by empty ideology. Populist 
parties and candidates lack core values and can be found in a wide “span [between] the 
radical left of the anti-globalization movement to the far right.”23 Linden (2008) 
associates populism with empty ideology, linking it with the necessary presence of 
charismatic leadership: “the ideological empty set at the core of populism, the need for 
a human embodiment of the heartland, and especially the desire for simple solutions and 
distrust of the ambiguities of ‘politics’ make a charismatic leader almost a necessity.”24  
Similar to Canovan (1999), another group of scholars defines populism as a 
strategy, discourse or political style. Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2009, 822) argue 
that using populism as a “characteristic rather than an identity” is preferable because 
doing so allows researchers to apply the concept to a variety of political parties, as all 
parties to some extent exhibit populist characteristics. Meny and Surel (2002) write that 
mainstream parties often “borrow the political rhetoric of populism for electoral 
opportunism…[however] it is ironic to listen to Jacques Chirac criticizing the French 
elites of whom he is the epitome.”25 By defining populism as a political strategy, 
scholars bring under the populist umbrella a wide variety of political parties and 
politicians, including outsiders, challenger candidates, mainstream parties, parties of 
government and parties in opposition. In this dissertation, I follow this group of 
researchers and define populism using family resemblance structure of concept 
formation viewing populism as a strategy that can be used by centrist, radical right, or 
                                                
23 Taggart (2004, 280). 
24 Linden (2008, 4). 
25 Meny and Surel (2002), 13. 
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radical left parties.26 In other words, in the following analysis populism is a matter of 
degree.  
It seems that despite disagreements over precise definition, there is general 
agreement in the literature that populism represents “an appeal to the people, against the 
established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society.”27 
Building on this core Manichaean feature of the people-versus-elite distinction, scholars 
have attempted to identify common features of populism to “build a universally 
applicable approach to populism.”28 Using this approach, Taggart (2004) outlines five 
defining features characterizing populism.29 Taggart’s definition is built using the 
necessary and sufficient structure of concept formation, which makes the concept a 
dichotomy: a party either meets all the criteria to be called populist or not (Goertz 
2006). The difficulties of applying these features in a cross-country or cross-regional 
context has brought major criticism of the concept.  
An important methodological innovation offered by Collier and Mahon (1993) 
allows researchers to deal successfully with those cases of populism that do not meet all 
the conditions identified in previous research. Collier and Mahon suggest to use “radial 
categories” when dealing with problematic concepts.30 Weyland (2001, 10), for 
instance, explains the radial category in the following way: “While simultaneous 
presence of all … attributes characterize full populism, the presence of some but not all 
of them yields diminished subtypes that fall under the general rubric of populism.” If a 
                                                
26 See, for example, Deegan-Krause (2007). 
27 Canovan (1999, 3). 
28 Taggart (2004, 273). 
29 Taggart (2004). Taggart’s five feature defining populism are: hostility to representative politics; 
creating the heartland – commitment to “the people”; empty heart – lack of core values, chameleonic 
features; sense of crisis; reluctantly political.   
30 Goertz (2006) calls them “family resemblance” structure of concept formation. 
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party fulfills all the criteria, it is an exemplar of full populism; if a party meets one or 
more criteria, it is also an exemplar of populism of a less rigorous form, or diminished 
type of populism. Other researchers followed Collier and Mahon’s (1993) lead. For 
instance, Roberts (1995) defines populism following Collier and Mahon’s suggestion to 
use radial categories. Similarly, Pop-Eleches (2010) uses family resemblance structure 
to identify “unorthodox” parties.31 
Populism has been seen as a negative phenomenon both in academic literature 
and by policymakers.32 Because of a strong negative meaning attached to populism, 
some scholars have suggested completely abandoning the concept (Roxborough 1984). 
It seems that populism is “forever on the verge of losing its meaning” but the cyclical 
nature of populism – populism periodically goes through the phases of (re)emergence 
and decline – has prompted scholars to revisit the central arguments, disagreeing again 
on the concept’s definition, causes and consequences.  
Based on the literature, three components characterize populist parties: 
1) Lack of coherent ideology  
Populism can be a defining feature of parties on both sides of the political 
spectrum. The earlier examples of Latin American populism are closely related to the 
redistributive policies and fiscal indiscipline.33 Other scholars have shown that populist 
socioeconomic policies can be compatible with neoliberalism (Roberts 1995, Weyland 
1999). These authors demonstrated how presidents Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Carlos 
                                                
31 Pop-Eleches’ (2010) definition of “unorthodox” parties is closely related to the definition of populism 
used in this dissertation. Pop-Eleches argues that unorthodox parties: (1) act as political vehicles for their 
leaders, (2) use electoral appeals based on extremist rhetoric rather than on moderate platform and (3) 
sidestep ideology.  
32 Field Research in the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine, 2009. Most, if not all, interview respondents 
attached negative meaning to populism. 
33 Sachs (1990); Cardoso and Helwege (1991). 
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Menem in Argentina and Fernando Collor in Brazil enacted neoliberal reforms after 
having won elections using populist discourse.34 While redistributive economic policies 
are one of the central elements of Latin American literature on populism, populism in 
Western Europe is associated primarily with radical right parties and movements.35 
Radical left populism, however, also exists in Western Europe; left wing populists 
combine socialist ideology with populist discourse (Mudde 2002, Abedi 2004).  
Finally, some parties in Central and Eastern European countries have displayed 
less extreme elements of populism and been labeled as a new family of populist parties 
– the “centrist” populism. Ucen (2007) defines centrist populist parties as parties that 
“channel… [their] anti-establishment zeal into party platforms of government 
transparency and accountability. New populism … is an ideology in the service of a 
power-seeking political strategy.”36 Similarly, Pop-Eleches (2010), argues that the new 
centrist populist parties do not use nationalist, anti-western, or anti-capitalist discourse. 
They prefer vague ideological appeals to extremist programs and “promise weary 
electorates they will square the transition circle by pursuing western integration and 
punishing mainstream elites widely associated with declining living standards and 
rampant corruption.”37 In short, the threshold of negativism and anti-establishment 
stance is considerably relaxed for centrist populists, as they do not need to be political 
outcasts to fit the centrist populism category.  
2) People-centric promises and appeals to the common sense of the people 
                                                
34 It is important to note that a large body of literature does not limit populist politics to policies of 
redistribution and fiscal irresponsibility. For example, Knight (1998), Weyland (2001) focus on political 
dimension of populism in their definitions. Roberts (1995) uses family resemblance structure of concept 
formation and only one of his “core properties” comprises an economic element. 
35 Mudde (2007); Kitschelt and McGann (1995). 
36 Ucen (2007, 50). 
37 Pop-Eleches (2010, 232). 
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Canovan (1999) defines populism as “an appeal to the people, against the 
established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society.”38 
Weyland’s (1999) definition focuses on the populist leader’s “appeal to a heterogeneous 
mass of followers…[rallying against] established politicians and government 
bureaucrats.”39 The definitions of populism outlined above are closely related to the 
ones used by Meny and Surel (2002) and Mudde (2004) who suggest that society is 
separated into two groups - the people and the elites who are viewed highly corrupt. 
Building on the people-elite antagonism, Deegan-Krause (2007) evaluates party 
populism based on two questions: “how deeply does the party opposes elites (in 
opposition to the united “people”) and for what reason.”40  
3) Anti-establishment stance 
When it comes to substantive characteristics, the literature focuses on 
antagonistic nature of populism. In a seminal study, Ionescu and Gellner (1969) argue 
that populist parties share two common features: 1) supremacy of the will of the people 
versus special interest groups and political establishment and 2) negativism – populists 
define themselves by what they are against, rather than by what they are for. The latter 
is closely related to the ideological emptiness of populism; populist parties and 
candidates lack strongly defined ideological platform and find it easier to juxtapose 
themselves to their opponents (the established elites), rather than to offer programmatic 
programs and policy solutions. Canovan (2002) comments that “a very large part of the 
populist message is negative and critical”, as populists attack mainstream parties for 
                                                
38 Canovan (1999, 3). 
39 Weyland (1999, 381-2). 
40 Deegan-Krause (2007). 
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unresponsiveness, corruption, and lack of accountability.41  Populists are often critical 
of membership in international institutions, such as the IMF, WTO, EU, NATO, 
portraying these institutions as a threat to the national identity, culture, and economic 
security of ordinary people. In other words, populist parties and politicians are quite 
reactive, and hence do not carry significant ideological content (Canovan 2002, 33) and 
defensive against external and internal threats (Taggart 1996). 
Common to these definitions is the appeal to the people against the established 
power of the elite using vaguely defined programs. Often, the cited reasons for 
criticizing the elite may be country or region specific. Deegan-Krause (2007) writes that 
populist leaders in Latin America criticized the elites based on their opposition to 
economic redistribution. As a result, populism in Latin America is known for and often 
associated with economic redistribution (clientelism). However, Weyland (1999) 
succinctly points out that the economic definition of populism, while relevant, is of 
limited use: irresponsible economic policies emphasizing “expansionary economic 
policies and programs that distribute benefits to the poor…thus undermining budget 
equilibrium and fueling inflation…have been adopted by a wide range of presidents, 
from the nationalist Juan Peron to the socialist Salvador Allende and the conservative 
Jose Sarney.”42  
Whereas anti-establishment criticism in Latin America is built on the elites’ 
resistance to distribution, populists in Western Europe opposed the elites’ pro-
immigrant policies and mobilized support by relying on xenophobic attitudes. In 
Eastern Europe, populism largely opposed corrupt practices among the establishment 
                                                
41 Canovan (2002, 32). 
42 Weyland (2001, 379) 
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(Deegan-Krause 2007). Overall, what is important to the definition of populism and its 
significance across cases and regions is anti-elite stance regardless of the origin of these 
sentiments.  
Similar to Mudde (2004), Ucen (2007), and Haughton and Deegan-Krause 
(2009), I define populism as an antagonistic relationship between the people and the 
elites. I follow Ionsescu and Gellner (1969) and Taggart (2004) and treat populism as a 
chameleonic movement; populism changes its hue depending on the environment and 
regularly shifts its positions on primary issues. Like Deegan-Krause (2007), I measure 
populism as a degree, rather than as a dichotomy, employing the family resemblance 
structure of concept formation (Goertz 2006).  
The literature on populist and protest parties uses a variety of terms to describe 
seemingly diverse group of parties – from far right to far left, including some parties in 
the middle of the political spectrum. However, a feature common to these parties is their 
juxtaposition to mainstream, or programmatic parties. Abedi (2004) refers to the 
challenger parties as anti-political establishment (APE) parties and identifies two broad 
types of APE parties - opposition and populist parties. Abedi builds on Andreas 
Schedler who introduced the term “anti-political establishment party” to describe parties 
emphasizing a) divisions between the people and the establishment and b) 
distinguishing themselves from the political establishment.43 Both Abedi (2004) and 
Schedler (1996) agree on including into this category parties regardless of their 
ideological position.  
Another group of party family closely related to the phenomenon studied in this 
dissertation is what Kitschelt (2000) calls clientelist and charismatic parties. He 
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contrasts these two groups with programmatic parties: programmatic linkages are “built 
on politicians’ investments in both procedures of programmatic conflict resolution and 
organizational infrastructure” (Kitschelt 2000, 850). Unlike clientelist parties that 
generate practices of rent seeking, market distortion, and corruption, programmatic 
parties identify programs of policies that they will pursue if elected to office. Kitschelt 
further argues that post-communist states are more likely to develop clientelist parties 
because of their lack of history of political mobilization based on programmatic 
linkages, rigidity of current institutions, and partial economic reforms resulting in rent-
seeking behavior.  
Kitschelt’s two residual categories – clientelist and charismatic – are often found 
as essential ingredients of populism. The Latin American literature has a long tradition 
of associating populism with clientelist payments and charismatic leadership. Stokes 
(2005) describes how populist parties, such the Peronists in Argentina, used direct 
handouts to the poor and uneducated voters.44 Roberts (1995, 88) includes in his 
definition of populism clientelist payments that “create a material foundation for 
popular sector support.”45  
Personalistic and charismatic leadership is included in definitions of populism in 
regional contexts. Drake (1978), Weyland (1999), Knight (1998), Kenney (2009), 
Levitsky and Loxton (2012), Roberts (2012) among others, have analyzed charismatic 
and personalistic appeals in Peron’s Argentina, Chavez’s Venezuela, Fujimori’s Peru as 
paradigmatic cases of populism. The literature on European cases of populism also 
                                                
44 Stokes (2005, 315). 
45 As has already been mentioned, some authors warn against using irresponsible redistributive policies as 
a defining feature of populism because many political candidates use these policies, which makes it 
difficult to distinguish populist from popular leaders (Weyland 1999). 
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emphasizes the importance of direct, personalistic appeals by leaders bypassing 
institutionalized channels of representational politics to mobilize the citizens. Vladimir 
Meciar in Slovakia, Jorg Haider in Austria, Pim Fortuyn in Holland, Jean Marie La Pen 
in France, King Simeon II in Bulgaria – these leaders among others used their 
personality to appeal to people bypassing representative institutions or using them as an 
electoral vehicle for getting to power. 
Pop-Eleches (2010) uses the term “unorthodox” to label parties whose electoral 
appeal is not based on “a recognizable and moderate ideological platform rather than on 
the personality of its leader and/or extremist rhetoric.”46 The category of unorthodox 
parties is closely related to other types of protest parties – populist, anti-establishment 
(Abedi 2004; Schedler 1996), anti-party (Mudde 1996), discontent (Lane and Ersson 
1994) or radical right populist parties (Mudde 2007). Common to these works is their 
emphasis on anti-elite appeals of political parties, ambiguities of their electoral 
programs and messages, and reliance on personalistic leadership. By emphasizing 
similarities in these scholarly works, this dissertation operates on the premise that non-
mainstream, non-programmatic parties with seemingly different names largely represent 
the same phenomenon. It is critical for us to understand the impact of this pervasive 
political phenomenon on political systems and institutions, especially on democracy.  
Populism as a Dependent Variable 
Whereas one strand of literature on postcommunist parties analyzes populism in 
conceptual terms, another broad body of literature follows a causal line of inquiry. Its 
primary focus is on the origin of populist parties, analyzing possible explanations for 
their rise, their instability or their decline. These studies estimate the average effect of 
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particular independent variables on populism. For example, Pacek (1994) and Tucker 
(2006) estimate the importance of economic voting suggesting that economic factors 
explain poor performance of mainstream parties and electoral success of “the extremist 
challengers.” The challengers to the political establishment generate support from the 
voters who are became the losers of the transition period.  
Other studies analyzing ethnically diverse societies have shown how the 
electoral support of political parties depends on ethnic composition of the state (Evans 
and Whitefield 1993). However, it is not clear whether ethnic cleavages are conducive 
to the emergence of populist parties. Populists often use ethnicity as a mobilization tool 
but there is no evidence that populist appeals are a useful predictor of the rise of 
populist parties. Some scholars stress the importance of political factors, such as the 
collusive practices and interactions of mainstream established parties with anti-
establishment parties (Abedi 2004). In some cases, the rises of a populist challenger 
have been associated with collusive practices but it has also been shown how collusion 
among mainstream parties was followed by higher popularity of another ideologically 
strong party. Deegan-Krause documents how collusion between two mainstream parties 
in the Czech Republic in late 1990s – Civic Democrats and Social Democrats – 
generated a backlash against them during the 2002 election. But it was the Communist 
Party (KSCM) rather than a new protest party that generated larger electoral support at 
the polls.  
Finally, several recent works attempt to explain the popularity of protest parties 
by looking at the role of successive generations of post-communist elections. Pop-
Eleches (2010) shows that citizens revert to vote for protest and unorthodox parties in 
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order to punish mainstream parties rather than to programmatically support protest 
parties. This assumption suggests that the support for protest parties may be highly 
volatile but their discourse and policies may serve as an important mechanism of 
accountability and better responsiveness in the political system.  
The commonality of these studies lies in their treatment of non-programmatic 
parties as a dependent variable. However, the literature does not share a consensus on 
which factors explain the rise or decline of populist movements. Structural factors seem 
to affect the performance of mainstream parties in consecutive elections: deterioration 
of economic conditions does no favor to the governing mainstream parties in their bid 
for returning to power, whereas institutional factors, such as high electoral threshold is 
an effective mechanism preventing small challenger parties from generating enough 
votes for the parliament bid. However, it is not clear that economic decline is a useful 
predictor of the rise of protest parties; nor is it certain that lower electoral threshold 
would automatically produce successful protest parties. Whereas these questions are not 
of direct concern in this study, it is important to know what types of grievances bring 
populists to prominence because the impact of populism on democracy and democratic 
quality may depend on the type of populist parties, their strength and regional context.  
Populism in Comparative Perspective 
Studies of populism have rich traditions in Latin America. Earlier scholarship 
linked populism to import substitution industrialization and redistributive policies used 
by personalistic leaders to mobilize broad group of supporters. These studies are 
associated with personalistic leadership of Juan Peron in Argentina, Getulio Vargas in 
Brazil and Lazaro Cardenas in Mexico (Panizza 2005, 2-4). As a result, earlier 
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definitions of populism built on expansionary economic policies that provided 
economic support to broad social groups, leading to economic crisis (Weyland 1996, 4). 
Drake (1978) identifies three features describing populism in Latin America - 
paternalistic, personalistic and charismatic leadership and mobilization from top-down, 
multi-class appeal, and redistributive economic policies. Neoliberal policies embraced 
by Latin American countries since 1980s seem to be incompatible with this definition of 
populism because they require fiscal discipline. However, scholarship in the 1990s 
identifies new forms of populism that are used together with neoliberal reforms. 
Leaders like Carlos Menem, Fernando Collor and Alberto Fujimori were described as 
typical examples of neopopulism which was associated with breakdown of 
representative institutions during economic and social turmoil (Roberts 1995). 
In Western Europe populist movements focused on anti-immigrant appeals and 
the term “populism” was often accompanied by such additions as “radical right” labels 
(Mudde 2004). Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front, Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party, 
Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and Pim Fortuyn’s LPF are among the most notable 
examples of populism in Western Europe. Existing research indicates that populist 
parties mobilize disenchanted constituencies. Ivarsflaten (2008), for example, 
demonstrates how radical right populist parties in Western Europe mobilized grievances 
over the issue of immigration. Populism in Eastern Europe is a relatively new 
phenomenon and scholarship on the subject has been inspired by the cases of Vladimir 
Meciar and Robert Fico of Slovakia, populist parties in government coalition in Poland 
and populist challengers in Hungary and Bulgaria. It is reasonable to expect similar 
impact of populism on higher mobilization and participation of new or disenchanted 
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voters in Eastern European context. Therefore, chapter 4 focuses on populism’s impact 
on participation in Poland.  
Ukraine has not received much academic attention when it comes to research on 
populism. Kuzio (2010) is one of the few analyses of Ukrainian populism. Kuzio’s 
analysis deserves attention because it places the concept often used in daily political life 
on the scholarly agenda. This is an important first step towards identifying the 
characteristics of populism in Ukraine setting the foundation for further research on 
populism’s impact.  
Kuzio’s study belongs to the conceptual group of studies that attempt to identify 
populist appeals based on a minimal definition. Kuzio analyzes political party platforms 
and rhetoric of their leaders to outline the defining features of Ukrainian populism 
testing the Western European conceptualization of populism. By looking at ten 
attributes of populism Kuzio shows that several mainstream Ukrainian parties exhibit 
populist components: Party of Regions, BYT and Our Ukraine meet three to four 
criteria established by Krastev (2006), while Svoboda (Freedom) meets all ten criteria.47  
Kuzio correctly captures the negative connotation attached to the concept, as 
party leaders and the media associate populism with a “pack of lies” and engage in 
blame politics criticizing others for “ideological amorphousness and populism“ (2010, 
9). Kuzio is also succinct about the ambiguous meaning of the concept that ranges from 
social redistributive policies to economic nationalism, simplistic electoral promises and 
appeal to heterogeneous and often incompatible policies.  
                                                
47 Svoboda has won popularity in Western Ukrainian regions, especially following the 2009 regional 
elections in Ternopil, where it obtained 34.7% of the votes (50 out of 120 seats) in the regional council. 
The party has not won any seats in the national elections as of 2012. 
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Following Krastev (2006), Kuzio suggests that charismatic leadership is an 
essential feature of populism. However, most Ukrainian party leaders lack charisma. 
Populist movements in Latin America and Western Europe do exhibit a particular type 
of leadership, but I find it more useful to use the concept of personalistic rather than 
charismatic leadership. Personalistic leader does not necessarily have to be charismatic 
(Roberts 1995). The essence of personalistic leadership is concentration of power in the 
hands of an individual rather than party, while charismatic leadership is better described 
by his or her individual abilities to appeal to citizens. Charismatic leaders are indeed in 
short supply in Ukraine but their leadership style can be called personalistic. The names 
of parties and political blocs often reflect their leaders’ ability to control and use them 
as personal electoral vehicles.  
The definition of populism used in this dissertation is not incompatible with that 
of Kuzio, but it differs in two respects. First, I use family resemblance structure of 
concept formation rather than necessary/sufficient criteria to define the concept. 
Second, I use three elements of populism, grouping similar elements into larger 
categories. For instance, five elements in Kuzio’s definition – anti-elite and anti-
establishment, anti-corruption, anti-American, anti-NATO, and anti-EU – are collapsed 
into a larger anti-establishment category. Despite the fact that I use a different definition 
of populism, I agree with Kuzio’s classification of Svoboda as a populist party and thus, 
chapter 6 focuses on populism’s impact on protest mobilization using the case of 
Ukrainian Svoboda. In sum, the inclusion of the Ukrainian case in the study provides an 
opportunity to examine how radical right populism in opposition may affect democratic 
quality when populism does not have strong nation-wide electoral support. This case is 
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also instructive in showing populism’s impact on protest mobilization in the country 
where the party system is seemingly infused with populism, but only Svoboda meets the 
academic definition of populism. 
Populism and Democracy 
While political parties play an essential role for democratic quality, the 
relationship between populist parties and democracy is less straightforward. “It is an 
uneasy partnership,” according to Papadopoulos (2002, 45), and “it is reductionist to 
consider populism as either a pathology of, or a threat to, democracy.” The uncertainty 
about affinity between the two has to do with one of the contradictions of the modern 
democracy, i.e. its uneasy relationship between the popular (majority) and 
representative elements. The rhetoric of populist parties presumes that democracy 
means exclusively the power of the people. Meny and Surel (2002, 9) call such 
definition a “reductionist definition of democracy” when populist parties present 
democracy as the “pure expression of popular view.” The representative dimension that 
helped make democracy workable is rejected by populists. However, as Meny and Surel 
note, in the course of the last centuries, democracy has been a regime combining the 
principles of representation and majority rule. The source of populism, accordingly, lies 
in this disconnect. As long as the contradiction between popular and representative 
dimensions exists, the debate on how to reconcile the demand for popular rule and 
representation principle will continue.  
On the one hand, populism is viewed in the literature having a positive impact 
on democracy. Populist parties, portraying themselves as agents of change and 
expression of popular will, seek to address the contradiction of modern democracy 
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between representative and popular dimensions. Some authors see populism as a means 
to fix the shortcomings of representative democracy by giving voice to new social 
groups (Hayward 1996; Taggart 2002; Canovan 1999; Mény and Surel 2002). They 
argue that populist politics may help strengthen the legitimacy of a political system by 
reducing rent seeking and corruption, and mobilize citizens who feel left out of the 
political process. Philippe Schmitter suggests that the impact of populist parties on new 
democracies in post-communist Europe is largely positive. While admitting the 
shortcomings of populist parties, he argues that they mobilize citizens who have 
previously been passive in the political process, promote the development of previously 
suppressed demands, expose collusive practices among the elites, raise ignored political 
issues, and question “exploitative dependencies upon foreign powers” (Schmitter 2007). 
Using the public opinion survey data, Ghodsee (2008) shows that populist party Ataka 
mobilized new voters in the 2005 Bulgarian election “giving voice to a political agenda 
hitherto ignored by Bulgaria’s political elite.”48 A quarter of Ataka’s 2005 electorate 
represented new voters who did not participate in the previous election.  
The mobilizing impact of populism was also emphasized by others (Levitsky 
and Loxton 2012; Roberts 2012). Levitsky and Loxton argue that by appealing to 
marginal sectors, Alberto Fujimori was able to open political space to mestizo, 
provincial politicians, and women. Fujimori increased the number of evangelical 
Christians in Congress representing the only political party to elect this previously 
unrepresented group in 1992 and 1995 (Lopez Rodriguez 2008 in Levitsky and Loxton 
2012). Fujimori also increased the presence of women in positions of power: his 
electoral bloc had twice the number of women in the Chamber of Deputies compared to 
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other parties. Similar to Fujimori, Hugo Chavez’s populist discourse contributed to 
higher popular mobilization of civic, community-based groups by creating mechanisms 
for grassroots participation (Roberts 2012). Created by Chavez grassroots “Bolivarian 
committees” were active participants in the debates on constitutional reform, as well as 
on economic and social programs (Hawkins 2010, 177). 
Populism’s positive impact is not limited to its mobilization capacities. 
Jasiewicz (2008) sees populism as a potential corrective mechanism for democracy 
rather than an alternative to it.49 By addressing previously silenced political and social 
problems, populism challenges mainstream parties to pay more attention to these 
problems. However, raising silenced questions may carry neither positive nor negative 
impact. Taking such a middle ground approach, Panizza (2005) describes populism 
neither as a threat nor as a benefit but as a “mirror of democracy”:  
By raising awkward questions about modern forms of democracy, and often 
representing the ugly face of the people, populism is neither the highest form of 
democracy nor its enemy, but a mirror in which democracy can contemplate 
itself and find out what it is about and what it is lacking.”50  
 
Poland is a case in hand of how this corrective mechanism operates. The populist 
government coalition collapsed after four months leading to the early parliamentary 
election of 2007. Although the populist Law and Justice (PiS) received more seats in the 
2007 election compared with 2005, the other two parties (the agrarian populist Self 
Defense and the extreme right League of Polish Families) that had been part of the 
populist coalition government failed in the 2007 polls. The result was what Jasiewicz 
                                                
49 Roberts (2000, 20), for instance, argues that populism “is an informal alternative to institutionalized 
forms of political representation.” As political parties rely less on social cleavages to generate support 
and citizens are less inclined to remain loyal to parties based on their own social status, populism may be 
viewed as an alternative to democracy. 
50 Panizza (2005). 
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calls the “ultimate victory of the liberal Poland over its social solidarity counterpart” 
(Jasiewicz 2008, 24). Several important issues articulated by populist parties – such as 
corruption, lack of accountability, unresponsiveness – received more attention from 
programmatic parties, thus suggesting support for the populism-as-corrective-
mechanism hypothesis.  
On the other hand, populism is viewed in the literature as a threat to democratic 
institutions and procedures. Some studies recognize that democratic institutions often 
fail to be responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens, but they nevertheless treat 
populist politics as a threat to democracy (Urbinati 1998, Jones 2007, Mair 2002). 
According to this view, the danger of populism is its anti-democratic, anti-liberal stance 
and its propensity to polarize political discourse. Meny and Surel (2002, 4) suggest that 
because populism is often associated with extreme right parties known questioning the 
legitimacy of democracy, populism is viewed as “pathology of democracy,” despite the 
authors’ claim that populists challenge a specific form of democracy – representative 
democracy – rather than democracy as a form of government. Populist parties criticize 
the existing democratic elites that ignore the needs of the people and they promise to 
return the power to the people. According to Schedler, populists try to make clear that 
they portray themselves as the only democrats rather than oppose liberal democracy.51 
The studies analyzing populism as a threat link populism’s negative impact to 
the specific subtype of populism - radical right. Mungiu-Poppidi (2005) refers to 
election of xenophobic leader Haider in Austria, assassination of Pim Fortuyn in 
Holland, as well as growth of popularity of right-wing parties as deteriorations of 
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democracies.52 The presence of populists elevates the level of conflict in politics, 
undermines the power of representative institutions and threatens democratic norms of 
benefiting majorities at the expense of minorities. For example, Fujimori’s populist 
policies have largely had negative impact on democracy. As an outsider, Fujimori 
brought high level of conflict into political life, downplayed opportunities to form 
legislative alliances, undermining the importance of compromise, launched an attack on 
Peru’s political elites, judicial authorities and the media, eventually bringing the 
breakdown of democracy (Kenney 2004). Similarly, Hugo Chavez and Vladimir Meciar 
challenged the institutions of horizontal accountability in Venezuela and Slovakia, 
respectively. Both leaders brought high level of intensity and conflict into political 
discourse, marginalizing the rights of the opposition, the judiciary and parliaments.  
The effect of populism varies, according to Rovira Kaltwasser and Mudde 
(2012), depending on populism’s relationship with government: when in opposition 
populism is expected to display positive effect by criticizing the government and 
“keeping it on its toes”, whereas its effect will be negative when populists become a 
governing party or a part of the coalition government. Their mere presence in 
government is troubling, according to Jones (2007), because “they challenge the 
underlying conception of society by attacking vulnerable minorities and by legitimating 
political differentiation and social exclusion.”53 Take the already mentioned example of 
Fujimori’s Peru. After election, Fujimori’s government gained control over the media, 
as well as over the judicial and electoral authorities replacing 80% of the judges by 
provisional appointees who were at the mercy of the executive (Roberts 2012).  
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Conclusions about positive impact on public policies of mainstream parties are 
often used to make arguments about negative impact played by their populist 
counterparts, even though the latter conclusions are not supported by the data. Keefer 
(2005) argues that programmatic parties have significant positive effects on public 
policy – by providing more public goods and engaging less in rent-seeking or 
corruption, while populist parties have the opposite effect. Analyzing the significance of 
programmatic linkages to democratic quality, Herbert Kitschelt, argues that 
normatively, clientelist or charismatic linkages are treated by analysts and citizens as 
deficient because they “stifle… political freedom and perpetuate… profound 
inequalities” (Kitschelt 2000, 872). However, he suggests that the literature often 
suffers from a misconception about the essential goodness of programmatic politics that 
can be as hostile to democracy as clientelist or charismatic politics. Kitschelt posits that 
empirically, programmatic party competition leads to “greater depersonalization of 
politics, more collective goods provision, and more institutionalization than clientelist 
politics” (Kitschelt 2000, 853).  
Finally, the third broad group of studies finds both positive and negative impact 
in the relationship between populism and democracy. Rovira Kaltwasser and Mudde 
(2012) offer arguably the most nuanced and rich account of the relationship between 
populism and democracy bringing together case studies from North America, Latin 
America, Western and Eastern Europe. They suggest that populism can be both 
corrective and a threat for liberal democracy at the same time. By trying to identify the 
circumstances under which populism becomes a corrective or a threat, Rovira 
Kaltwasser and Mudde hypothesize that (1) populists are more effective when they are 
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strong while democracy is weakly consolidated and (2) populists will exhibit positive 
effects in opposition and negative effects in government. The authors bring into 
discussion eight cases of populism grouping them into a two-by-two cell table 
depending on whether populism is in opposition or in government and whether 
democracy is consolidated or unconsolidated. The contributors to the volume 
demonstrate that the most important factor for populism’s impact on democracy is the 
power of populism – in opposition, populism’s impact is limited to advancing themes 
and agendas that are of little priority for mainstream parties and therefore are ignored by 
them. In other words, populism in opposition does not have much power to effectively 
impact democracy, whereas populist forces in government are more capable to affect 
both the discourse and policies.   
However, in each of the studied cases, populism exhibits both positive and 
negative effect on democracy. Evaluating the effect of Chavez’s populism in Peru, 
Levitsky and Loxton find that populism can only be democratizing under conditions of 
strong liberal democratic institutions but when these institutions are discredited by the 
elites, populism further undermines them pushing weak democratic regimes into 
competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010). Populism may have a 
positive impact on democracy by mobilizing marginalized sectors of society against the 
establishment elites and negative effect by elevating the level of conflict and usurping 
the relationship between political branches. Overall, according to Levitsky and Loxton, 
“populism tends to be inclusionary but is rarely democratizing…[it is] more of a threat 
than a corrective to democracy” (Levitsky and Loxton 2012).   
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Roberts (2012) arrives at similar conclusions evaluating populism’s effect on 
democracy in Chavez’s Venezuela. According to Roberts, Chavez’s positive record on 
the participatory dimension and his ability to mobilize grassroots organizations was 
accompanied by erosion of the democratic contestation dimension which was negatively 
affected by concentration of power in the hands of the executive. Chavez moved to 
control the executive, legislative and judicial power. Roberts reminds us about frequent 
but not inevitable tradeoff between democracy’s principles that are affected differently 
by populism; populism, as a result, may be a corrective to democracy and a threat at the 
same time. In the case of Venezuela, higher democratic inclusiveness as populism’s 
corrective was achieved at the expense of democratic contestation.  
Vladimir Meciar’s populism in Slovakia had similar effect on the level of 
conflict and political competition and inclusion described by Roberts (2012) and 
Levitsky and Loxton (2012). Meciar polarized politics elevating the level of intensity 
and conflict in political life mobilizing both supporters and opponents (Deegan-Krause 
2012). Similar to Chavez and Fujimori, Meciar “pursued the systematic elimination of 
institutional restraints,” marginalizing the role of the opposition, undermining the 
institutions of horizontal accountability, and having a detrimental effect on consensus 
building. Whereas Meciar’s impact on inclusion is questionable (it is unclear whether 
he mobilizing particular demographic groups), he did contribute to reframing of the 
national political debate along nationalist issues (Deegan-Krause 2012). 
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Conclusion 
In sum, current literature contains an unresolved puzzle about the effects of 
populism on democracy. Partially this can be attributed to disagreements in the 
literature on the conceptualization of populism, as authors focusing on individual 
countries present core dimensions based on their own definitions, even though these 
definitions are built on the literature.  
As far as the causal analysis is concerned, the literature tends to generalize about 
the relationship between populism and democracy because it lacks clearly measurable 
empirical indicators to examine populism as a dependent or independent variable and 
does not specify the effects of populism on democracy’s individual dimensions. 
Moreover, normatively negative assessments of populist politics are often juxtaposed 
with positive empirical records. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s (2012) edited volume 
is the first attempt to evaluate this relationship in a more systematic way using case 
study analysis in an integrated theoretical framework. The authors identify a set of 
hypotheses concerning populism’s impact. The argument advanced in this dissertation 
is closely related to the one developed by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) and the 
contributors to their volume. The authors use the concepts of democracy and democratic 
quality interchangeably and seem open to consider any consequences of populism on a 
regime whether or not it constitutes a democracy. In this dissertation, I make an effort to 
clearly separate between definitions of democracy and democratic quality and focus on 
three individual dimensions of democratic quality – electoral participation, democratic 
responsiveness and protest mobilization. I develop a detailed account of how populist 
parties affect participation in Poland, responsiveness in the Czech Republic, and protest 
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mobilization in Ukraine. Moreover, by further disaggregating participation and 
responsiveness into lower-level concepts, this study seeks to give a more nuanced 
analysis of how populism relates to inclusiveness, electoral participation, mandate 
responsiveness, and policy responsiveness. Finally, the dissertation also contributes to 
the literature on populism by incorporating into discussion the case of Ukraine. 
49 
Chapter 3 – Research Design 
 
The goal of this study is to evaluate the impact of populism on democratic 
quality in post-communist countries. I focus on populist parties in three countries – the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine analyzing the impact of populism on participation 
in Poland, on responsiveness in the Czech Republic, and on mobilization in Ukraine. 
Chapter 2 reviewed the existing literature on populism showing that populism has the 
potential to impact democracy in both positive and negative ways. This chapter outlines 
the research design for the study, presenting the case selection criteria, variables and 
their measures, methods and data used. The chapter also outlines hypotheses about the 
relationship between populism and democratic quality and conditions under which 
populism’s effect is more or less pronounced. The chapter concludes with brief 
overview of the cases under investigation.  
Variables  
Most studies on populism identify populist parties as the most common residual 
type of political parties; they seek to explain populist programs, rhetoric and 
mobilization54, distinguish between different types of populism (Canovan 1981) or 
identify common features of populism to come up with workable and normatively 
neutral definition of the term theoretically. These studies use populism as a dependent 
variable and briefly discuss larger implications of populism for representative 
democracy. However, few analyses use populism as an explanatory factor for individual 
components of democracy and democratic quality. Unlike the studies explaining 
populism as an outcome, this dissertation uses populism as an explanatory variable.  
                                                
54 Ionescu and Gellner (1969); Roberts (1995); Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004); Jasiewicz (2008). 
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The dependent variable is democratic quality, disaggregated into three 
dimensions – democratic responsiveness, political participation and mobilization. I 
examine separately the effect of populism on a single dimension for each of the three 
cases because the available data which gives me maximal leverage to assess the 
components of democratic quality on a case-by-case basis. The first component of 
democratic quality – responsiveness – reflects the ability of elected representatives to 
act in the interest of the public. I look at responsiveness as a multidimensional 
concept.55 Political parties may exhibit responsiveness by presenting clear programs, 
policy proposals, and web communication with their constituencies (mandate 
responsiveness); or via legislative activities by enacting policies favored by the 
constituencies (policy responsiveness).   
Political participation includes voting in elections, contacts with politicians, and 
running for office. Populist parties may induce citizens to participate in these and other 
political activities, or may have a demobilizing effect. They may boost citizen 
participation by emphasizing corrupt and unresponsive practices of the elites and their 
own novelty and “purity”, bringing new or disenchanted voters to the polls. They 
mobilize activists from previously inactive and marginal groups of the population. On 
the other hand, populism may have marginal effect on participation if it fails to mobilize 
voters or if its mobilization efforts are indistinguishable from those of mainstream 
parties. They may offer vague and un-productive criticism of government just for the 
sake of criticism (as often populist parties do). The effect of populism may also be 
negative if voters become disaffected due to a sense of continuing corruption scandals 
and incompetent governance by populists.  
                                                
55 See Eulau and Karps (1977). 
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Participation and mobilization are closely linked dimensions. Political parties 
mobilize citizens to increase the likelihood of participation.56 It is the mobilization 
efforts of political parties that create opportunities for people to participate and 
therefore, I consider mobilization as a separate dimension sequentially linked to the act 
of participation. Specifically, I focus on mobilization via protest activities to understand 
how populist parties use political protest to mobilize citizens and how populist 
mobilization differs from mobilization of mainstream parties. Populism may challenge 
governments by focusing their criticism on concrete practices, thus highlighting protest 
mobilization as a constructive dimension of democratic quality. Alternatively, they may 
elevate violence during protests, which results in destructive consequences for 
democratic quality. 
The independent variable is populism. I suggest three elements that should be 
included in the definition of populism following the family resemblance structure of 
concept formation.57 This definition is closely related to the definition of unorthodox 
parties used by Pop-Eleches (2010). Populist parties can be distinguished by three 
identifying characteristics: 
 First, they show lack of coherent ideology and often build their appeal on leader 
personality. These parties are not constrained by ideological positions on various issues 
and “tell the voters what they want to hear” (Pop-Eleches 2010, 210). Less populist 
parties are expected to fit the ideological spectrum of mainstream established Western 
                                                
56 See Tilly (1978). 
57 Collier and Mahon (1993). 
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democracies, while more populist parties “sidestep… ideology,”58 and display 
ideological "empty heart” (Taggart 2000). 
Second, they use people-centric promises and appeal to the common sense of the 
people, using simplistic, direct language often bordering on demagoguery. This element 
of populism is difficult to operationalize but the empirical reality is the reason to 
include it in definition of populism. Among people-centric promises offered by 
populists are appeals to address corruption, and increase responsiveness and 
accountability. Populist parties appeal to deficiencies in these issue areas and promise 
quick fixes. However, it is difficult to say that they constitute the core of the populist 
appeal. As salience of these issues changes from one election to another, populists 
change their positions. They use their appeals in an instrumental way as long as they 
serve their political needs. 
Third, populist parties demonstrate anti-establishment stance, criticizing the 
elites – whether domestic or international – using appeals by negation. The core element 
of ant-establishment appeals used by populists is negation. Rather than using positive 
appeals outlining views on policy positions, populists reject others' proposals, 
describing what they are opposed to; they denounce the elites for poor economic 
conditions, moral crisis, or for ignoring the needs of the ordinary people. While 
negation defines populist parties and candidates, the object of negative attitudes varies 
depending on the context. In Western Europe, for example, negation is associated with 
anti-immigrant stance and xenophobic discourse. Populist candidates and parties in 
CEE countries demonstrate attitudes against immigrants, homosexuals, foreign 
companies, international institutions, communists, and the corrupt establishment. 
                                                
58 Pop-Eleches (2010, 226). 
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Populist parties rely primarily on the anti-elite appeals captured through negativism and 
anti-elite stance in party programs and speeches. Scholars of populism focusing on the 
demand side of the phenomenon expect populist party constituencies to show higher 
levels of cynicism in representative institutions, political processes, the elites, and 
performance of democracy in general.  
Populist parties should be viewed as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. In 
other words, populism is a matter of degree. While Sartori (1984) warned against using 
“degreeism,” Goertz (2006) strongly advocates building a concept continuum, 
suggesting that the biggest advantage of continuous concepts is the ability to avoid 
“grey zones”.59 These are sufficient rather than necessary conditions: two of three 
populist characteristics – incoherent ideology, anti-establishment stance, and people-
centric appeals – are sufficient conditions to label a party populist.  
I define populism using family resemblance structure of concept formation 
displaying populism as a continuum, rather than a dichotomy. To reiterate, because all 
political parties display certain populist characteristics, populism is a matter of degree. 
If a party fulfills all three criteria, it is an exemplar of populism of high intensity; if a 
party meets one or two criterion, it is also an exemplar of populism of a less intensive 
form, or diminished type of populism. For measuring the impact of populism, this study 
analyzes more intensive forms of populism – the ones meeting two of three populist 
characteristics.60 
                                                
59 Goertz (2006, 35). 
60 Hicks et al. (1995) use similar technique for arriving at their definition of a welfare state. The authors 
define a country a welfare state if it meets three out of four classic welfare programs: health insurance, 
workman’s compensation, old age pensions, and unemployment compensation. The presence of three 
conditions is thus sufficient for labeling a country as a welfare state. 
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Following Deegan-Krause (2007), I conceptualize populism as a political 
strategy rather than ideology, thus bringing a wide variety of parties and politicians 
under the populist umbrella. Using this definition, any mainstream political party may 
qualify as populist because most parties make appeals using populism as a strategy. If 
populism is defined as a political strategy, it is no longer seen as a residual category and 
can be applied to most, if not all political parties or candidates.  
In order to better show how the definition of populism adopted in this 
dissertation is used to identify populist elements I offer examples of five parties 
representing more intensive forms of populism. The next section includes discussion of 
case selection criteria and illustrates how three definitional criteria described above help 
identify parties with populist characteristics. 
Case Selection 
I assess my argument using case studies of populism in the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Ukraine. These countries share a common legacy of communism. 
Institutionally, the Czech Republic and Poland are parliamentary systems with strong 
prime ministers and weak presidents who have some prerogative powers. These two 
states have “fairly well-institutionalized party structures and coherent patterns of party 
interaction between left and right” (Webb and White 2007, 7). The party system of 
Ukraine is characterized by individualistic and personalistic presidential rule. The 
political legitimacy in Ukraine in the 1990s has rested on presidency rather than on 
party politics. Nevertheless, all three countries epitomize lower levels of party 
membership, weaker social cleavages, and lower party system institutionalization than 
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other regions in the world. These three countries with populist parties are a good 
representation of the post-communist region.  
All three countries have experienced populism’s rise at different times since 
their transition from communism. Polish Self Defense (SO) and League of Polish 
Families (LPR) came to the national prominence in 2001, whereas Law and Justice 
(PiS) acquired populist characteristics over time, since 2005. The Czech Public Affairs 
(VV) emerged just before the 2010 parliamentary election, and Ukrainian Svoboda has 
been coming into prominence since 2007. Party populism differs in three cases and 
ranges from radical right and radical left characterized by higher intensity (Poland and 
Ukraine) to centrist populism characterized by lower intensity (the Czech Republic). 
These countries also offer a variation in populism’s relation to government. Three 
Polish parties at different times have been in government and in opposition; Ukrainian 
populist party is a party in opposition, whereas the Czech populist party is a party in 
government.   
I select my cases to account for variation in populist party types and their 
presence in government, slightly altering the framework offered by Rovira Kaltwasser 
and Mudde (2012).  Rovira Kaltwasser and Mudde posit an important question of 
conditions under which populism is a corrective rather than a threat for liberal 
democracy. They choose their cases placing them into a two-by-two table based on the 
strength of democracy (consolidated-unconsolidated) and populism (in government-in 
opposition). Rovira Kaltwasser and Mudde’s categorization of the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia as unconsolidated democracies is controversial, even though they are using 
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limited minimal definition of consolidated democracy offered by Schedler (1998).61 
Based on Schedler’s definition, all three cases examined in this study – the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Ukraine – are cases of consolidated democracy. Nations in Transit 
study by Freedom House also classifies Poland and the Czech Republic as consolidated 
regime, whereas Ukraine is classified as transitional government or hybrid regime. 
Following Rovira Kaltwasser and Mudde (2012), I use a slightly altered grouping of 
cases for this study, dividing the cases based on populism’s types and its relationship to 
government. Table 3.1 presents the variation of populism’s type, strength and 
relationship to government. 
Table 3-1 Populism’s Type, Strength and Relationship to Government  
                    Populism strength 
 
Populism type 
 
Opposition 
 
Government 
Radical right/radical left 
populism 
Svoboda (since 2007) 
LPR (2001-2005) 
SO (2001-2005) 
LPR (2006) 
SO (2006) 
Centrist populism PiS (2001-2005) 
 
PiS (2006) 
Public Affairs (since 2010) 
 
The radical right category is characterized by a combination of populist, 
nationalist, xenophobic, and authoritarian features (Učeň 2007, 51), and is represented 
by the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Svoboda (Freedom). LPR, for example, 
criticized the political establishment for downplaying traditional Catholic values, 
showed anti-liberal attitudes by actively campaigning against NATO and EU 
membership, and demonstrated xenophobic characteristics through anti-German and 
anti-Russian attitudes. Furthermore, the LPR expressed its authoritarian features during 
the 2005 parliamentary campaign by advocating for strong state control of the economy.  
                                                
61 Schedler suggests that consolidated democracies should be expected to “last well into the future” 
(Schedler 1998, 102). 
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Svoboda is another example of a xenophobic party using slogans such as 
“Ukraine for Ukrainians” and appealing against “foreign occupation” in political, social 
and economic areas. The party offers an alternative electoral option that, as its program 
suggests, is not based on the choice of the less evil, opposing to pro-Yanukovych’s 
Party of Regions, on the one hand, and to Yulia Tymoshenko and Victor Yuschenko, 
the betrayers of the Orange Revolution, on the other hand. Overall, Svoboda criticizes 
the establishment – the “oligarchic clans” – that usurped power and deny people any 
possibility to influence democratic decision making. Its program combines nationalist 
appeals to limit the power of foreigners in Ukraine with anti-establishment statements 
calling for lustration of politicians and a ban on communist ideology. Svoboda’s radical 
appeals are based on ethnic nationalism and Russophobia, although the party also 
exhibited strong anti-immigrant stance criticizing the inflow of Asians into the country.  
The radical left parties represent traditional agrarian populism, such as Self 
Defense (Samoobrona) in Poland. Self Defense is known for violence and radical 
protest in the early 1990s. Its leader, Andrzej Lepper led the hunger strike of the 
farmers who were on the brink of extinction after failing to repay loans following 
disastrous years of draught. Self Defense organized protests blocking the roads to attract 
media attention. The party’s program called for increase of social programs and 
subsidies to agriculture. One of the anecdotal indicators of simplistic appeals used by 
Self Defense was an appeal to fund social programs using foreign currency reserves.  
Law and Justice (PiS) and Public Affairs (VV) are cases of centrist populism. 
Peter Učeň uses a category “new centrist populism” to describe populist parties that are 
“non-radical challengers mobilizing disappointed electorates against under-performing 
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and morally failing established parties” (Učeň 2007, 54). Anti-establishment stance and 
vague ideological promises are central defining characteristics of this category. Centrist 
populist parties refuse ideological labels such as “right” or “left” on the political 
spectrum. Rather, they justify their policies as based on common-sense decisions 
benefiting ordinary citizens. Being a part of the ruling elites and having broad popular 
support, the party leaders distance themselves from other elites, accusing them of 
corruption, and lack of responsiveness and accountability. PiS has undergone a dramatic 
transformation since 2001 and moved from center-right to the right of the political 
spectrum. After a short experience in a government coalition with Self Defense and the 
League of Polish Families in 2006, and snap parliamentary election of 2007, PiS took 
over a large portion of the SO and LPR’s electorate and started using radical populist 
rhetoric that had previously characterized its coalition partners. The central appeals used 
by PiS have been anti-corruption, social solidarity, and criticism against lack of 
accountability of the political establishment. PiS also has a history of mobilizing 
constituencies based on nationalist appeals, and therefore xenophobia and protests have 
been somewhat present in its program, rhetoric, and policies.  
Public Affairs (Veci Verejne, or VV) participated in the 2010 parliamentary 
election as an outsider, criticizing the establishment for endemic corruption and lack of 
transparency and responsibility. Although Public Affairs was founded in early 2000s, 
until 2009 it has been active only in Prague’s local politics. Public Affairs demonstrated 
its tough approach to establish law and order by organizing “social intervention 
patrols,” – a type of neighborhood watch brigades – to confront criminals and hand over 
suspicious individuals to the police (Mares 2011, 292). The party received more 
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prominence with arrival of Radek John as its leader, an investigative journalist who 
became famous in the Czech households for his anti-corruption stories. Its image as a 
populist anti-establishment party is quite controversial. On one hand, the party criticized 
political establishment for corrupt practices encouraging to “leave the dinosaurs out of 
politics.” On the other hand, following 2010 election, it joined Civic Democrats and 
TOP09 in a government coalition, effectively joining the establishment it denounced 
before. Public Affairs did not exhibit racist or extremist views but its anti-corruption 
stance allowed the party to become an avenue for protest voters to express their 
frustration with the elites. These characteristics help classify Public Affairs as a centrist, 
rather than an extreme populist party. 
These three countries show presence of wide range of populist parties and offer 
variation of populism’s intensity over time and across cases. In Poland, political parties 
with populist features have gone through the full life cycle. Self Defense (SO) and 
League of Polish Families (LPR) cleared the electoral threshold and obtained seats in 
the lower house in 2001. They repeated their success in 2005 following corruption 
scandals within the governing (at the time) Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). SO and 
LPR formed a government coalition with Law and Justice (PiS) in 2006 but were 
eliminated from the parliamentary picture having failed to pass the electoral threshold in 
the snap 2007 election. This dynamic change in the fortune of populist parties offers a 
useful example of evaluating populism’s effect (a) outside the governing coalition, 
when populist parties were in opposition and (b) when populists became part of the 
governing coalition. The Polish case represents a useful testing ground for evaluating 
populism’s impact on political participation: How inclusive is populism? Does 
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populism bring new voters to the polls? How do populism’s discourse and policies 
affect citizen’s desire to vote?   
Aside from short experience with populist Republican Party (SPR-RSC) in the 
1990s, the Czech Republic has been largely immune to populism. The literature 
suggests that the presence of communist parties represents an alternative channel for 
protest attitudes among citizens. The strength of the Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia (KSCM) was seen as protest vote against collusion among the largest 
mainstream parties (Deegan-Krause 2006). Whereas populist tendencies were not 
present in the Czech Republic until 2010, the 2010 parliamentary election brought new 
political parties to the lower house, one of which – Public Affairs – exhibited populist 
characteristics. Small opposition parties rarely have an impact on responsiveness of the 
political system, given their marginal role in the political process. However, the 
potential for having an impact increases once a party becomes part of the coalition 
government, even though the behavior of a party may be restrained by participation in 
government.62 Shortly after election, Public Affairs joined the governing coalition as a 
junior partner running on anti-corruption platform. Public Affairs focused on anti-
corruption appeals and promises to be responsive to voters’ concerns in addressing 
corruption. By politicizing corruption Public Affairs was seeking to increase 
responsiveness of the political system. A strong concerted effort by Public Affairs to 
address corruption, offers an opportunity to analyze its impact on responsiveness: How 
                                                
62 Jasiewicz (2008, 23) argues that the decision to include radical populist parties – Self Defense and 
League of Polish Families – into the government coalition can be interpreted as a “noble – and effective – 
way to domesticate populism, to move it away from street demonstrations and road blockades into the 
halls of parliament.” The case of the Czech Public Affairs is different though, because Public Affairs was 
never a radical challenger to the establishment, as its label – centrist populism – suggests.  
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responsive are populist parties in addressing the problems which they criticized the 
establishment for? 
The Ukrainian case of populism is represented by the radical right party 
Svoboda (Freedom). Svoboda came to prominence in 2004 after its charismatic leader 
Oleg Tyahnybok was expelled from Yuschenko’s bloc Our Ukraine following 
Tyahnybok’s racial comments during one of the political rallies. Svoboda represents the 
views of ethnic Ukrainians who have been “repressed” for centuries by the imperialist 
and Bolshevik Russia.63 Kuzio (2010) argues that Svoboda “most closely resembles 
European populist parties”, as it meets all ten criteria identifying populism.64 The 
party’s strongest support comes from Western Ukrainian regions; in 2010 regional 
election Svoboda received seats in municipal and regional councils in 10 out of 24 
regions, while its leader obtained 1.43% of the vote in the 2010 presidential election. 
Svoboda has been quite successful in regional elections but has not yet achieved 
national prominence. Given the party’s recent limited success in local elections and 
presence at the sub-national level, the impact of populism on democracy is limited. 
However, Svoboda offers a useful case for exploring populism’s impact at early stages 
of protest mobilization. Are populist parties more successful at mobilizing citizens to 
vote than mainstream parties? How successful is populism at mobilizing citizens to 
express their protest against government? Does political protest represent a constructive 
or destructive strategy resulting in improvements or deteriorations of democratic 
quality? 
                                                
63 Svoboda’s electoral program, “Protection of Ukrainians Program,” August 5, 2007, available at the 
website of Central Election Committee of Ukraine www.cvk.gov, accessed on July 20, 2011.  
64 Kuzio (2010, 4). 
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Approach, Hypotheses, and Measurements  
This dissertation is a comparative study focusing on three cases of populism in 
Eastern and Central Europe. In order to examine the impact of populist parties on the 
quality of democracy, I use comparative study of populism in three countries – the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine. Building on recent scholarship by Rovira 
Kaltwasser and Mudde (2012), who view populism as a corrective and a threat to 
democracy, I examine the conditions and the scope of populism’s impact on individual 
dimensions of democratic quality. Each case study is analyzed individually using 
within-case analysis. This approach allows me to focus on cases of populism which 
vary in each national context and analyze the impact of populism on individual 
dimensions of democratic quality. The case study approach also helps to examine 
distinct cases of populism, which do not seem to belong to the same analytical category 
at first glance. This approach has been criticized for its focus on small number of cases 
and lack of external validity. However, based on the findings, we can draw contingent 
generalizations that populism in government will have stronger yet positive impact on 
democratic quality, while populism in opposition will have weaker but negative impact. 
Centrist populism has higher potential of having positive impact on democratic quality 
and responsiveness, in particular, as the Czech case shows. Extreme right or extreme 
left populism is likely to produce positive impact on participation, but it can also create 
backlash against populist type of discourse and incompetence of populist parties in 
government, as the Polish case demonstrates. The Ukrainian case shows a mixed effect 
of radical right populism in opposition on mobilization and participation. 
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The case study approach allowed me to use a variety of methods and data 
collection techniques to offer a more detailed understanding of populist party strategies, 
the tools used to generate electoral support and context within which populism emerged 
and persisted. The interviews were essential to understanding the motivation for the 
discourse used by political parties during electoral campaigns. I analyzed the interview 
transcripts and made continuous comparisons to grasp the objectives pursued by 
political parties, how parties appeal to the voters and whether their programs change 
depending on criticism expressed by their competitors, the media and citizens. I also 
tried to establish how parties with populist features differ in their approach to campaign 
activities and legislative behavior. The interviews provided a useful starting point for 
identifying general effects of populism. I asked open-ended questions on whether the 
presence of populism in politics had any effect on policies, citizens, or other political 
parties; how and why populism’s appeals differed from those of mainstream parties; 
whether populism was necessary for party system to be more responsive and 
accountable.65 Through questions like these I was able to establish that populism is seen 
both positively and negatively and identify dimensions of democratic quality where 
populism’s effect was most pronounced.  
The Polish respondents discussed populism’s mobilizing effect linking it to 
dramatic increase of electoral turnout in 2007. The Czech respondents commented that 
populism was not necessary for political system to be more responsive because populist 
appeals focusing on anti-corruption strategies are part of mainstream party programs; 
yet, four months later, populist Public Affairs received 10.9% of the vote obtaining 24 
seats in the lower chamber running on anti-corruption platform and promising higher 
                                                
65 See Appendix A for the list of interview questions.  
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responsiveness in fight against corruption. The mobilization activity of the populist 
Svoboda in Ukraine is unprecedented given the party’s limited regional success. 
Specific comments by Polish respondents linking populism and participation, the 
emphasis of Public Affairs in the Czech Republic on responsiveness in addressing 
corruption, and mobilization activities by Svoboda prompted me to examine populism’s 
impact on these three individual dimensions on democratic quality. 
Table 3-2 Three-Level Concept of Democratic Quality  
Basic level Secondary level Indicator/data level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democratic 
quality 
 
 
Participation 
 
Electoral turnout 
Level of inclusion of marginalized groups and 
newly mobilized voters 
Mobilization of politicians representing 
unprivileged groups 
 
Mandate 
responsiveness 
Citizen perceptions about positioning on the left-
right scale 
Clarity of electoral promises 
Press releases on the parties’ websites related to 
corruption (its presence or efforts to combat it) 
Policy 
Responsiveness 
Questions asked from the parliament floor 
Policy record on corruption 
Protest 
Mobilization  
Electoral turnout 
Contacts with politicians 
Participation in protests and demonstrations 
Table 3.2 presents the three-level framework of the concept of democratic 
quality. Each dimension of democratic quality is further disaggregated into lower-level 
measures, following Goertz (2006, 50). Democratic quality is the basic-level concept, 
while participation, responsiveness and protest mobilization are the secondary-level 
concepts. The indicator-level reflects a more proximate element of concept formation – 
these are the variables often used in quantitative analyses as proxies for more abstract 
concepts. As Goertz (2006, 53) suggests, the abstractness of the basic-level concept 
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necessitates the introduction of the secondary level that serves as a “theoretical linkage 
between the abstract basic level and the concrete indicator/data level.” 
Poland 
The elite interview respondents commented that populism mobilized new and 
protest voters and brought new candidates to office – people who never participated in 
politics before. Other respondents suggested that populism brought high level of 
conflict to political life and citizens turned out to vote to return to “normalcy.” Sifting 
through the secondary literatures – newspaper articles and special reports66 – I 
established that in the Polish context respondents discussed populism’s impact in two 
different contexts. First, during early 2000s, when populist parties initially came to 
power, their impact was largely characterized as positive, as they mobilized 
constituencies that were not represented or disenchanted by “politics as usual.” This 
helped identify the inclusion mechanism during the 2001 election. I further analyzed the 
survey data from the Polish National Election Study (PGSW) to identify the level of 
                                                
66 A special report by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) prepared and published in 2006 followed the 
creation of the coalition government between populist Law and Justice, Self Defense and the League of 
Polish Families. The ADL was highly critical of the coalition denouncing xenophobic and anti-Semitic 
appeals expressed by two extremist parties (Self Defense and the League of Polish Families) and the 
right-wing Catholic radio station, Radio Maryja, affiliated with Law and Justice and Self Defense. The 
report contained the information on anti-Semitism, xenophobia and intolerance in Poland in the aftermath 
of 1989 transition from communism; it provided a profile of populist extremist parties and individual 
members of government, specifically, Roman Giertych, Minister of Education and Andrzej Lepper, 
Deputy Prime Minister. The report included a detailed account of Radio Maryja, focusing on anti-Semitic 
content presented by the radio station; conspiracy theories about Jewish responsibility for communist 
repressions; and the radio’s inspirational leader Father Rydzyk known for his instigative hate speech. 
Another report, Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, was published 
in collaboration between four East-European institutions in a case study format that included a section on 
Poland along with sections on Bulgaria, Slovakia and Hungary. The report primarily focused on dangers 
of populism for liberal democracy and rule of law. The Polish section presented information on specific 
characteristics of Polish populist parties, on corruption and anti-corruption activities by the populist 
government, on relationship between populist parties on the one hand and the media, the judiciary, the 
Central Bank, and the Anti-Corruption Bureau.  
Another special report Democracy in Poland 2005-2007 was funded by Open Society Institute and 
prepared by the Institute of Public Affairs in Warsaw, Poland. This study included a rich description of 
the party system, the judiciary, the rule of law, the anti-corruption institutions, and citizen activism in 
2005-2007, while the populist parties were in government.  
66 
engagement in politics among constituencies of populist parties. In other words, the 
survey data helped establish whether populist parties had been a novel avenue of 
interest representation. The first hypothesis reflects the relationships between populism 
and the degree of inclusion: 
Hypothesis 1. Populism in opposition brings higher level of inclusion into politics, 
expanding participation to those groups that were marginalized and not represented in 
the past.  
The level of inclusion is measured by the share of newly mobilized voters by populist 
parties, as well as the share of newly elected politicians representing unprivileged 
groups. I examine the electoral data from the Polish National Election Study (PGSW) 
following 2001, 2005 and 2007 elections. I trace the origins of populist party voters to 
understand whether they were previously engaged in politics, mobilized and represented 
by other parties or whether populist parties were primarily responsible for voter 
mobilization. I begin by looking at the data from the 2001 National Election Study, 
because it was in 2001 when Self Defense and League of Polish Families cleared the 
electoral threshold for the first time. I further examine the data from the 2005 National 
Election Study on the first-time voters to see whether they were mainly mobilized by 
populist parties. Finally, I assess whether populist parties opened up political space for 
politicians representing marginal and unprivileged groups. The literature on populism in 
Latin America suggests that populism is inclusionary because it mobilizes individuals 
and groups who were previously excluded – or perceived being excluded – from 
political life. Moreover, as Levitsky and Loxton (2012) show, populism’s inclusiveness 
includes appointment of representatives of marginalized groups – indigenous peoples, 
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women, and evangelical Christians - to positions in power. Using secondary sources I 
examine the changing demographics of the Polish lower chamber in terms of gender, 
age, education and occupation to establish whether populist parties were able to expand 
the presence of marginal groups in government.  
Second, the interviews helped identify the second causal mechanism in play 
during the 2007 election and detect a key intervening variable – high level of conflict 
and negativity – that was associated with populism in Poland. The second hypothesis 
has to do with the level of negativism epitomized by populist parties. 
Hypothesis 2. Negativism exhibited by populist discourse and policies elevates citizen 
anxiety about politics. Citizens showing high level of awareness of political problems 
are more likely to participate in elections. 
Negativism is measured by citizens’ awareness of political problems, while 
participation is measured by voter turnout. Following Martin (2004), I assume that 
voters who are more exposed to negative discourse are more likely to express awareness 
with political problems. As citizens become more aware of political problems they 
experience anxiety about the future of the country, which leads to higher participation 
rates. I use problem awareness as a proxy for exposure to negativism expresses by 
politicians.  To test the hypothesis linking negativism and participation, I relied on 
newspaper articles and special reports compiled by the Polish Academy of Sciences and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to identify main aspects of confrontational 
discourse and policies pursued by populist parties. Among those were interventions in 
the content of news and accusations of belonging to uklad of those media who criticized 
the government; interference with the independence of the judiciary system and attacks 
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against the Constitutional Court under pretext to fight corruption, radical push of the 
lustration legislation and other extra-Constitutional measures to fight corruption.  I 
describe how radical and confrontational policies contributed to higher activity of the 
Polish civil society. These data sources helped create an account how radical discourse 
and encroachment on the independence of the media, the judiciary, and other 
institutions of horizontal accountability by populists mobilized collective grievances 
and contributed to higher electoral participation. A crucial task in developing the 
argument is to establish (a) that populism produced high level of conflict in political 
life; (b) how widespread conflict was by providing evidence of the spheres of life 
impact by the populist discourse and legislation; (c) that conflict contributed to urgency 
among citizens (through statistical analysis showing awareness of political problems by 
citizens); (d) that these development contributed to higher participation. 
The Czech Republic 
When I conducted the interviews in the Czech Republic, Public Affairs – a party 
strongly exhibiting populist characteristics – had not yet announced its participation in 
the 2010 election. Therefore, given the absence of nation-wide populist parties, the 
interviewees commented on the limited impact of populism in the Czech context. Even 
though the Czech respondents perceived that populism was not present in the country, 
they commented on its desirable effect on democracy. The central insight from the 
Czech interviews is that populism helps identify social and political problems 
politicizing and attracting public attention to them. The announcement by Public Affairs 
to contest the 2010 national parliamentary election provided me with valuable 
opportunity to incorporate it in this dissertation. Based on examination of the party’s 
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electoral program, I established that uncovering and attacking corruption was its central 
appeal, which prompted me to evaluate the impact of Public Affairs on democratic 
responsiveness in the realm of anti-corruption policies. Given the contested and 
ambiguous notion of democratic responsiveness, I disaggregated the concept into 
individual components – mandate responsiveness and policy responsiveness.  
a) Mandate responsiveness helps establish whether parties make clear and 
recognizable electoral promises. Clear campaign promises send important cues to 
constituents telling them what parties will do once in office. Moreover, voters will show 
higher coherence in ideological positions, if parties of their choice display a clear 
platform.   
Hypothesis 3a. Populism will display a higher degree of mandate responsiveness by 
detecting problematic areas in the functioning of democracy, such as corruption. 
To identify populism’s impact on mandate responsiveness, I examine 
ideological positioning among Czech voters; ideological vagueness in voter perceptions 
signals low mandate responsiveness. I compare standard deviations of voters’ left-right 
ideological self-positioning with left-right positioning of parties expressed by all 
respondents, using the results of the Czech National Election Study conducted in June 
2010. Higher standard deviation indicates lower homogeneity of support for each party 
and may suggest a weaker-defined ideological profile of the party. This measure of 
mandate responsiveness shows an ideological component of populism.  
Location of a party on the ideological extreme combined with low standard 
deviation indicates a well-defined ideological profile of the party, while high deviation 
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combined with location of the mean in the middle of ideological spectrum signals weak 
ideological profile. 
In addition to examining ideological positions of the voters, I also look as 
parties’ communication with constituencies via their websites. Both serve as measures 
of mandate responsiveness. Higher intensity and frequency of featuring corruption 
indicates higher rate of mandate responsiveness.  
Hypothesis 3b. Populism will show higher mandate responsiveness on its central 
campaign issues via website presence. 
To measure this aspect of mandate responsiveness, I analyze website 
communication related to corruption among Czech political parties. Specifically, I 
review press releases published by political parties on their websites. Because I evaluate 
party responsiveness related to a specific issue of corruption, I look for frequencies of 
references to corruption in press releases between May 2010 and December 2011. 
Mandate responsiveness is measured as frequency and intensity of featuring corruption 
in press releases published on parties’ websites.  
I examine the websites of five Czech parties with parliamentary seats in the 
lower chamber having analyzed 3,497 press releases, 14.9% of which contained a 
reference to corruption. The articles were divided into three groups that indicate a 
degree of intensity of referencing corruption in press releases. Higher intensity of 
featuring corruption is a proxy for high mandate responsiveness. Articles mentioned 
only once or twice were coded as 1; articles where corruption is mentioned several 
times were coded as 2; articles which main theme is corruption were coded as 3. A 
71 
useful cue for coding the article as 3 was whether it contained the word “corruption” in 
the title.  
b) Policy Responsiveness 
Policy responsiveness reflects legislative behavior of political parties. I evaluate 
the degree of policy responsiveness by analyzing oral questions on corruption-related 
issues by members of parliament. The examination of oral questions asked during 
parliamentary session of the lower Chamber, I seek to establish whether populist Public 
Affairs exhibits higher policy responsiveness since taking office in 2010. I also compare 
the frequency of questions related to corruption among all parliamentary parties during 
the previous parliamentary session (2006-2010) to determine whether populism has an 
effect of responsiveness of other political parties.  
H4a: Populism will exhibit higher, compared to other parties, degree of policy 
responsiveness via speeches and inquiries made by its members of parliament (MPs). 
Finally, I look at legislative initiatives by the coalition government, which is a 
good indicator of government’s policy responsiveness, although it is difficult to clearly 
isolate the individual role of Public Affairs using this measure. 
H4b: Through its legislative initiatives, populist parties in government will demonstrate 
higher policy responsiveness on corruption-related issues than other parties.  
Ukraine 
In the Ukrainian case, the interviews suggest that all Ukrainian political parties 
share populist features. However, based on the definition of populism established in this 
dissertation, I focus on the case of Svoboda – radical right populist party – and evaluate 
its impact on participation. Whereas the Polish case focuses on the demand side 
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dimension of participation, the Ukrainian case examines the supply side of 
participation, or populism’s capacity to mobilize constituents through political protest.  
Hypothesis 6. Political participation will be higher in regions where populist support is 
stronger. 
Political participation is measured by voter turnouts, contacts with politicians and 
participation in lawful demonstrations using the European Social Survey data. I use 
bivariate correlation analysis to examine the relationship between Svoboda’s electoral 
support and these several forms of political participation.  
I further assess the data on protest activities in Ukraine comparing populism’s 
mobilization capacity with that of other political parties. This hypothesis is tested with 
data on the frequency of protests organized by parties alone or in collaboration with 
other social actors.  
Hypothesis 7. Populist parties are likely to mobilize citizens to participate in political 
protests more frequently than other parties. 
Political mobilization and participation largely represents a positive element of 
democratic quality. However, when mobilization leads to political violence, its positive 
impact becomes disputed. The last hypothesis addresses explanations that emphasize 
the use of negative discourse by populism to draw attention to their cause. The literature 
suggests that populism’s critical stance may often be combined with higher levels of 
violence.  
Hypothesis 8. Populism exhibits higher level of violence during political protests 
compared to mainstream parties, having negative consequences for democratic quality. 
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The presence of violence in political protests is measured by the type of protest 
the mobilizing actor was engaged in and whether the protest involved physical abuse, 
attack, break in, a fight, acts of vandalism, etc. 
In sum, even though I examine populism’s impact on participation in Poland, on 
responsiveness in the Czech Republic, and on mobilization in Ukraine, these cases 
contribute to the overarching argument about populism’s impact on democratic quality. 
Disaggregation of democratic quality into individual dimensions in each country helps 
construct a more detailed account and moves the argument on populism beyond 
desirable/undesirable effects. This helps identify conditions under which populism is 
likely to have positive, negative or mixed effect on democracy.  
Data and Sources 
In this study, I am relying on comparative case study approach using within-case 
study analysis and process tracing as well as multiple methods of data collection. The 
semi-structured elite interviews were my departing point serving as an exploratory 
analysis, guiding the case study approach. Each empirical chapter is an individual case 
study where I combine primary and secondary data sources. As I described in the 
previous section, elite interviews served at early stages of the research to point to 
general effects of populism. After the fieldwork was finished, I extensively used the 
data from the European Social Survey, the Polish National Election Study, the Czech 
National Election Study, and Protest and Coercion data collected by the Ukrainian 
Center for Society Research.  
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Process Tracing 
I use the method of process tracing to establish the causal link between populism 
and various components of democratic quality. The method of process tracing has 
received wide recognition among qualitative researchers even though it is often used 
without specific reference to the method or under different names (Tilly 1997, Hall 
2000, Checkel 2005, George and Bennett 2005).67 George and Bennett (2005) offer a 
strong argument for using process tracing method in qualitative research, and within-
case research in particular. The authors’ central concern is developing or testing 
theories focusing on causal mechanisms which are essential for causal explanation. This 
method is helpful to identify intervening causal processes, obtain explanations for 
deviant cases, or gain insight into causal mechanisms. Process tracing is used both for 
theory testing and theory development complementing other research methods and can 
be used methods and approaches (George and Bennett 2005, 208).   
For example, I use process tracing to identify a causal chain linking populism 
and participation in the Polish case. Specifically, the elite interviews helped establish 
that populism had led to higher level of negativism in political life: the populist 
government and the ministries controlled by them were accused of attacks on the 
judiciary, on the opposition parties and on the media. The short tenure of the populist 
government was described as “politics of warfare” featuring “radical politics, 
permanent crisis, and accusations.”68 I further studied newspaper articles and special 
reports to find evidence of confrontational discourse exhibited by populists and 
                                                
67 Collier (2011) lists a number of alternative methods that have much in common with process-tracing, 
e.g. Lazarsfeld’s (1940) “discerning,” Bates et al.’s (1998) “analytic narratives,” or Hall’s (2003) 
“systematic process analysis.” 
68 Field Research, 2009. A detailed description of the field research is below. 
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backlash against the government. Having documented populism’s attacks against the 
media, the judiciary system, radical push of the lustration legislation and extra-
Constitutional measures to fight corruption, I turned to regression analysis to show how 
high level of citizen awareness with political problems (as a proxy for negativism 
exhibited by populism) is positively associated with higher participation levels; higher 
awareness of political problems among citizens increases the likelihood of voting.  
What makes these steps process tracing? First, as Mahoney (2010) explains, 
careful description is a foundation of process tracing.69 In the Polish chapter, I pay 
particular attention to the description of discourse and policies of populist parties – their 
anti-establishment stance against uklad, the emphasis on primacy of political 
expediency over rule of law, marginalization of the role of opposition, subordination of 
the judiciary and the Constitutional Court to the governing coalition, and one of the 
central appeals of the populist government which focused on “moral revolution.”70 The 
detailed description of these events is an essential building block in analyzing the 
processes.  
The second essential element of process tracing is the sequence of variables. I 
seek to establish (a) that populism produced conflict in daily life involving not only 
politicians but also ordinary citizens; (b) the large scope of the conflict in the political 
life. It covered many spheres of daily life including the populist attacks against the legal 
system, attacks against specific professions as a pretext to combat corruption, critical 
stance against uklad, lustration legislation, incriminations, illegal prosecutions by Anti-
                                                
69 Mahoney (2010, 125). 
70 Uklad in translation from Polish means network. Polish populists use this term to describe the network 
of “secret connections between institutions, politics, business and other informal groups, which 
dominated the transition period” (Meseznikov et al. 2008). 
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Corruption Bureau; (c) that conflicts and negativism contributed to urgency among 
citizens. The Polish chapter suggests that negativism exhibited by populist parties 
during their government tenure in 2005-2007. This type of negativism directed against 
democratic institutions – mainstream political parties, the Constitutional Court, and the 
media – differs from negative campaigning in the pre-election period, as it rests at the 
core of what constitutes populism; (d) the elements of this conflict contributed to higher 
popular mobilization and participation in the snap 2007 election.  
For the purpose of this dissertation, process tracing is important because it 
represents an “alternative method for making causal inferences when it is not possible 
to do so through the method of controlled comparison” (George and Bennett 2005, 
214). Three cases used in this dissertation do not represent the perfect combination of 
cases, similar in every aspect but one, which is essential for controlled comparison. 
Therefore, I evaluate the impact of populist parties using within-case study analysis.  
Process tracing is defined as “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence 
selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the 
investigator.”71 This method requires a detailed description of the phenomenon, and 
close attention to the sequence of variables.72 Collier (2011) explains that when using 
process tracing method “we must be able to characterize key steps in the 
process…taking good snapshots at a series of specific moments.”73 For example, 
chapter 5 evaluates the effect of populist parties in Poland on participation by exploring 
causal mechanisms. It documents how populist rhetoric and policies elevated the level 
of conflict in political life producing higher level of anxiety among citizens. Negativism 
                                                
71 Collier (2011, 823). 
72 Mahoney (2010). 
73 Collier (2011). 
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displayed by populist parties led to unintended consequences working as a mobilizing 
factor against populists who showed disrespect for liberal democratic procedures, 
institutions and rule of law. The chapter captures the key snapshots at specific moments 
– confrontational election of 2005, hardline foreign policy exhibited by populists, 
assaults on the institutions of horizontal accountability and the media, illegal 
prosecutions – to show the unfolding of events over time. These developments 
contributed to the atmosphere of suspicion and anxiety among citizens and higher 
turnout against populist policies and negative discourse.  
Secondary Sources 
The process tracing method requires a detailed description of pieces of evidence. 
It focuses on the unfolding of events over time and requires close engagement with case 
knowledge. I conducted a thorough work reviewing secondary sources and the existing 
body of literature bringing together the literature on populism in Latin America, 
Western and Eastern Europe. This dissertation investigates the development of populist 
parties during the second decade following the post-communist transitions of Eastern 
European countries. Populism is a recurring phenomenon (Roberts 1995) and at times 
its effects spill over the borders, as populist leaders and parties successfully emulate 
their neighbors’ success (Rydgren 2005, Mungiu-Pippidi 2007, Krastev 2008).  
Because of the high profile case of the Polish populism since 2001 - and 
especially between 2005-2007, when populist parties formed the government coalition, 
the newspapers and academic journals dedicated a significant amount of attention to 
analyzing Polish populism. I studied specialized reports published by the Polish 
Academy of Sciences on developments of political parties, the media, the judiciary and 
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civil society (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008, Kolarska-Bobinska et al. 2008, 
Mesežnikov et al. 2008).  
The Czech newspapers provided a useful description of events related to re-
emergence of populism in the Czech Republic. Their continued references to anti-
corruption activities by the populist party prompted me to look at the survey data to 
establish whether the populist program corresponding to the newspaper coverage also 
reflected the sentiment among the citizens. Triangulation of these data sources helped 
create a more complete account of how an issue such as corruption could be politicized 
by populism and used succinctly to demonstrate higher degree of responsiveness. I used 
the survey data on citizen ideological perceptions to establish how populism affects 
mandate responsiveness. I analyzed press releases on party websites to identify 
differences in non-legislative mandate responsiveness, between populist and 
mainstream parties. Using transcripts from legislative sessions of the Czech parliament I 
explored policy responsiveness exhibited by populism.  
I reviewed the newspaper articles in Ukrainian and Russian to keep in touch 
with the rise of radical right populist Svoboda in Ukraine. I also used the data on protest 
activities from Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data (UPCD) project to assess populist 
capacity to mobilize citizens through political protest. Using this data allowed me to 
systematically compare mobilization tools used by Ukrainian political parties and 
evaluate how populist mobilization differs from that of other political parties.  
I read most of the secondary source material in English, Ukrainian and Russian. 
Availability of newspapers on the Internet and advances in translation tools helped me 
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when searching for non-English sources and with translation from Czech and Polish, 
when it was necessary.  
Academic journals were a useful source for addressing the ambiguities related to 
the concept of populism. The majority of conceptual literature uses the cases of Latin 
America and Western Europe for testing definitions but the emergence of high profile 
populist cases in post-communist Europe prompted scholars to start developing research 
using the concepts tailored to the post-communist region.  
Semi-Structured Elite Interviews 
Elite interviews are an essential technique for data collection in qualitative 
research (Odendahl and Shaw 2002, Tansey 2006). The benefits of elite interviews are 
difficult to overestimate. When conducting elite interviews, I was able to get access to 
participants who had first-hand knowledge of the processes under investigation. My 
interviews with journalists, political analysts, party strategists, press secretaries and 
party representatives and members of parliament allowed me to identify and refine the 
research questions because the empirical reality often differs from academic research. 
The interviews with members of parliament, for instance, were useful to uncover 
limited yet positive ability of populism to help identify acute problems which are 
ignored by mainstream parties. Later, I was able to link this evidence to the speeches 
from the floor of the parliament and press releases on political party websites, in the 
Czech case. The richest evidence was collected from the Polish interviews because of 
high prominence of populism first in opposition, and then in government.  
Apart from these advantages, the interviews have shortcomings, such as 
reliability of information (Kramer 1990). Sometimes respondents misrepresent their 
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perspectives on particular questions, especially if questions have personal significance 
to them. For example, during my interviews with ex-representative of populist parties in 
Poland it was difficult to avoid perceptions of negativity connected to populism because 
of the value-laden nature of the concept. Respondents aware of populism’s negative 
connotation appeared defensive seeking to justify their parties’ policies possibly 
minimizing their negative impact. 
Despite these shortcomings, elite interviews are an incredibly useful tool, as it 
helped me better understand the cases, revise the research questions, and point to 
appropriate follow-up data. For this dissertation, I conducted 49 elite interviews in the 
Czech Republic (16), Poland (16) and Ukraine (17) between May and November 2009. 
Among respondents were party representatives, members of parliament, professors of 
political science and sociology, practicing sociologists and political commentators.  
The interviews were semi-structured, with open-ended questions aiming to get a 
fully articulated response by participants. I asked broad questions about party strategies, 
programs, perceptions about populism, populist parties and politicians.74 Depending on 
the anticipated length of the interviews, and depth of responses, I adjusted the sequence 
of questions and follow-up questions. The selection of semi-structured open-ended 
question interviews when conducting elite interviews has been recognized in the 
literature (Aberbach and Rockman 2002). Each interview lasted between 30 and 60 
minutes, although there were several aberrations.  
I used the method of snowball sampling to identify respondents. Snowball 
sampling is commonly used in qualitative sociological research (Biernacki and Waldorf 
                                                
74 See Appendix A for interview protocol and Appendix C and D for IRB approval memo and IRB 
inactivation memo. 
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1981). The study sample was identified through personal referrals after each interview. 
Using this technique in post-Communist states has complications unique to the region, 
which are related to lack of trust among citizens (Howard 2003). It is very difficult for 
researchers to meet public officials in unofficial settings for a brief discussion. For 
example, in Ukraine, most public officials holding office actively engage in business 
relations. Therefore, a personal referral from a colleague was extremely useful to set up 
meetings with public officials.  
Another potential methodological problem with using the snowball sampling 
approach has to do with finding initial respondents and starting referral chain. I started 
by identifying several academic researchers and political commentators with high 
public visibility. At the end of each interview, I asked the interviewees to suggest 
potential respondents. Following these interviews, I obtained further referrals. I also 
continued meeting and receiving references from academic experts who were more 
accessible and willing to have a personal meeting. Several times, I received harsh 
rejections to meet both from the experts and politicians. For instance, the director of one 
of the political research centers suggested that I met one of his employees after I 
introduced myself and mentioned the name of the reference who had suggested to 
contact him: “This is insufficient referral to use my personal time to meet you. If I were 
meeting all doctoral students from the University of Oklahoma, I would not have time 
for anything else.” Fortunately, most of the potential respondents that I contacted agreed 
to meet me.  
Elite interviews are often used with other research methods, such as archival 
research, statistical methods, or public opinion surveys. In this dissertation I use elite 
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interviews as a departing point for the argument. From the interviews I sought to learn 
how the elites – party representatives and academic experts – viewed populism, whether 
they perceived is as a positive or negative phenomenon; whether, in respondents’ views, 
populist parties were more attentive to certain issues, such as corruption; how political 
parties responded to citizens’ concerns and whether respondents viewed populism as 
something necessary for party systems to be more responsive and accountable.  
Whereas the secondary literature researched prior to conducting fieldwork was 
essential for formulating initial hypotheses and outlining the general direction for 
research, the elite interviews helped me identify the future direction for developing the 
argument and look for further data. The interviews have advanced my understanding of 
populism in three cases in several important ways. First, conceptually, they show 
important differences in how populism is understood in different regional contexts. In 
the Czech case, populism was associated with negative campaigning and criticism, 
simplified solutions and direct appeals to the people, irresponsible social payments, 
personalistic leadership and incompetent decisions and empty appeals. The interviews 
were conducted in fall 2009, when the snap election scheduled for October was 
canceled and the regular election was re-scheduled for May 2010. Public Affairs (VV), 
the typical case of populism,75 had not yet announced its participation in the election. 
Therefore, most Czech respondents answering the question about populism and its 
potential effects replied without identifying any particular Czech party as populist. As 
one of the respondents explained:  
There are no populist parties in the Czech Republic. Even the Communists who 
are a protest party cannot be portrayed as populist. It is very well defined in 
ideological terms, perhaps even better than ODS or CSSD. Historically, there 
                                                
75 Mareš (2011). 
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was one populist extreme right party – the Republican Party [SPR-RSC]. It was 
without strong ideological alignment, without strong identification in terms of 
social and economic policy. Criticism of other parties was their main tool for 
voter mobilization.76  
 
The Czech respondents were making comparisons to populism in Poland, Slovakia, and 
Bulgaria suggesting that such problems with protest parties do not exist in the Czech 
Republic. In fact, many respondents argued that populism was not necessary for a 
political system to be more responsive to citizen needs and concerns; nor was it 
necessary to address the problems with endemic corruption, because anti-corruption 
appeals were present in programs of mainstream parties.  
The Ukrainian respondents associated populism with simplified solutions and 
electoral promises of redistributive social payments made by political parties. “It’s the 
ability to catch the mood of the people and be responsive to their demands,” according 
to one of the Ukrainian commentators, “public request for a miracle, a fairytale, as 
people want to receive everything at once.”77 Whereas Czech and Polish respondents 
articulated their perceptions about populism in terms of parties’ strategies, a quarter of 
Ukrainian respondents emphasized the demand side of populism. According to these 
views, populism is a “response to social expectations of voters,”78 “a response to the 
mood of the crowd…a drug-type addiction to promises.”79  
Second, in terms of attribution of the causal effects, the interview respondents in 
three cases helped identify several types of impact by populist parties. One group of 
respondents suggested that protest parties help identify problems that are not addressed 
by mainstream parties. Populists represent a “positive threat to the establishment by 
                                                
76 Field Research, Interview #10, the Czech Republic. 
77 Field Research, Interview #4, Ukraine. 
78 Field Research, Interview #9, Ukraine. 
79 Field Research, Interview #17, Ukraine. 
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raising questions about corruption”, according to one of the Czech respondents.80 
Chapter 5 finds support for this argument by analyzing the impact of populism on 
various forms of responsiveness in the Czech Republic. Populist Public Affairs focused 
its electoral campaign on corruption – an issue that has been largely ignored by 
mainstream parties. Even though the evidence about the impact of Public Affairs on 
democratic responsiveness is mixed, Chapter 5 finds general support for the argument 
about populism’s ability to identify problems downplayed or ignored by the 
establishment, consistently with elite interviews. 
Overall, despite different understanding of populism, respondents in all three 
countries addressed the question about populist suspects critically, attaching negative 
connotation to the concept and attributing largely negative impact brought by populist 
parties.  
Quantitative Tools 
I used European Social Survey data along with the data from the Czech and 
Polish National Election Studies to complement the evidence collected through the 
interviews and secondary sources. Specifically, the Polish survey data was helpful to 
identify populist constituencies and establish whether populist parties represented the 
interests of unprivileged groups, whether they mobilized new voters. I used linear 
regressions to link awareness with political conflicts among citizens to voter turnout.  
The Czech surveys provided useful data on the most politicized problems in the 
country and showing how, in citizen perceptions, populism was positioned to deal with 
these problems. The survey data on the left-right self-positioning of party constituencies 
allowed me to test the hypothesis on ideological profile of political parties, or their 
                                                
80 Field Research, Interview #13, the Czech Republic. 
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mandate responsiveness. Following previous research, I looked at standard deviations of 
party constituencies indicating well-defined or weak ideological profiles, which in turn, 
indicated the higher or lower mandate responsiveness of populism.  
The Protest and Coercion Project data collected by the Ukrainian Center for 
Society Research was helpful to gauge the level of protest activity in Ukraine to see 
how populist mobilization differed from that of other parties. Using descriptive statistics 
I analyzed the share of populist protest as well as the share of violent/confrontational 
protests organized by populists. I coded the dataset by central protest themes to examine 
which protests – ideological, socioeconomic, power struggle or civil rights – are 
predominantly used by populism. Populism’s impact on different types of participation 
was measured using cross-tabulations. Cross-tabulations allowed me to see in the table 
format whether populist vote share in Ukrainian regions was positively associated with 
voter turnout, participation in demonstrations, and contacts with politicians. 
Conclusion 
To reiterate, this dissertation examines the relationship between populist parties 
and individual dimensions of democratic quality using the case study approach. It seeks 
to answer the research question What are the effects of party populism on participation, 
responsiveness and mobilization in Poland, the Czech Republic and Ukraine, 
respectively? This chapter outlined the research design for the study justifying the 
selection of cases, describing the variables and the data sources, laying the foundation 
for the empirical case study analysis. 
The next three chapters focus on individual cases on populism in three countries. 
Chapter 4 analyzes populism’s impact on participation in Poland; chapter 5 examines 
86 
the relationship between populism and mandate responsiveness and policy 
responsiveness in the Czech Republic; chapter 6 focuses on populism’s ability to 
mobilize citizens, specifically focusing on protest mobilization.  
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Chapter 4 Populism and Participation in Poland 
 
In late September 2006, when the coalition government of Law and Justice, 
Self-Defense and League of Polish Families collapsed following the dismissal of 
Andrzej Lepper from the post of deputy prime minister and ejection of Self-Defense 
from the government coalition, Bartosz Weglarczyk, a political analyst of Gazeta 
Wyborcza warned that an early election would have a disastrously low turnout: “It’s a 
total mess…Poles are totally fed up with the [political] process. If we have new 
elections in November or December, I would expect no more than 20 percent of the 
voters to actually go vote.”81 A year later, when an early election was indeed held, it 
resulted in the record-high turnout of 54%. While being quite low for European 
established and new democracies, this turnout was an increase of almost 30% from the 
2005 election. The record-high turnout does not seem to make sense from Weglarczyk’s 
perspective, according to which, frustration with political conflicts, negative discourse 
and perpetual political government infighting were to suppress the level of citizen 
participation. How to explain such a rapid spike of civilian electoral activism?  
This chapter explores causal mechanisms linking populism and participation in 
Poland between 2001 and 2007. It discusses two types of mobilization. First, it looks at 
how populist appeals contributed to the level of political inclusion of marginalized and 
previously disengaged citizens during the 2001 and 2005 parliamentary elections. 
Second, it analyzes how populist policies and rhetoric elevated the level of conflict in 
political life, contributing to higher levels of negativism and anxiety among citizens and 
consequently, to higher participation. The central argument of the chapter is that 
                                                
81 Sikorski and Komorovsky (2006). 
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participation of new voters and new groups of politicians increased in 2001 and 2005 
due to populist mobilization efforts, or in support of populism; however, participation in 
the 2007 election increased in opposition, rather than in support of populism. During 
their short government tenure, populist parties experienced a dramatic decline in 
support despite growing economy. They undermined the institutions of horizontal 
accountability by implementing policies viewed by the civic groups as threatening to 
liberal democratic procedures. The lustration legislation, attacks against the media, the 
Constitutional Tribunal and the judiciary mobilized professional groups becoming the 
impetus for protest based on values, rather than economic interests. Higher electoral 
turnout is thus interpreted as a mandate against policies and confrontational discourse of 
populist government.  
The chapter combines within-case analysis with qualitative data based on elite 
interviews with party officials and academic experts. Populist parties contributed to 
higher inclusion among voters when they first came to power in 2001. While I find that 
negativism is associated with higher participation rates, higher turnout was one of the 
unintended consequences of populist discourse. The combination of within-case 
analysis and elite interviews seek to show: 
 (1) the ability of populism to mobilize previously marginalized groups; 
(2) how anti-establishment stance, negative discourse and confrontational style 
exhibited by populist parties contributed to higher level of anxiety among citizens and 
resulted in higher mobilization against populism. While the literature on negative 
campaigning attributes increase or decline of turnout to candidates’ conscious efforts 
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directed against their competitors, this chapter emphasizes the unintended consequences 
that negativism had on participation increase.  
Populism’s negative discourse had unintended consequences for electoral 
turnout and populist party electoral success, as negativism mobilized more voters in the 
2007 election than any previous election in Polish democratic history.  “Abnormality” 
and negativism in daily political life created a lot of discontent between the government 
and the opposition, on the one hand, and between citizens and the government, on the 
other hand. Poles who have been quite apolitical since the founding elections in 1989, 
distrusting democratic institutions, and whose election turnout levels have been 
dramatically lower compared to the rest of CEE, came to the polls to end abnormality 
and negativism. Anxiety triggered by political conflicts resulted in changes in citizen 
behavior, mobilizing anxious and disenchanted voters. I find that populist rhetoric and 
policies have had a mobilizing effect on election turnout as populist parties discredited 
themselves by contentious rhetoric of “moral revolution”, negative discourse and 
confrontational policies.  
Importance of Political Participation 
Several conditions are important to assure broad citizen participation generally. 
Among them are basic education, knowledge about the system of government, tolerance 
of political differences, and the rule of law protecting the rights and freedoms.82 When 
one or several of these conditions are violated, political participation and democratic 
quality is compromised.  
High levels of participation in political life by citizens have been seen by 
political theorists as a important element of effective and legitimate government. For 
                                                
82 Diamond and Morlino (2005).  
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Rousseau, “no government, however, efficient, was morally justified unless is rested on 
the active participation of all it citizens.”83 Rousseau viewed participation as a “solvent 
of social conflicts” as a learning process in a democratic polity.84 Others, however, were 
more cautious about involvement of the ordinary people in politics. Aristotle’s was 
suspicious about prudence of the poor and Samuel Huntington warned about “excess of 
democracy” that may have a negative impact on government’s capacity to deal with 
important issues.85 Almond and Verba’s study emphasizes the importance of balance in 
participation: the “civic culture” is a mixture of activity and passivity, when “there is 
political activity, but not so much as to destroy governmental authority; there is 
involvement and commitment, but they are moderate.”86 Overall, however, the literature 
agrees that high level of electoral participation is a sign of a higher quality democracy, 
while low participation indicates its deficiency. Higher level of participation provides 
higher inclusion in the political process, especially for minorities, have-nots, and 
marginal groups that find it difficult to get access to the positions of power. Lower 
levels of participation indicate citizen frustration with the political process, political 
actors or the environment in which they operate. High numbers of disenchanted voters 
may be especially harmful for democracy, because that may open the door to extreme 
parties and politicians who would find it harder to become electorally relevant under 
higher turnouts.  
Factors influencing the willingness of citizens to vote in elections have been 
widely debated. In one of the earlier studies of election turnout, Tingsten (1937) found 
                                                
83 Rousseau, Edited and translated by Frederick Watkins (1986, XXV). 
84 Salisbury (1975, 323–341). 
85 Huntington (1968, 430-431). 
86 Almond and Verba (1963, 360). 
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that the level of participation in elections increases as social standards improve. Verba, 
Nie, and Kim (1978) show that better off citizens are more likely to engage in such 
political activities as working in election campaigns, contacting government officials, or 
working in communities. Socio-economic factors do not always determine the level of 
citizen political engagement. In post-Communist Europe, after a lengthy period when 
voluntary political participation had been suppressed, the rates of citizen engagement 
were quite high despite relatively low socio-economic standards. As newly 
democratized countries moved from one election to another, skepticism and frustration 
with liberal democratic governance had a strong effect on citizen participation rates. 
Political apathy became a strong impediment for higher democratic quality. 
 Diamond and Morlino (2005) suggest that political apathy among citizens is 
one of the most common subversions of political participation. However, they make an 
important caveat that the same factors that contribute to growing apathy and, as a result, 
to lower participation, may under certain conditions increase participation. For example, 
corruption scandals, abuses of power, unresponsive or incompetent government, may 
either increase or decrease citizen’s apathy and, consequently, the level of participation. 
Similarly, perceptions about government stability, negativity and the level of conflict 
among major political actors may also have either positive or negative effect on 
participation. Overall, political apathy, frustration with the political process and 
democratic institutions may be either a demobilizing or mobilizing factor for the voter 
decision to participate in elections. 
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Political Participation as a Dimension of Democratic Quality 
Political participation is a necessary but not sufficient element of democratic 
societies. It allows citizens to be a part of the political process and influence it through 
voting or by means of communication with officials and fellow citizens. Low 
participation leads to unequal political influence and disproportionally harms less well-
to-do citizens.87 The concept of participation seems to be easy to define. Robert Dahl, 
for example, conceptualized participation as the right to participate – to vote or join 
organizations.88  However, the right to participate differs from the rate of 
participation.89 Dahl’s right to participate is a part of his definition of polyarchy and it 
separates democracies (polyarchies) from autocratic regimes. The rate of participation 
reflects the qualitative dimension of democracy.  
Political participation is often associated with voting in elections but the latter is 
only one aspect of participation. High democratic quality is attained when people’s 
participation is not limited to voting in elections but includes other forms of 
participation – membership in political parties, civil society organizations and social 
movements, participation in spontaneous demonstrations and protests, communication 
with elected officials, involvement in discussions on public policies, contributing 
money to parties and candidates or working in election campaigns (Diamond and 
Morlino 2005).  
Participation is closely related to the concept of political efficacy, or citizen’s 
belief in affecting the political system. Internal political efficacy indicates citizen 
perceptions about their impact on the political process, while external efficacy shows 
                                                
87 Lijphart (1997). 
88 Dahl (1971). 
89 Altman and Pérez-Linan (2002, 88). 
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the responsiveness of political institutions to citizen actions. The interconnectedness of 
democratic quality dimensions also implies that participation is closely related to 
equality (the state has to protect the rights of all individuals to ensure that they can 
exercise their rights), responsiveness (unresponsive government renders participation 
ineffective and reduces people role to that of observers), the rule of law (violence can 
threaten the aspiration of citizens to organize and participate politically), and 
accountability (citizens engage elected officials in the dialogue and demand 
accountability) (Diamond and Morlino 2005).  
In Chapter 3, I outlined the defining characteristics of populism arguing that 
three elements should be included in its definition. Parties (1) showing lack of coherent 
ideology and therefore building its appeal on leader personality; (2) using people-
centric messages appealing to the common sense of ordinary people; and (3) displaying 
anti-establishment stance and appeals by negation – belong to the family of populist 
parties.  
Table 4-1 Populist Characteristics of Polish Parties 
 
Note: The scores are based on author’s personal interviews with academic experts and party officials 
conducted during the fieldwork in Poland in 2009 and on the analysis of secondary sources, primarily, 
Jasiewicz (2008), Kolarska-Bobiñska et al. (2008), Markowski (2008), Mesežnikov et al. (2008). 
  
Table 4.1 summarizes populist characteristics exhibited by Polish populist 
parties. Self Defense (SO) meets all three characteristics of populism established above 
and should be positioned on the populist extreme. League of Polish Families (LPR) 
Populist suspects  
Anti-
establishment 
stance 
Ideological 
incoherence/ 
vagueness 
 
People-
centric 
appeals 
Degree of 
populism 
(0-low, 0.5-
medium, 1-
high) 
League of Polish Families (LPR) high low high 0.67 
Self Defense (SO) high medium high 0.83 
Law and Justice (PiS) medium-high low high 0.58 
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should be positioned closer to the mainstream side of the continuum, as the party meets 
two of populist criteria, based on its electoral appeals. Finally, Law and Justice (PiS) 
meets two criteria of populism suggesting that PiS exemplifies a case of the new-
centrist populism (Pop-Eleches 2010). The existing literature also suggests that PiS 
started as a moderate conservative party and obtained populist features over time after 
joining SO and LPR in a government coalition following the 2005 election (Jasiewicz 
2008).  
Negative Campaigning and Populism’s Appeals by Negation 
The question about the relationship between populist strategies and participation 
is closely related to studies analyzing the effects of negative campaigning. It is 
necessary to elaborate on this linkage. One of the central characteristics of populist 
parties is negativism and appeals by negation as it is closely related to the anti-
establishment appeals used by populist parties and is used by other populism scholars. 
Negativism is one of two necessary conditions identified by Ionescu and Gellner (1969) 
defining populism, as populism “defined itself more by what it is against than by what it 
is for.”90 Taggart uses a “them-vs-us” dichotomy which is closely related to appeals by 
negation. While populists are vague about their own positions on issues, they clearly 
position themselves against “them”, or the object of negativism. Negativism exhibited 
by populist parties includes anti-liberal, anti-western, and anti-immigrant stances, 
among others.  
Negative appeals used by populists are not universal and they are contingent on 
the regional and national context. For instance, populist candidates in Latin America 
appeal to their core constituencies by opposing elites because of their opposition to 
                                                
90 Quoted in Abedi (2004, 7). 
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distributional policies;91 the central appeal of most Western European populist 
movements has been anti-immigration,92 while Eastern European populists have built 
their negative appeals on anti-EU and anti-NATO sentiments.93 Among differences 
exhibited by populist movements in these appeals, there is a main similarity, which is 
populist affinity to criticize “the other” and structure their message based on negation. 
Appeals by negation are closely related to populism’s orientation towards process rather 
than outcome, as their program says nothing about what should be done once they 
succeed in displacing the elites.94 As a result, populist candidates and movements can 
outline any outcome in the ad-hoc style because of what Taggart (2000) calls an “empty 
ideological heart.”   
The analysis of populist appeals by negation fits well into the framework of 
studies that focus on negative campaigning. The literature on negative campaigning 
does not offer conclusive evidence on the effects of negative campaigns on 
participation. The effects of negativism range from demobilization (Ansolabehere, 
Iyengar, and Valentino 1994) to mobilization (Kahn and Kenney 1999; Lau and Pomper 
2001, 69). There are also studies showing no significant relationship of negativism on 
turnout (Brooks 2006; Lau et al. 1999), as well as studies demonstrating different effect 
of negativism depending on its intensity. For example, Lau and Pomper (2008) find that 
negative campaigning in the US Senate elections depresses voter turnout only at 
extremely high levels of negativism; partisan voters tend to be encouraged by 
negativism, while the effect on independents is the opposite.  
                                                
91 Weyland (2001). 
92 Taggart (2005). 
93 Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004); Mudde (2003). 
94 Deegan-Krause (2010). 
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This literature focuses primarily on American voting behavior in a two-party 
system and uses exposure to negative campaigns, ads and information as independent 
variable. This chapter looks at the effect of negativism indirectly. It suggests that 
negativism in the Polish case was exhibited by populist parties during their short 
government tenure in 2005-2007. This type of negativism directed against established 
democratic institutions – mainstream political parties, the Constitutional Court, the 
media – differs from negative campaigning in the pre-election period, as it rests at the 
core of what constitutes populism. This aspect of negativism has not been addressed by 
the literature.   
Given the low levels of party identification and large number of undecided 
voters in each election, negative campaigning should be expected to suppress voter 
turnout. However, Matušková, Eibl, and Braun (2009) argue that the negative campaign 
of the Czech Social Democrats (ČSSD) “created a sense of urgency among voters” and 
resulted in increased voter turnout in the 2006 Czech parliamentary election compared 
to the 2002 election.  
Hypotheses, Method and Data 
In this chapter I assess the relationship between two variables – populism and 
participation, following “causes-of-effects” approach.95 This approach allows me to 
explore the causal mechanisms linking populism and participation. I employ the method 
of process tracing to identify a causal chain linking independent variable (populism) and 
the outcome (participation).96 
                                                
95 Mahoney (2010, 120–147, 141). 
96 George and Bennett (2005, 206-207). 
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While the main leverage sought by statistical methods is aggregate causal effect 
of independent on dependent variables across cases, the method of process tracing 
focuses on identifying causal processes and causal mechanisms linking causes to effects 
within cases. Once we uncover the causal mechanism in play within a particular case, 
we can hypothesize about the work of similar mechanisms in other cases. I identify 
causal mechanisms between populist discourse and the level of citizen participation in 
Poland between 2001 and 2007 in Poland, which represents a paradigmatic case of 
populism. Two populist parties – Self Defense (SO) and League of Polish Families 
(LPR) – became electorally relevant in 2001, joined the government coalition with Law 
and Justice (PiS) in 2006 and were eliminated from the parliament in 2007 having failed 
to pass electoral threshold. PiS was a moderate conservative party that entered the 
parliament in 2001 and gained prominence after 2005 election. Its policies and 
discourse obtained populist character since 2005, especially after its partnership with 
SO and LPR. 
Studies seeking to explain the level of participation across cases focus on a 
number of factors – socio-economic, demographic, institutional, or temporal (Jackman 
1987; Blais 2006, 111). Scholars also emphasized a variety of factors to explain voter 
turnout in post-communist countries (Kostadinova 2003; Kostadinova and Power 2007; 
Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker 2009). Yet, the effect of anti-establishment discourse, 
negativism, ideological coherence or electoral promises on voter turnout is an 
understudied subject. The analysis of populist politics allows us to uncover the 
mechanism linking populist characteristics with higher voter turnout in Poland in mid-
2000s. Analyzing the discourse and policies of populist parties does not discount above-
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mentioned factors. I do not claim that populism is the only and most important factor 
explaining changes in participation but the causal link between the two is often 
overlooked in the literature. Therefore, I focus on the mechanisms linking populism and 
participation rather than trying to identify the most powerful factor explaining higher or 
lower participation. Two main mechanisms linking populist strategies and participation 
that can be presented as hypotheses are adduced in this chapter:  
Inclusion mechanism 
By exhibiting the anti-establishment stance and criticizing the elites for 
corruption, unresponsiveness and lack of accountability, populists appeal to marginal 
groups and those voters who become disenchanted with electoral democracy. These 
appeals by negation positively affect participation because when voters feel 
marginalized and betrayed by existing power relations, they are drawn to parties that 
validate their critique. Populism positively affects participation by expanding the 
presence of marginal groups in national politics. Once populist parties become part of 
the government coalition, they have to recreate themselves – to abandon their critical 
stance and engage in constructive policymaking. However, they are often unable to 
transform themselves into mainstream parties with programmatic appeals because 
populist strategies focus on the process rather than the outcome and they simply do not 
have an agenda beyond criticism (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009). A number of 
studies analyzed populist politics outlining the populist ability for inclusion (Roberts 
2000; Levitsky and Loxton 2012). Roberts (2000), for example, argues that the appeal 
for inclusion from citizens acts as an engine for populist impetus; when organizing the 
masses against the elite rule, populist movements use the promises of political 
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inclusion, social organization and economic benefits for marginalized or disadvantaged 
groups. 
Hypothesis 1. Populism in opposition brings higher level of inclusion into politics, 
expanding participation to those groups that were marginalized and not represented in 
the past.  
I measure the level of inclusion as a share of newly mobilized voters during the 2001 
and 2005 elections. I also measure the level of inclusion by looking at the origins of 
populist party voters to establish whether populist constituencies were largely marginal 
in the political process or had been represented by mainstream parties prior to the 2001 
election.  
Using the data from Polish National Election Study (PGSW) for 2001, 2005, and 
2007.97 I compare the shares of the first-time voters and electoral choice during 
previous election cycles among populist party constituencies using cross-tabulation 
analysis. The secondary sources help examine the demographics of the Polish 
parliament and compare the composition of Sejm by gender, age, education and 
occupation. 
Disenchanted mobilization mechanism 
Some studies suggest that voters may be repulsed by negativism “because of the 
business of politics as usual,” and because of a loss of sense of efficacy among citizens 
(Ansolabehere et al. 1994, 835). These arguments rely on cultural tastes of the mass 
public: as citizens experience negativity, they disengage from politics (Robinson 1976).  
                                                
97 I am thankful to Radoslaw Markowski and Michal Kotnarowski for granting me access to PGSW 2007 
data. 
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Other authors argue that as citizens are exposed to high levels of conflicts by 
parties and politicians, they feel anxious and threatened about the future. High level of 
anxiety leads to higher mobilization. This mechanism is based on findings that 
“negativity stimulates attention to the electoral campaign” and the argument relies on 
psychology of negative information.98 Negative information is more interesting, 
exciting, memorable and attracts higher popular attention because “it is induced by the 
perception of threat,” as people show higher levels of attention when they experience 
negative messages and images (Martin 2004, 548). 
I find useful the framework used by Martin (2004), who explores the impact of 
negativity on turnout. He argues that “campaign negativity may be apt to stimulate the 
kind of attention that could translate to mobilization” and suggests three sub-
mechanisms (paths) linking negative campaigns to higher citizen participation in 
elections.99 Negative ads: a) stimulate problem awareness, b) highlight threats about 
candidates and c) indicate closeness of races. It is therefore plausible that similar 
mechanisms are in play not only during election campaign period but also after 
elections, especially when political parties pursue similar type of negative discourse 
strategies. Populist parties may have a mobilizing effect on participation when they 
maintain high level of negativity by criticizing mainstream politicians and parties and 
are unwilling to compromise; when citizens experience negativity exhibited by populist 
parties, they are willing to return to “normalcy” and show higher participation rates.  
                                                
98 Martin (2004, 547). On psychology of negative information, see Lau (1985). 
99 Ibid., 548-9.  
101 
H2: Negativism exhibited by populist discourse and policies elevates citizen anxiety 
about politics. Citizens showing high level of awareness of political problems are more 
likely to participate in elections.  
I use citizens’ awareness of political problems as a measure of negativism. 
Assuming that voters who are exposed to negative discourse are more likely to show 
higher awareness of political problems, I use a logit regression to see how higher 
awareness is linked to electoral participation. Electoral participation is measured by 
voter turnout. The secondary sources along with elite interviews help create a rich 
account of confrontational discourse exhibited by populist parties. The causal 
mechanism may be presented as a diagram (Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4-1 Negativity and Electoral Participation 
 
Inclusion Mechanism 
The existing literature on Polish populism suggests that two populist parties – 
Self Defense (SO) and League of Polish Families (LPR) and later Law and Justice (PiS) 
– represented the interests of unprivileged groups, “the losers” of the transitional period. 
Among the losers were farmers previously engaged in civic disobedience actions and 
groups of Catholic and nationalist activists dissatisfied with post-Solidarity’s 
“insufficient commitment to Polish national interests and Catholic values” (Jasiewicz 
High level of conflict 
in political life 
produced by populism 
Spheres of life 
impacted by the 
populist discourse and 
legislation 
Higher urgency 
among citizens 
(higher awareness of 
political problems) 
higher participation 
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2008, 15). To understand the impact of populist parties on political mobilization and 
inclusion, it is important to analyze when populist constituencies initially emerged and 
whether they were previously mobilized and engaged in politics. In other words, we 
need to establish whether voting for two populist parties (SO and LPR) in 2001 gave 
voters a novel avenue of interest representation.  
Figure 4-2 Origins of SO (left pie) and LPR (right pie) Voters, PGSW 2001 
  
Note: SO-Self Defense; LPR-League of Polish Families; AWS – Solidarity Electoral Action; SLD – 
Democratic Left Alliance; PSL – Polish People’s Party; ROP – Movement for Reconstruction of Poland; 
UP – Labor Union; UW – Freedom Union. 
Source: Polish National Election Study (PGSW) 2001. The data is based on cross-tabulation of questions 
C21. Which party did respondent vote for in 1997 Sejm election?, and C11. Which party respondent voted 
for in 2001 Sejm election? Data is available on the website of Polish Social Data Archive (ADS) at 
http://www.ads.org.pl/. 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the origins of voters supporting populist parties in 2001 with 
SO voters displayed on the left pie and LPR voters on the right pie. The cross-
tabulations from the 2001 Polish National Election Survey (PGSW) show the share of 
votes cast for electorally relevant parties in 1997 and 2001 consecutive parliamentary 
elections. The PGSW2001 data are based on self-reporting by respondents and can 
therefore be confabulated. But the official shares of votes received by SO and LPR in 
the 2001 election differ insignificantly in comparison to the survey data.  
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The analysis of PGSW2001 suggests that 72.1% of 2001 SO constituencies also 
voted in the 1997 parliamentary election, whereas 19.2% did not vote and were 
mobilized for the first time by Self Defense.100 As for LPR constituencies, 98.4% of 
those who voted for LPR in 2001 also participated in the 1997 election.101 Overall, 
according to both pies, the overwhelming majority of populist constituencies (SO and 
LPR) was represented by the mainstream parties prior to the 2001 parliamentary 
election. In 2001, Self Defense mostly generated its support from the Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD), Polish People’s Party (PSL) and Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), 
while the League of Polish Families constituencies came overwhelmingly from AWS. 
Self Defense generated a fifth of its 2001 support from new voters but under 2% of LPR 
constituencies came from new voters. Overall, SO and LPR voters do not constitute a 
large proportion of the electorate (11.2% and 7% respectively) but their vote shares 
according to the survey correspond to the official share of votes received by these 
parties (10.2% and 7.9% respectively).  
These numbers partially answer the question about the impact of populism on 
political inclusion. There is no evidence that populist parties mobilized groups that were 
previously marginal in the political process, thus expanding the presence and influence 
of these groups in politics. On the contrary, many of the 2001 populist voters were part 
of the Solidarity generation supporting the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) – a broad 
coalition of organizations actively involved in politics during the underground activities 
                                                
100 Among 2001 SO constituencies, 8.7% were not eligible to vote. The numbers are based on cross-
tabulation analysis of PGSW2001. Pearson’s Chi-Square=16.574 (p<.001), df=2, N=955. 
101 The numbers are based on cross-tabulation analysis of PGSW2001. Pearson’s Chi-Square=11.665 
(p<.01), df=2, N=954. 
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of Solidarity in the 1980s as well as during the early transition period of the 1990s. To 
call these groups marginal would not be entirely correct. 
The comparison of the data on newly mobilized voters in the 2005 election 
reveals that both populist and mainstream parties contributed to higher political 
inclusion, although the impact of populist parties on mobilization of new voters is more 
pronounced (Figure 4-3). On the one hand, the 2005 election showed higher 
mobilization of new voters by SO and LPR; about a third of 2005 SO and LPR voters 
(and almost a quarter of PiS voters) were newly mobilized, as they did not participate in 
the 2001 election. Participation of these voters in the 2005 election is a positive 
evidence of the populism’s mobilization effect. There is a possibility that these voters, 
newly mobilized by SO and LPR did not participate in the 2001 election because they 
were not eligible to vote based on their age. However, it is unlikely that age ineligibility 
was a significant factor explaining such a large influx of voters. The exit poll data 
indicates that voters of age 18-24 constituted a small share of party total vote 
(Markowski 2008, 1063)102. So, about 1/3 of newly mobilized voters supported populist 
parties in 2005. Most likely, these newly mobilized voters were motivated by the series 
of corruption scandals inside the SLD-PSL coalition. The SLD-PSL government 
collapse changed the opportunity structure of the Polish political landscape, “creating an 
unexpected political vacuum” and opened up space for more radical and critical parties 
(Wasilewski 2010, 185). Political discourse directed against SLD was used by SO, LPR, 
and more importantly by PiS to motivate disenchanted voters. In this regard, populists 
                                                
102 Voters of this age group could have been ineligible to vote in 2001. However, only 8.3% and 6.9% of 
the 18-24 age cohort voted for SO and LPR respectively. 
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deserve credit for bringing to the polls voters who otherwise would have probably 
stayed at home. 
Figure 4-3 Percentage Share of Newly Mobilized Voters by Each Party in 2005
 
Source: Polish National Election Study (PGSW) 2005. 
Note: The data is based on cross-tabulation of questions Q31. Which party did respondent vote 
in the Sejm 2005 election?, and Q39. Which party did respondent vote for in2001 Sejm election? 
Data is available on the website of Polish Social Data Archive (ADS) at http://www.ads.org.pl/. 
 
On the other hand, the share of newly mobilized voters by each party does not 
indicate that only populist parties mobilized new voters. In 2005, Self Defense and 
League of Polish Families did mobilize around a third of their voters from those who 
did not vote in the previous election but mainstream PO, SLD and PSL mobilized 27%, 
16% and 15% of their support from new voters respectively. Therefore, the impact of 
populism on political mobilization is largely positive, yet limited: they bring new voters 
to the polls but so do mainstream parties.  
Another element of mobilizing effect of populist parties – their ability to open 
up political space for previously marginalized politicians – deserves attention. This 
record is also mixed as it is not clear whether populist parties opened up political space 
for a substantial number of politicians representing unprivileged groups. Comparison of 
29.41 28.95 
26.67 
22.57 
16.30 14.81 
0.00 
5.00 
10.00 
15.00 
20.00 
25.00 
30.00 
35.00 
LPR SO PO PiS SLD PSL 
Didn't vote in 2001 
106 
the Sejm composition does not reveal significant differences between newcoming 
members of parliament between 2001 and 2005 elections. The 2005 newcomers did not 
differ in their level of education, gender, or the number of deputies living in their 
constituencies compared to the old deputies or the newcomers in the 2001 Sejm 
(Wasilewski 2010, 186). The age differences however existed, as the 2005 Sejm 
newcomers were on average three years younger than 2001 Sejm newcomers (47.2 - 
44.1 ratio) and the percentage of deputies under the age of 40 grew from 17% in 2001 to 
31% in 2005. While age differences are a significant indicator of changing 
demographics of the national parliament, we cannot attribute this change to the stronger 
appeal of populist parties and their ability to include a more diverse – younger, in this 
case – population. Rather, the age differences can be explained by generational changes 
in Polish politics – the change from the “Round Table generation” (those politicians 
who were actively involved in democratic transition process) to the “younger right-wing 
and populist” generation (Wasilewski 2010, 191).    
The breakdown of the 2005 Sejm newcomers by political parties does not 
indicate significant differences among composition of various parties in terms of their 
political backgrounds (see Table 4.2). The majority of newcomers was involved in local 
politics and held leading party positions or government office, although the share of SO 
and LPR new members of parliament involved in local politics was slightly lower 
compared to the mainstream parties, indicating that they were new to politics compared 
to the mainstream parties. As far as occupational backgrounds are concerned, 
significant differences exist between newcomers of Self Defense and other parties.  
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Wasilewski (2010, 190) shows that Self Defense 2005 newcomers in Sejm were 
primarily represented by farmers, blue-collar workers, craftsmen and merchants, while 
the LPR, PiS and SO primarily were represented by the intelligentsia. Overall, the data 
on political and occupational backgrounds of the 2005 new members of Sejm is quite 
mixed. What stands out is Self Defense’s representation in 2005 Sejm; compared to 
other parliamentary parties it brought to national politics a large share of provincial 
politicians, farmers and blue-collar workers, thus signaling the ability of populism to 
expand the presence of marginal groups – farmers, in particular.  
Disenchanted Mobilization Hypothesis 
Polish parliamentary elections are not known for high electoral participation 
(Table 4.3). In fact, Markowski (2008, 41) posits that the turnout in Polish elections is 
so low “that it is casting of one’s vote should be treated as deviation and not, as in other 
countries, abstaining from voting.” Despite historically low participation rates in recent 
history of Polish democracy, the turnout during the 2007 election increased by 31% 
from 40.6% to 53.9%, compared to 2005. The increase in turnout is even more puzzling 
given a strong negative influence of the frequency of elections on participation rate 
(Boyd 1989). Jackman and Miller (1995, 482) attribute this negative relationship to 
voter fatigue. Between 2004 and 2007 Poland held an election to the European 
Parliament (2004), two rounds of Presidential election (2005), parliamentary election 
(2005), local election (2006), and a snap parliamentary election (2007).  
Table 4-3 Voter Turnout in Elections to the Lower Chamber (Poland) 
Year 1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 2007 
Voter turnout, % 43.2 52.1 47.9 46.3 40.6 53.9 
Source: National Electoral Commission (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza), available at http://pkw.gov.pl/.  
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Existing explanations of the increase in turnout are not abundant in the Polish 
literature. Czesnik (2009) argues that the 2007 turnout increased on average due to 
higher mobilization of better educated, urban and religiously active voters. While 
demographic characteristics of newly mobilized voters are important, they are not 
determinants of voting behavior. In other words, they do not explain why these new 
voters were mobilized in 2007 while they were disengaged in the 2005 election. I argue 
that negativity exhibited by populist parties contributed to the high level of conflict in 
political life, which served as a mobilizing factor for citizens.  
There are ample reasons for linking political conflicts, negativism, and populist 
discourse, on the one hand, to citizen calculations about participation, on the other hand. 
The data from Polish Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) indicates that for the 
Poles, political conflicts among parties and politicians are one of the most salient 
concerns. Responding to the question “What are you worried most in matters of the 
country” in the January 2006 survey, the Poles are mostly concerned about the acts of 
terrorism followed by political conflicts among politicians or parties (Table 4.4).  
Table 4-4 What are You Worried Most in Matters of the Country? 
Responses  
% of 
respondents 
Hard to say 15.97 
Terrorist attacks 10.71 
Conflicts among politicians and parties, destabilization 7.62 
Collapse of government or presidential power 6.17 
Conflict with Russia, worsening of relations with neighbors 6.17 
Unemployment 5.99 
Collapse of the economy 5.99 
Bad government, bad political situation, incompetence of politicians 4.17 
Source: Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), January 2006.  
Q: P24_D_2. What are you worried most in what’s going on in Poland this year? Data available on the 
website of Polish Social Data Archive (ADS) at http://www.ads.org.pl/.  
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This issue is more salient for the Poles than conflict with Russia or economic problems, 
such as unemployment. Political conflicts are considered as something negative by 
Polish citizens, a perception shared by respondents to face-to-face interviews103.  
Negativism and Populist Discourse 
The vote share gained by Law and Justice in the 2005 parliamentary election 
(27%) suggested that the party’s break from the moderate and “cohabitation” politics 
was appealing to the voters. As Wasilewski (2010) argues, the anti-corruption appeal, 
the promises to fix the legal system, and ongoing calls for decommunization attracted a 
large number of poorly educated, rural and provincial citizens having strong Catholic 
and nationalist values. PiS mobilized “much of the discontent among people who saw 
themselves as losers in post-communist Poland” (Wasilewski 2010, 176). Along with its 
coalition partners, PiS promised a “radical institutional overhaul of the political system” 
aimed primarily at the fight with corruption and hoping to restore public trust with 
democratic institutions (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008, 7). Law and Justice headed by 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski “trafficked in a plebiscitary and warlike political discourse” serving 
as a classical example of populism – portraying Poland divided into the two camps 
(people versus elites, or us-versus-them division commonly used during the communist 
times), creating an ideological “heartland” of Poland (the 4th Republic), appealing to the 
conditions of crisis of moral and Catholic values.104 It is important to note that both the 
PiS election campaign and after-election rhetoric and policies have been highly 
negative, confrontational and marked by perpetual scandals. Some scholars suggest that 
while some of the accusations did have some substance, many claims by PiS were 
                                                
103 Field research, Poland, September 2009. 
104 For a more detailed account of PiS program and slogans see Jasiewicz (2008); Wasilewski (2010). 
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exaggerated and negativity became the everyday reality of political life (Wasilewski 
2010, 178).  
The level of conflict in political life became a particular concern after three 
populist parties formed a government coalition following the 2005 election. According 
to evaluations by various observers, the two-year term between 2005 and 2007 was “the 
most turbulent period of Polish party politics” marked by “fierce conflicts” within the 
governing coalition (Markowski 2008, 1055). The government used security services 
against its political opponents, initiated “spectacular arrests of suspects” and leaked 
information from secret services about scandals to the media (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 
2008, 11). The final scandal that brought down the coalition government resulted from 
controversial actions by the Central Anti-Corruption Office (CBA) that set a 
provocation instead of starting an investigation on officials of the agricultural ministry 
(including Deputy PM Andrzej Lepper) who had been allegedly bribed to re-zone 
agricultural land.  
The policies of the government coalition towards major democratic institutions 
were one of the sources contributing to the backlash against the government. The 
following aspects of confrontational discourse and policies pursued by the populist 
parties are of particular importance:  
1) Central appeal to “moral revolution” and radical break with politics of 
normalization. This appeal by the populist coalition was a “crusade against the Third 
Republic, the post 1989 Poland” initiated by Law and Justice (PiS) after they formed 
the government. PiS described the Polish Third Republic as the “uklad” – a network of 
former secret services, communist collaborators, big business, the media, and 
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opposition. Both Civic Platform (PO) and PiS campaigned on strong anti-corruption 
promises, emphasizing radical break with the past practices, promising to cleanse the 
public life (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008). However, PiS showed a more radical 
break with politics of normalization, while PO embraced it. The moral revolution 
initiated by PiS extended beyond political discourse and encompassed the controversial 
policies of the new government including attacks against the judiciary system 
(Constitutional Tribunal), the media regulatory agency, civil service and experienced 
managers in state-owned companies. 
2) Attacks against the media. Polish media are characterized by liberal bias and 
as a result, they have been highly critical of populist negative discourse during the 
electoral campaign and during their short government life. The media themselves have 
been exposed to political attacks from the governing coalition under the pretense of 
“purging the media of post-communists” (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008, 81). 
Commercial TV stations were attacked by the PiS government for connections with the 
“uklad”. Adam Michnik, the editor of one of the largest dailies Gazeta Wyborcza, was 
also confronted by Law and Justice and the League of Polish Families for being one of 
the fathers of the “uklad”. One of the first legislative initiatives of the new government 
was introduction of the new media legislation – the Act of December 2005. The Act 
shortened the term of office for the members of the Council governing the media 
relations (KRRiT), subordinated the Council’s members to the ruling government 
coalition, and changed the procedure of appointing the chairperson of the Council. 
While the old legislation mandated that the chairperson was to be elected by the 
members of the Council, the new proposal gave the mandate to the President to appoint 
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the chairperson and “determine standards of professional ethics for journalists” 
(Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008, 88).105 Since its establishment in 1992, the Council 
was subordinated to and represented the interests of all parliamentary parties, but the 
new changes limited the role of all parties except for those in governing coalition. These 
legislative changes challenge and compromise horizontal accountability, measured by 
Altman and Pérez-Linan (2002) by the presence of balanced opposition in the 
parliament. The Constitutional Tribunal announced that legislation contradicted the 
Constitution, as the role of the Council is explicitly outlined in Constitution and cannot 
be changed by legislative decision. This ruling became yet another point of criticism by 
the populist coalition. In sum, the independence of the media was compromised by the 
government attempts to control the content of publications and broadcast: “the everyday 
language of politics has become one of confrontation, recrimination and accusations” 
(Michnik 2007). 
3) Attacks on the judiciary system and anti-corruption campaign. Low public 
confidence in the judiciary in early 2000s was related to the high levels of corruption in 
the judiciary. Kucharczyk and Wysocka (2008, 88) report that 64% of the Poles 
assessed the judiciary negatively in 2001 (CBOS January 2001 data). The reforms 
introduced by the PiS government included changes in legislation to simplify 
commercial cases and attempts to undermine independence of the judges. To 
demonstrate government’s commitment to anti-corruption campaign, the Minister of 
                                                
105 It is important to note that the 2005 presidential election was held a few weeks prior to the 
parliamentary election. Lech Kaczynski, the previous leader of Law and Justice, was elected president. 
The government coalition was also controlled by Law and Justice and Lech’s twin brother, Jaroslaw. The 
political appointment of the media Council’s chairperson can be interpreted as a significant compromise 
of horizontal accountability. In particular, the chairperson’s subordination to the president challenges the 
“free alternative media” dimension of democracy. 
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Justice Zbigniew Ziobro publicly launched a number of high profile cases against Polish 
medical elites. In one of these attacks, Ziobro accused a leading cardiac surgeon of 
corruption. The arrest was performed in the hospital and the doctor was taken away 
handcuffed. The scene was videotaped and broadcast on national TV later (Cienski 
2007). The way in which the government handled this case and other corruption cases 
was particularly striking. In a Hollywood-style press-conference Ziobro announced the 
“shocking charges” against the doctor promising that “no one else will lose life because 
of this man” (Cienski 2007). These charges implying the doctor’s guilt before the trial 
received a lot of negative publicity in the media, while the Constitutional Court 
denounced the actions as illegal.  
 The Constitutional Court (Constitutional Tribunal) became a core of 
criticism by populists. The Tribunal has been heavily criticized since its inception by 
various political forces but most vicious attacks against the Tribunal were launched in 
2005 when the Jaroslaw Kaczynski tried to change the process of nomination of 
justices. PiS coalition headed by Kaczynski challenged the Tribunal decisions on 
numerous occasions criticizing justices as “members of the uklad…disgusting, 
opportunistic cowards…engaged in legal circus-tricks” (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 
2008, 87). For instance, the Ministry of Justice introduced legislation aiming at 
restricting the independence of prosecutors, attorneys and judges. Between 2005 and 
2007, PiS frequently questioned the role of the Constitution and the Constitutional 
Court, bending parliamentary procedures and trying to marginalize the role of the 
opposition (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008).  
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4) The lustration legislation. In an attempt to purge Poland of Communist 
secret collaborators, the PiS government passed a law on lustration, which mandated 
700,000 Poles to complete a form declaring whether they had collaborated with the 
secret services. The legislation implied that politicians, teachers, lawyers, journalists, 
and other public and private sector employees had to comply under a threat of being 
forbidden to practice their professions or to hold public office for ten years, in the case 
of false information or refusal (Michnik 2007).106 The Constitutional Tribunal ruled that 
many of the lustration law provisions were unconstitutional: “Governments are not 
above the constitution…If they are then that is the way of a dictatorship…The law 
should not be retroactive….there must be a guarantee of a legal defense…the aim of 
lustration should not be revenge”.107 The blogger journalist reporting on the Tribunal’s 
decision wrote: “The law…has created an atmosphere of suspicion, and for many 
people, fear.”108 
5) Central Anticorruption Bureau: The Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA) 
became the symbol of the Law and Justice governance as its focus on anticorruption 
activities was in the center of the party’s electoral program. Critics posit that CBA has 
enjoyed powers extending beyond its legally prescribed mandate. The CBA was 
criticized from its inception by legal experts and NGOs “for its lack of accountability 
and excessive concentration of ‘hard power’ rather than on the prevention of 
corruption” (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008, 12). A number of high-profile corruption 
scandals revealed in 2005-2007 actually contributed to a more positive assessment of 
                                                
106 Michnik, Adam. “The Polish Witch-Hunt,” June 28, 2007. 
107 “Fiasco! Polish Lustration Law – Not Constitutional,” Politics and Current Affairs of Poland and 
Central Europe, entry posted May 11, 2007, http://beatroot.blogspot.com/2007/05/polish-lustration-law-
not.html (accessed May 7, 2011). 
108 Ibid. 
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the government’s anti-corruption activities. Two professional groups – doctors and 
lawyers – appeared at the center of scandals manufactured by CBA109. CBA was also 
instrumental in removing PiS coalition partner (Self-Defense) and Deputy PM Andrzej 
Lepper from power that consequently contributed to breaking down of the populist 
government coalition after the corruption scandal. The activities by CBA were quite 
controversial and it is difficult to assess their impact on democratic practices. On the 
one hand, public perception about CBA’s anti-corruption success was rather high. Over 
41% of respondents to the National Election Study (PGSW) agreed in 2007 that CBA 
fights corruption, while 27% disagreed.110 On the other hand, the confrontational way 
CBA operated also contributed to the negative perception of the political discourse 
among citizens, which I argue, contributed to higher voter mobilization as a backlash 
against the ruling coalition and consequently higher electoral turnout. 
6) Foreign policy controversies: Even though foreign policy played secondary 
role for the PiS government, a series of pronouncements and actions regarding 
European partners created a backlash against the Kazynski government. What the PiS 
government presented as a defense of the Polish national interest was interpreted as 
arrogance toward other countries, leaders, and projects. The “hard line foreign policy” 
declared by the PiS government was seen as anti-European (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 
2008, 91). 
                                                
109 A high-profile arrest of the head of the cardio-surgery region in the Hospital of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Administration and the subsequent charges in receiving bribes is an often-cited case. The 
arrest created a lot of resonance in the media and the governing coalition was accused of using the CBO 
for political purposes. This and other scandals, however, resulted in a shift of public perception about the 
most corrupted spheres in Poland. 35% of the respondents considered politics to be the most corrupt area 
in 2007, a decrease from 61% in 2006. At the same time, 53% saw healthcare services to be the most 
corrupt public areas during the PiS governance (Roguska 2008, 70). 
110 Polish National Election Study (PGSW) 2007. 
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Overall, the institutions, policies and discourse created or supported by the 
populist government contributed to high politicization of corruption and relations 
between the governing coalition, on the one hand and the media, the Constitutional 
Tribunal, the judiciary, and the Central Anticorruption Bureau, on the other hand. The 
lustration legislation that was supposed to affect the daily lives of hundreds of 
thousands of citizens created an atmosphere of suspicion and fear; the independence of 
the media and other democratic institutions was compromised; the judiciary, as an 
important element of horizontal accountability was challenged too. By politicizing these 
issues, populist parties brought a high level of negativism into the daily political 
discourse challenging institutions of horizontal accountability. The PiS government’s 
policies of “confrontation, recrimination, and accusations” turned out to be dangerous 
for democratic consolidation. As Wasilewski (2010) argues, “developments in Poland 
under the Kaczynski-led government amounted to a dramatic retrogression from liberal 
to illiberal democratic politics” (185). This experience with illiberal democracy “led to 
the electoral tsunami of 2007 when voters turned out en masse to vote against the 
government” (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008, 12). 
While some of my interviews (next section) indicate that high politicization of 
corruption was necessary for dealing with this problem, the level of negativity 
expressed through the media and public policies created a sense of apprehension among 
ordinary people. The government’s war on corruption turned out to be limited to a few 
high-profile purges of doctors. The result of politicization of corruption was a change in 
public opinion about medicine as the most corrupt realm of public life. Public opinion 
about performance and support for government was also indicative of the policies 
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pursued by PiS. The support for the Kaczynski government declined over the two year 
time period even though the Polish economy grew at the rate of 6% annually and 
unemployment decreased (Kucharczyk and Wysocka 2008, 94). Higher rates of 
electoral turnout can thus be interpreted as a mandate against populist policies and 
negative discourse towards more positive and peaceful political relations among 
institutions of the state.  
Other Forms of Participation 
 This chapter primarily deals with electoral participation and captures the effect 
of populism on voter turnout. The problem with using other dimensions of participation, 
such as membership in political parties, civil society organizations, and participation in 
protests is that a number of studies have shown low levels of civil participation in post-
communist countries (Howard 2003). The levels of membership in political parties in 
CEE remain extremely low and do not exceed 3% (Webb and White 2007). At the same 
time, the dramatic events in Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 and 
Kyrgyzstan in 2005 have shown surges in mass mobilization against autocratic elite 
practices. Therefore, it is important to look at alternative ways of citizen participation in 
politics and the effects of populist party discourse on the levels of participation.  
In Democracy in Poland 2005-2007 Report, Lena Kolarska-Bobinska provides 
evidence that during the governance of Law and Justice between 2005 and 2007, Poland 
experienced the intensification of protest activity by the middle class. She argues that 
unlike the earlier periods of the 1990s, when the most salient issues were economic in 
nature, the protest activity in 2005-2007 was related to values and ideology. Different 
groups that mobilized to express their grievances objected to the “confrontational style 
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of practicing politics” used by the governing coalition (Kolarska-Bobiñska, 
Kucharczyk, and Zbieranek 2008, 73). For example, the governing coalition’s division 
of interests into “haves-versus-have-nots” dichotomy was directed against the so-called 
“cheat-elites” – better educated Poles who “benefited from the political transformation, 
disregarding the needs of the rest of the society” (Kolarska-Bobiñska, Kucharczyk, and 
Zbieranek 2008, 74). The government coalition’s rhetoric was built around the values of 
traditionalism, Euro-skepticism and distrust towards society, while the values shared by 
the middle class and intelligentsia focused on democracy, free market values and 
European integration. The intelligentsia and the middle class, according to the Report, 
opposed to the “authoritarian practices” of the governing coalition and mobilized to 
“defend the freedom of speech and the freedom to express their own views” because the 
attacks were directed against their interests and values as a group (74). The Report lists 
a number of pickets, demonstrations, and other types of peaceful protest activities that 
were used by the civil society groups against political attacks of the government. 
Protests included environmental initiatives (against the construction of a road crossing 
in the Rospuda Valley); demonstrations by teachers and student groups expressing fears 
that Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, Roman Giertych, would impose 
nationalist ideology on the school system111; actions against the attempts to centralize 
state decisions regarding European structural funds; against the actions initiated by 
authorities in the public sector.112 Between 2005 and 2007 a number of initiatives were 
                                                
111 According to the Special Report by the Anti-Defamation League Poland: Democracy and the 
Challenge of Extremism, a number of NGOs expressed their concern about the appointment of Roman 
Giertych as Minister of Education. The Israeli embassy in Warsaw called The League of Polish Families 
headed by Giertych as “a vehicle for anti-Semitism.” In late May 2007, approximately 3,000 teachers and 
students went on strike in Warsaw (Foxman, Abraham. Poland: Democracy and the Challenge of 
Extremism. Anti-Defamation League, 2006.) 
112 Ekiert and Kubik (2009). 
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organized for or against particular public officials. For instance, 138,000 people signed 
a petition to remove Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, Roman Giertych 
from his ministerial position. 20,000 people signed a petition defending the author of 
Polish economic reforms, Leszek Balcerowicz. 
In sum, the negative and confrontational rhetoric and radical policies of the 
governing coalition contributed to higher activity of the Polish civil society; various 
professional groups mobilized to defend their interests against encroachment by the 
state. While economic interests were the primary driving forces of protest activities in 
the past (Ekiert and Kubik 2009), protests and demonstrations in 2005-2007 are 
characterized by Kolarska-Bobiñska, Kucharczyk, and Zbieranek (2008) as value-
driven: when various civic groups felt threatened by the populist and radical discourse 
they mobilized to express their collective grievances. 
Elite Interviews 
My interviews with party officials and academic experts support the claim about 
the confrontational nature of Polish politics in 2005-2007. For instance, a PO party 
official from Torun discussed how frustration with scandals was related to the higher 
voter turnout in the 2007 election:  
In 2005-2007 we had a strange [government] coalition. Our [electoral] program 
was easy. It was enough for us to say ‘we won’t do anything they [coalition of 
PiS, SO and LPR] did. Every home talked about politics and everyone was 
concerned and frightened… People are tired of scandals and [confrontational] 
politics. In the last 10 years, people didn’t want to participate. In 2007 higher 
turnout showed that voters feel they’ve had enough. They voted to demonstrate 
their frustration with radical politics, permanent crisis, and accusations.113  
 
In other words, he views scandalous politics as damaging to citizen perceptions about 
the political process and relates the increase of turnout to the growing citizen frustration 
                                                
113 Field research, interview #10 with Civic Platform (PO) party official, Torun, Poland.  
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about negativity. Another Civic Platform party official shows similar reaction to 
abnormality in political life during the populist government: “We showed voters that we 
are a normal political party that can offer people more quiet political life, unlike PiS.”114 
Academic experts share this view about re-established normalcy in political life and 
return to less scandalous politics. The perception about return to normalcy is important 
because in respondents’ minds abnormality was clearly associated with negative 
campaigning by Law and Justice, Self Defense and League of Polish Families. The 
populist coalition has been in power for only six months between May and October 
2007 but this short time has been marked by highly controversial government actions 
and divisive rhetoric. Adam Michnik, the former dissident comparing this coalition as a 
fusion of conservative rhetoric of George W. Bush and authoritarian practices of 
Vladimir Putin, wrote:  
…numerous civil servants have been summarily replaced by unqualified 
but loyal newcomers. The independence of the mass media – especially 
of public radio and television – was curtailed by changes in personnel 
instigated by the government and by pressures to control the content of 
what was published and broadcast. The Kaczynski administration’s 
efforts to centralize power have limited both the activities of the 
independent groups that form civil society and the autonomy of local and 
regional government. The everyday language of politics has become one 
of confrontation, recrimination, and accusations.115   
 
In essence, the 2007 election became a referendum on the PiS government. Law and 
Justice appealed to their constituents to support the party effort to establish the Fourth 
Republic, thus describing the election as plebiscite for Law and Justice. At the same 
time, Civic Platform portrayed the election as plebiscite against Law and Justice. One 
of the PO officials explained that the PO campaign was based on a simple but subtle 
                                                
114 Field research, interview #4 with a PO party official, Warsaw, Poland 
115 Cited in Krastev (2007, 56).   
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“we won’t do anything they did”. The plebiscite for and against the PiS government 
contributed to the high stakes election and higher electoral turnout. The higher support 
won by the PO can be interpreted as general dissatisfaction with confrontational politics 
and conspiracy tactics used by the PiS government. Even the Self-Defense officials 
suggested that higher voter support for PO was related to its non-confrontational 
politics:    
The PO doesn’t like conflicts and people like that about them. People are 
indifferent [about politics] because they know that parties don’t represent 
their interests. They like parties without conflicts. For example, 
Kwasniewski was a disaster president but was supported because he was 
a conflict-free president. If people see there is a mess in government they 
think it’s wrong. Therefore, we have low election turnout.116  
 
Public opinion polls prior to the 2007 election showed that many Poles were 
critical about the PiS electoral campaign that had an “aggressive [and] condemnatory” 
style compared to a more moderate, future-oriented campaign by PO that appealed to 
democratic and liberal values (Markowski 2008, 1056). Using the data from the 2007 
exit poll, Jasiewicz (2009) supports the claim that the election was marked by 
mobilization of voters opposed to PiS policies. The greatest voter mobilization was 
observed in large cities that strongly supported Civic Platform. In Warsaw, the turnout 
was 74% of eligible voters (54% voted for PO), in Poznan – 67% (58% voted for PO), 
in Lodz and Krakow the turnout was 62% (almost half voted for PO)117. Wasilewski 
(2010) posits that Civic Platform won thanks to the higher turnout but reminding that 
many votes were cast against PiS rather than for Civic Platform because voters “did not 
                                                
116 Field research, interview #8 with a former Self-Defense party official, Warsaw, Poland. 
117 Data from the website of the National Electoral Commission, available at 
http://wybory2007.pkw.gov.pl/SJM/EN/WYN/W/.  
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like the methods that PiS used to pursue its goals” (195). These policies resulted in 
higher polarization of Polish society.  
Although the data on new voters does not allow us to make a clear conclusion 
that new voters were mobilized only by mainstream parties, the exit polls show that two 
biggest parties drew to the polls almost 4.5 million of new voters; PiS mobilized almost 
two million new voters, while PO attracted over 2.5 million new voters. The fact that 
both of these parties contributed to the mobilization of new voters means that populist 
politics has had a mobilizing effect by drawing to the polls supporters of both populist 
and mainstream parties. Whether voters support liberal democratic parties or do not, 
higher turnout rates can be assessed as having a positive effect on the participation 
dimension.  
In support of the inclusion mechanism, one of the Self Defense party officials 
argued that SO was “the most open party representing the electorate of losers.”118 He 
mentioned a case of the legislature sponsored by the party representatives that prevented 
the spread of supermarkets in Poland as an example of the party’s successful effort of 
addressing the interests of small shop owners. Responding to the question about the 
effect of populist policies and discourse, the respondent suggested that Self Defense had 
a strong indirect effect: on the platform of Law and Justice (the anti-corruption and anti-
establishment stances were allegedly imitated by PiS) and on the participation level. 
PiS took a lot of ideas from Self Defense. For example, anti-corruption and anti-
establishment stance was borrowed from SO. SO had an indirect positive effect 
on politics by expanding participation and increasing trust in political parties. 
Some members of our party have never participated in politics before 2005 and 
being involved in party politics gave them this opportunity. SO also brought 
new voters to the polls. Since 1989 Poland had 10-15% of the protest electorate. 
They had 2 choices – either to stay at home, because no one represented their 
                                                
118 Field research, interview #16 with Self Defense party official. 
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interests or to vote for SO, because we were the voice of protest. We must 
distinguish between protest and anti-system parties. Protest parties like SO are 
not a danger for democracy.119 
This response supports the inclusion mechanism hypothesis suggesting that 
populist parties expanded the level of involvement of new politicians in power – 
those who have not participated in politics before. Similarly, populist protest 
stance encouraged participation of ordinary people whose alternative was not to 
vote. 
Statistical Tests 
Following the definition of populism that includes three elements (anti-
establishment stance, ideological vagueness, and appeals to the common sense of the 
people), elite interviews and within-case analysis I test the mechanism of disenchanted 
mobilization that links populism and electoral turnout. 
In previous sections, I have demonstrated how negative discourse and 
confrontational policies exhibited by populist parties – both in domestic and foreign 
areas – had elevated the level of conflict in political life, contributing to higher levels of 
negativism and anxiety among citizens. In this section, I operate under the assumption 
that citizens will exhibit higher levels of awareness with political problems related to 
conflict rather than to economic factors when they experience negativism and 
confrontational style of politics. Survey respondents who identified conflict to be the 
most important issue during the 2005 and 2007 campaigns were likely to associate 
conflict with the ruling populist coalition. Therefore, awareness of conflict is used as a 
proxy for exposure to populism.  
                                                
119 Field research, interview #16 with Self Defense party official.  
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I look at the level of citizen awareness of political conflict and its association 
with participation. To capture political conflict awareness, I created a series of 
dichotomous variables using the question What is the most important problem facing 
Poland today? from the Polish National Election Study 2005 (PGSW2005) and Polish 
National Election Study 2007 (PGSW2007).120 The resulting three dichotomous 
variables are: awareness of political conflict, awareness of economic problems and 
awareness of other problems. Because this is a series of dichotomous variables created 
from the survey questions, I exclude the variable awareness of economic problems. The 
results will demonstrate the effect of awareness with political conflict in comparison to 
awareness with economic problems. 
I use a number of variables to control for demographic factors, such as age, 
gender, education and household income and two variables controlling for political 
efficacy. External political efficacy is captured by the degree of respondents’ trust in 
members of the Polish parliament (MPs), whereas internal political efficacy is measured 
by respondents’ beliefs that “people like me have a say in what government does.”121  
Tables 4-5 and 4-6 report the descriptive statistics for variables in two models. 
The tables show that there are slightly more females than males in the samples and the 
average age of the respondents is 45 years old with standard deviations of 18.641 and 
                                                
120 A selection of the following closed-ended questions in PGSW2005 was coded as conflict awareness:  
31-bad government, conflicts, quarrels, bad political culture; 33-Corruption, theft, bribery, political 
scandals; 79-elections, democracy. For the PGSW2007: 31- Restoration of peace in politics, conflicts and 
quarrels; 33-Corruption, theft, bribery, scandals; 39 – lustration; 70 – confrontation between parties; 71-
removal of PiS from power. All responses related to economic factors were coded as economic awareness 
variable. All other responses that did not fit in the first two categories were coded as awareness of other 
problems.  
121 PGSW2007 had no questions about trust in MPs and believe that “people like me have a say in 
government” and therefore I used the questions “Satisfaction with the way democracy works” as a 
measure of external efficacy and “For people like me it doesn’t matter if the government if democratic” 
as a measure of internal efficacy. 
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17.671 for the 2005 and 2007 models respectively. There are more people trusting 
members of parliament in the 2005 survey (the mean is 3.156 on a 1-4 scale) and those 
who are satisfied with the way democracy works (the mean is 2.411 on a 1-4 scale).  
Table 4-5 Descriptive Statistics, PGSW2005 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 18 94 45.863 18.641 
Sex (Male = 1) 0 1 .488 .500 
Education122 1 11 5.347 2.512 
Household income (monthly) 43 12,000 1,630.980 1,110.727 
Participated in 2005 election-dummy 0 1 .503 .500 
Awareness of conflict (PROBCONFLICT) 0 1 .122 .327 
Awareness of economic problems (PROBECON) 0 1 .790 .407 
Awareness of other problems (PROBOTHER) 0 1 .082 .274 
Level of trust in members of parliament (MPs)123 1 4 3.156 .711 
Perception that people have no say in government124 1 4 1.422 .720 
Note: N=681 
Source: Polish National Election Study (PGSW 2005) 
 
Table 4-6 Descriptive Statistics, PGSW2007 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 18 92 45.701 17.671 
Sex (Male =1) 0 1 .477 .500 
Education 1 11 2.370 1.043 
Household income (monthly) 0 20,000 1972.540 1,644.870 
Participated in 2007 election-dummy 0 1 .668 .471 
Awareness of conflict (PROBCONFLICT) 0 1 .148 .355 
Awareness of economic problems (PROBECON) 0 1 .498 .500 
Awareness of other problems (PROBOTHER) 0 1 .218 .413 
Satisfaction with democracy 125 1 4 2.411 .685 
It doesn’t matter if government is democratic126  1 4 2.697 .933 
Note: N=693 
Source: Polish National Election Study (PGSW 2007) 
 
The data includes the first wave of the 2005 survey and the only wave of the 
2007 survey. Both were conducted prior to the election. The voter turnouts according to 
the surveys are 50.3% and 66.8% for the 2005 and 2007 elections respectively. 
According to the Polish Election Commission, the actual turnouts were 40.6% and 
                                                
122 On a 1-11 scale (1 means no education, 11 means university education) 
123 On a 1-4 scale (1 means a lot of trust, 4 means a lot of distrust) 
124 On a 1-4 scale (1 means completely agree with the statement, 4 means completely disagree) 
125 On a 1-4 scale (1 means completely satisfies, 4 means completely dissatisfied) 
126 On a 1-4 scale (1 means completely agree with the statement, 4 means completely disagree) 
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53.8% for the 2005 and 2007 elections respectively. Previous studies have shown that 
surveys usually overestimate the electoral turnout and therefore, the difference between 
the official turnout and the numbers reported in the survey is not surprising.  
I use a weighted least square regression (WLS) weighting the sample for 
demographic and regional differences. A logit regression would be preferable for this 
analysis because I am using a dichotomous dependent variable. However, running the 
logit regression in SPSS did not allow me to weight it by demographic differences. I did 
run the models in a logit regression and the results turned out consistent with the 
weighted least square regression in terms of the direction and significance of the 
coefficients.  
Table 4-7 shows the regression results demonstrating how voter turnout is 
affected by citizen awareness of political conflicts, as the most important problem 
facing the country.127 The primary independent variables of interest are awareness of 
political conflicts, awareness of economic problems, and awareness of other problems. 
The model controls for differences in income, age, education and gender as well as for 
internal and external political efficacy. The results demonstrate that in comparison with 
people who are aware of economic problems, people aware of political conflicts are 
more likely to vote. Awareness of conflict is statistically significant at the 10% level and 
is positively related to electoral participation in comparison to awareness of economic 
problems. Respondents who identify conflict to be the most important problem in the 
country are more likely to vote in the 2005 election. Whereas awareness of other 
                                                
127 A logit regression would be preferable for this analysis because I am using a dichotomous dependent 
variable. However, running the logit regression in SPSS did not allow me to weight it by the demographic 
differences. I did run the models in a logit regression and the results turned out consistent with the 
weighted least square regression (WLS) in terms of the direction and significance of the coefficients.  
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problems also has a positive sign, it is not statistically significant. Overall, awareness of 
conflict variable is significantly different from the other two variables – awareness of 
economic problems and awareness of other problems – in its impact on electoral 
participation. All control variables with the exception of gender are significant and have 
the expected signs: older citizens, with higher income levels and those who are better 
educated were more likely to vote.  
Table 4-7 Awareness of Conflict and Voter Turnout, 2005 
Awareness of conflict (PROBCONFLICT) .108(.059)* 
Awareness of other problems (PROBOTHER) .035(.069) 
Age .005(.001)*** 
Sex (Male=1) .059(.038) 
Education .018(.008)** 
Household income .000(.000)* 
Trust Members of Parliament (MPs) -.072(.027)** 
Belief that people have no say in government  .097(.029)*** 
Constant .164(.137) 
Number of observations 681 
Adjusted R square  .076 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
Source: Polish National Election Study (PGSW 2005) 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Sex, Education, Trust MPs, People Have No Say, Awareness of Conflict, 
Awareness of other problems, Awareness of economic problems. The excluded variable is Awareness of 
economic problems. 
b. Dependent Variable: Participated in 2005 election. Dependent variable is coded 1 if the responded 
voted in election and 0 if not.  
c. Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Sample/demographic weight for 1st wave 
d. Trust MPs is coded using the survey question q92e Do you trust Polish members of parliament (MPs), 
1-4 scale (1-trust a lot, 4-no trust at all). 
e. People have no say is coded using the survey question q72e Do you agree with the statement: people 
like me don't have any say in what government does, 1-4 scale (1-definitely agree, 4-definitely disagree). 
 
The data from the 2007 National Election Study (PGSW2007) show similar 
results (Table 4-8). In comparison to awareness of economic problems, awareness of 
political conflict, has a strong positive and statistically significant effect on voting. The 
coefficient of interest is statistically significant at the 1% level. Because the sample 
sizes of 2005 and 2007 surveys differ, it would be inappropriate to compare the shares 
of explained variance. However, the 2007 model shows a dramatically larger adjusted R 
square (0.245). The effect of conflict awareness is more pronounced in the 2007 model. 
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This can be explained by higher degree of confrontational discourse and policies 
exhibited by populist parties in government between 2005 and 2007. These results are 
also consistent with findings of within-case analysis and elite interviews; the negative 
discourse of populist parties is an important factor to contribute to citizens’ awareness 
of political conflicts, and the latter is a statistically significant predictor of higher voter 
turnout.  
Table 4-8 Awareness of Conflict and Voter Turnout, 2007 
Awareness of conflict (PROBCONFLICT) .189(.044)*** 
Awareness of other problems (PROBOTHER) .045(.042) 
Age .007(.001)*** 
Sex (Male=1) .071(.033)** 
Education .168(.008)*** 
Household income .000(.000) 
Satisfaction with democracy  -.160(.024)*** 
Doesn’t matter if government democratic  .032(.019)* 
Constant .215(.105)** 
Number of observations 693 
Adjusted R square  .245 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis.  
Source: Polish National Election Study (PGSW 2007) 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Age, Sex, Education, Trust MPs, People Have No Say, Awareness of Conflict, 
Awareness of other problems, Awareness of economic problems. The excluded variable is Awareness of 
economic problems. 
b. Dependent Variable: Participated in 2005 election. Dependent variable is coded 1 if the responded 
voted in election and 0 if not.  
c. Weighted Least Squares Regression - Weighted by Sample/demographic weight (Waga) 
d. Satisfaction with democracy is coded using the survey question c21 Are you satisfied with the way 
democracy works in Poland?, 1-4 scale (1-completely satisfied, 4-completely dissatisfied). 
e. Doesn’t matter if government democratic is coded using the survey question x68e For people like me it 
doesn't matter if government is democratic, 1-4 scale (1-strongly agree, 4-stronly disagree). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the relationship between populism and political 
participation seeking to identify causal mechanisms linking populist discourse and 
participation in Poland. The evidence suggests partial confirmation to Hypothesis 1. On 
the one hand, there is little evidence that populist parties – SO and LPR – mobilized 
groups that were previously marginal in the political process, as only 19% of SO 
supporters were new voters in 2001. Many voters who supported populist SO and LPR 
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in 2001 had been a part of the Solidarity generation and voted for the Solidarity 
Electoral Action in the previous election cycle. It is therefore difficult to call these 
groups marginal. On the other hand, a series of corruption scandals within SLD created 
a power vacuum prior to the 2005 election which was used by populist parties. About a 
third of populist support – SO, LPR and Self Defense – was generated from new voters 
and populists deserve credit for bringing to the polls disenchanted voters who did not 
participate in the previous election. Other political parties also mobilized new voters but 
at a lower rate. In sum, the impact of populist mobilization is positive, yet limited.  
Hypothesis 2 suggests that higher participation in 2007 was related to the level 
of negativism displayed by populist governing coalition between 2005 and 2007. 
Negativism exhibited by populist parties led to unintended consequences: it worked as 
mobilizing factor to bring to the polls citizens who perceived that the populist 
government showed disrespect for liberal democratic procedures, institutions, and for 
the rule of law. Higher voter turnout had a detrimental effect on populist electoral 
fortunes, as populist Self Defense and League of Polish Families failed to pass the 
electoral threshold. It is more difficult to interpret the higher share of votes received by 
populist Law and Justice compared to 2005 but the election also became a plebiscite on 
the Law and Justice government.  
Among interesting findings of the analysis are the results of the statistical tests. 
Using the National Election Study data, I show that in comparison to awareness of 
economic problems, awareness of political conflict has a strong positive and statistically 
significant effect on voter turnout. Moreover, the results are consistent for the 2005 and 
2007 survey data and the coefficients are stronger in 2007. Those respondents who are 
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aware of political conflicts were 10.8% more likely to vote than respondents aware of 
economic problems in 2005. In the 2007 model, respondents aware of political conflicts 
were 18.9% more likely to vote that respondents aware of economic problems. 
Combining the findings from the statistical tests, within-case analysis and elite 
interviews, I conclude that negative discourse exhibited by populism was an important 
factor for increasing citizen awareness of political conflicts and the latter was a 
statistically significant predictor of higher electoral turnout.  
While populist discourse and tactics affected participation, its effects are indirect 
as voters mobilized by negative discourse are not radical; rather, they rejected 
confrontational style politics and chose to participate in order to keep populists from 
returning to office by voting overwhelmingly for mainstream parties. These findings are 
consistent with Markowski's (2008) conclusion that voters mobilize to protect 
democracy when they realize democratic institutions are threatened. The conclusion that 
negativism displayed by populist parties brings anxiety and elevates the election stakes 
are also consistent with Kostadinova (2003) and Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker (2009) 
who suggest that citizens are more likely to vote in high stakes elections. I show that 
citizen perceptions about high-stakes elections are a consequence of populist policies 
and discourse.  
The policy record of the populist coalition indicates that populism in 
government has a negative impact on democratic quality when populists challenge 
democratic norms and procedures and compromise the independence of the media, the 
judiciary and other institutions of horizontal accountability. The Polish case suggests 
that populists are likely to be held accountable for negative discourse and illiberal 
132 
practices, as the elimination of radical left and radical right populist partners (SO and 
LPR) from the electoral field shows. 
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Chapter 5 Populism and Responsiveness in the Czech Republic 
 
Populism’s claim to be more inclusionary and more responsive to citizen 
interests is based on appeals to individuals and groups that feel excluded from the 
political process or choose not to participate in it out of frustration and distrust of the 
elites. In chapter 4, I documented how populist parties in Poland succeeded in 
mobilizing new and disenchanted voters against the elites. The record of populism’s 
effect on participation in Poland is mixed because it wasn’t marginalized groups that 
were mobilized by the populists; rather, the populists brought to the polls disenchanted 
voters who did not participate in the previous election and mostly likely would have 
ignored the election, if not for the populist parties.128 Overall, populist parties 
contributed to higher rates of participation either directly – by mobilizing disenchanted 
citizens who voted for populist challengers, or indirectly – by creating a backlash 
against populist discourse and tactics which mobilized citizens against populist parties. 
The goal of this chapter is to evaluate populism’s effect on responsiveness.129 
When populists come to power, they partially replace the existing elites bringing the 
expectations to carry out policy reforms, to create new channels of access to power, and 
to appoint representatives who would bring changes to the political process. Do 
populists exhibit a higher rate of responsiveness than mainstream parties who use 
similar programmatic discourse from one election to another? 
                                                
128 Marginalized are considered voters who feel excluded from the political process. Populist leaders win 
support among marginal groups of voters by promising to address their needs and concerns by 
combatting the corrupt elites, privileged groups, and special interests. Weyland (2001, 14), for example, 
suggests that support from marginalized groups is an essential characteristic of winning support by 
populist politicians.  
129 The measures of two components of responsiveness used in this chapter – mandate responsiveness and 
policy responsiveness – are discussed below. 
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One of the academic experts I interviewed in the Czech Republic commented on 
the ability of populist parties to draw attention to societal problems: 
Populist appeals can have a positive effect. In some cases, populists can identify 
what the problem is and show the importance of the problem when no other 
parties bring up the problem. Meanwhile, mainstream parties need to accept the 
existence of the problem and need to start working on solutions.130 
This largely optimistic view about populism’s impact on responsiveness has been 
shared by other respondents – both academic experts and party representatives. The 
alternative perspective, describing the role of populism as marginal, identifies the limits 
of populist parties’ abilities to offer constructive solutions to problems and be truly 
responsive to citizen needs and concerns: “They open marginal questions and offer 
scare tactics.”131  
These opposing views are an impetus for this chapter focused on the relationship 
between populism and responsiveness. Does populism contribute to higher 
responsiveness in the political system? Do populist parties exhibit higher degree of 
responsiveness on such issue as corruption? 
I assess my argument through an examination of the case of Veci Verejne, a 
newcomer to Czech national-level politics. Veci Verejne (VV or Public Affairs) has 
been described as a typical case of party populism (Mares, 2011). The party is built on 
personalistic leadership of Vit Barta, the party’s informal leader and main financier, and 
Radek John, the official “face” of the party. An outsider, Public Affairs has used anti-
establishment and people-centric appeals. Its campaign was built on strong anti-
corruption rhetoric, support of direct democracy, fiscal responsibility and personalistic 
leadership. The core message of the populist campaign was to “leave the dinosaurs out 
                                                
130 Field research, interview #6 with an academic expert, the Czech Republic 
131 Field research, interview #15 with an academic expert, the Czech Republic 
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of politics” implying that the current political elites are corrupt, inert, and unresponsive 
to the needs and interests of the people.  
Having received 13% of the vote in the 2010 election, Public Affairs received 25 
seats in the 200-seat lower chamber. On the Czech political landscape dominated by 
five stable parties since early 1990s, the vote for two smaller parties – Public Affairs 
and TOP09 – was seen as a protest vote by disenchanted voters. The anti-establishment 
image exhibited by Public Affairs was somewhat undermined once the party joined 
coalition government with Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and TOP09. However, VV’s 
participation in government allows us to evaluate the relationship between populism in 
government and responsiveness. More specifically, I focus on whether and how Public 
Affairs’ commitment to citizen demands to combat corruption, as one of the most 
important problems at the time of the election, had an effect on mandate responsiveness 
and policy responsiveness.  
Organization of the Chapter 
This chapter proceeds as follows. I begin with brief overview of my interviews 
conducted with academic experts and party representatives in the Czech Republic in 
2009. Public Affairs started a nation-wide campaign only in 2010 and therefore, my 
respondents did not comment on the populist features and impact of Public Affairs on 
democratic quality. However, the interviews outline variations in elite outlooks on 
various effects of populism suggesting mixed and sometimes conflicting outcomes. 
Given the central claim by Public Affairs to combat corruption, I examine how 
VV’s rhetoric, strategies and legislative behavior affect responsiveness in the area of 
anti-corruption campaign. I look at two components of responsiveness. First, I examine 
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mandate responsiveness expanding on the measure used by Roberts (2010). Mandate 
responsiveness captures a party’s capacity to “make… clear campaign promises and 
fulfill… these promises once in office” Roberts (2010, 37). Clear campaign promises 
made by parties send a useful cue to the voters. If voters are well informed about their 
party’s promises and its electoral platform, they are likely to display higher degree of 
coherence in ideological positions. To identify the degree of mandate responsiveness 
among parties, I examine (a) ideological positioning of Public Affairs’ voters and 
compare those with positions of voters of mainstream parties. Ideological vagueness (or 
clarity) of voter perceptions is a rough measure of mandate responsiveness and has been 
criticized as a “flawed instrument [of party ideology] at best” (Deegan-Krause 2010, 3). 
Party elite perceptions would serve as a better measure of party ideology and mandate 
responsiveness but in the absence of these data, I will use party supporter beliefs as a 
proxy for mandate responsiveness.  
In addition to using electoral platforms, political parties use other tools of 
communication to inform their constituencies of their mandates. I therefore analyze (b) 
web press releases related to corruption published on parties’ websites between May 
2010 and January 2012 to evaluate differences in communication maintained by 
different parties. Websites are becoming an increasingly important channel for 
individual representatives and parties to maintain communication with their 
constituents. Realizing enormous possibilities of web communication, politicians use 
websites to complement traditional ways of communication. Website communication is 
an important tool of mandate responsiveness because parties can use it both before and 
after the election providing important information on party platforms, goals, policy 
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proposals, and services. Surveys show that more and more Czechs use the Internet as an 
information outlet and individual politicians and parties providing the information and 
various services through their websites create an image of dynamic, engaged, and 
responsive representatives. For example, the 2010 Czech National Election Study 
indicates that more than 50% of respondents use the Internet at least once a week, while 
almost 30% of respondents use the Internet three or more times a week.132 
Current research also indicates the increasing role of electronic communication 
between representatives and constituents.  Golbeck, Grimes, and Rogers (2010) show 
how US members of Congress increasingly use twitter as a direct communication tool 
with constituents to disseminate information about their daily activities, while Jarvis 
and Wilkerson (2005) examine communication via congressional websites. Others 
studies examine the use of websites as a communication tool between representatives 
and constituents in European parliaments (Vicente-Merino 2007; Leston-Bandeira 
2011). These studies suggest that electronic communication – via the websites, email, 
twitter or online social networks – are becoming one of the most important tools for 
communication between representatives and citizens. The research on electronic 
communication with elected representatives in Eastern Europe is scarce.  
Using websites as a tool of mandate responsiveness yields a number of benefits 
for political parties. These services are easily available at all times for a wide range of 
citizens who have Internet access; they are not limited geographically; finally, at a 
relatively low cost parties can reach a large number of constituencies. Overall, websites 
are positioned as a useful tool of mandate responsiveness. 
                                                
132 Czech National Election Study, 2010 available at http://archiv.soc.cas.cz/.  
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Second, I assess policy responsiveness focusing on a specific issue of 
corruption, given the high salience of corruption in the recent Czech electoral campaign. 
I look at cabinet appointments of the new coalition government. Having received four 
ministerial portfolios, including Ministry of the Interior – one of the main tools of 
combatting corruption – Public Affairs was well positioned to influence the anti-
corruption agenda. To measure policy responsiveness, I analyze oral questions referred 
to the cabinet to examine the extent to which populist party politicians use the 
parliament floor to inquire about corruption. Public Affairs used corruption as a key tool 
to mobilize its constituencies and it is reasonable to expect VV’s members of 
parliament to use the oral question section of the parliamentary debate more 
prominently that the MPs of other parties to inquire about government’s anti-corruption 
policies. I conclude by looking at government’s policy achievements in addressing the 
problem of corruption. 
Components of Responsiveness 
Democratic responsiveness is a complex and multidimensional concept which 
cannot be limited to policy responsiveness defined as congruence between interests of 
the public and actions of representatives (Eulau and Karps 1977). Political parties 
respond to voters’ needs and concerns in more than one way. I use two components of 
responsiveness - mandate responsiveness and policy responsiveness – and evaluate 
populism’s effect on each type of responsiveness. Mandate responsiveness is important 
because it allows for ex-ante control of elected representatives by the citizens (Roberts 
2010). Knowing the mandates of competing parties gives voters a cue about their choice 
prior to elections: a party with clear promises and easily recognized electoral platform is 
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expected to be more mandate responsive than a party with an opaque platform. 
Additionally, a party that addresses various issues more prominently in its web 
communication also exhibits higher degree of mandate responsiveness. Do populist 
parties show higher rates of mandate responsiveness in their web communication? 
Finally, policy responsiveness is most commonly used indicator of 
responsiveness in the literature on representation. Policy responsiveness is defined by 
Eulau and Karps (1977, 238) as “the presence of a meaningful connection between 
constituent policy preferences or demands and the representative’s official behavior.” 
As long as representatives and their constituencies agree on particular policies, the 
representatives are seen responsible to their constituencies (Eulau and Karps 1977, 
242).  
The issue of policy responsiveness defined in this way is complicated because it 
depends on citizen competence about public policies. Zaller (1992), for example, is 
skeptical about citizens’ interest and knowledge of political systems. He argues that 
public opinion is a result of elite discourse. If that is the case, it may be challenging to 
distinguish true citizens’ demands, or “what people want”, from policy options supplied 
by the elites. Another difficulty with measuring policy responsiveness is related to 
whether we adhere to the “trustee” or the “delegate” model of representation and the 
role of leadership in the democratic process (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000, 298).  The 
“trustee” model suggests low responsiveness and decisive leadership, while the 
“delegate” model implies minimal leadership and strong responsiveness. Jacobson and 
Shapiro (2000, 303) agree with Pitkin (1967) that representative democracy requires 
both responsiveness and independent initiative. They insist that the choice of either 
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responsiveness or direction “is a false one” and offer an alternative model of 
“responsible leadership.”133 Additionally, variations in the types of electoral systems 
may also be an important determinant of responsiveness among political parties. For 
example, single-member districts provide incentives for representatives to demonstrate 
more active legislative behavior than proportional representation systems.  
In its 2010 electoral campaign Public Affairs focused on corruption, inducing a 
high degree of public awareness with corruption problems. I assess the degree of 
responsiveness on corruption exhibited by Public Affairs, compared to other parties, 
given the high prominence of anti-corruption appeals in the populist party’s campaign. I 
test the following hypotheses about the relationship between populism and two types of 
responsiveness: 
Hypothesis 3a. Populism will display a higher degree of mandate responsiveness by 
detecting problematic areas in the functioning of democracy, such as corruption. 
I measure mandate responsiveness through ideological positioning among Czech voters 
on the left-right scale and compare standard deviations of voters’ self-positioning with 
left-right self-positioning of parties expressed by all respondents. High standard 
deviations are likely to show weaker ideological party profiles, whereas low standard 
deviations will indicate stronger ideological profile.  
Hypothesis 3b. Populism will show higher mandate responsiveness on its central 
campaign issues via website presence. 
This aspect of mandate responsiveness is measured as frequency and intensity of press 
releases related to corruption, published by political parties on their websites. Higher 
intensity and high frequency of press releases related to corruption indicates higher 
                                                
133 See Jacobs and Shapiro (2000, 298) for extensive literature review on these models of representation. 
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mandate responsiveness and therefore a gain for democratic quality, whereas lower 
intensity and frequency shows lower mandate responsiveness.  
H4: Populism will exhibit higher degree of policy responsiveness via speeches and 
inquiries made by its members of parliament signaling higher democratic quality. 
I measure policy responsiveness by examining the speeches and inquiries related to 
corruption made by the members of parliament (MPs) between May 2010 and 
December 2011. I also compare the frequency of corruption-related inquiries during the 
previous parliamentary session (2006-2010) to assess the impact of populist rhetoric on 
anti-corruption campaign of other parties. 
Populism and Responsiveness in Elite interviews 
One of the questions I asked during my interviews with representative of Czech 
parties and academic experts was whether, in their opinion, populism helped increase 
responsiveness among political parties. The answers can be broadly divided into two 
categories. The first group of respondents commented on the relative weakness of 
populist appeals in the Czech Republic, bringing up the stability of the Czech party 
system, the presence of the Communist Party as a outlet for protest attitudes serving as a 
replacement of full-fledged populist parties, or the absence of large minority or 
common enemy as a mobilization tool for populists. This group also suggested that 
populism had marginal effect on responsiveness in the political system. One of the 
academic experts explained:  
I think that the absence of populist parties is replaced to some extent by the 
protest role of the Communist party and the use of populism by mainstream 
parties. The attacks of mainstream party politicians are more frequent. The 
general assessment of political rivals is more critical than it used to be. And 
maybe these elements are strong enough that they are able to channel the 
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populist tendencies of the Czech electorate and there is no need for a real, full-
fledged populist party.134 
The low prominence of populism was therefore explained by lack of political space 
available for populist challengers; the presence of populist features among mainstream 
parties was seen as a replacement mechanism for a nationally strong populist party. Some 
respondents also suggested that populism was not necessary in the political system 
because of its potential threat to democracy: 
I don’t think populist parties are necessary. When they are not strong, they can’t 
change the system and they are not a threat to democracy. When they are a part 
of the system they become problematic. There are only small populist parties 
which are not relevant nationally, for example, Public Affairs. They criticize all 
other parties and do not represent a threat to our democracy.135 
In a similar statement, an ODS representative commented on the low 
prominence and the potential threat of populism: 
Maybe the absence of populists makes politics less confrontational. Populists 
bring conflict and tensions – this is dangerous for the party system, and society. 
It’s for our good that populist parties are not very strong in the Czech Republic. 
But we understand that every bad policy or decision – including those made by 
our party – is an advantage for extremism. 136 
Several other respondents offered an alternative reason for why populism is not 
essential for better responsiveness on corruption, for instance, explaining that 
there is nothing new about anti-corruption appeals because they are already 
articulated by mainstream parties:  
Anti-corruption discourse exists in the programs of mainstream parties. 
Mainstream parties can discuss openly in society questions and problems about 
corruption. You don’t need populist parties for that. There is no space for anti-
corruption discourse in populist party programs.137 
                                                
134 Field research, interview #10, the Czech Republic 
135 Field research, interview #12, the Czech Republic 
136 Field research, interview #12, the Czech Republic 
137 Field research, interview #8, the Czech Republic 
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Another broad group of respondents claimed that populism had a positive, 
although limited impact. A professor of political science at the University of Economics 
in Prague explained that the ability of populist parties to draw attention to societal 
problems was one of the positive aspects of populism: 
Populist appeals can have a positive effect. In some cases, populists can identify 
what the problem is and show the importance of the problem when no other 
parties bring up the problem. Meanwhile, mainstream parties need to accept the 
existence of the problem and need to start working on solutions.138 
This observation is insightful, as the respondent suggested a degree of usefulness for 
populism – its ability to bring attention to important social problems that are ignored by 
mainstream parties. Two other respondents echoed the view about the limited impact of 
populism: 
Populism is a positive threat for political establishment. They can mobilize but 
are unable to offer solutions to real problems and have weak organization to 
implement their solutions. Raising questions about corruption can be positive for 
the system but extreme parties are problematic for democratic system.139 
The comments about the weakness of populist appeals in the Czech Republic 
merit some explanation, especially in the light of the argument assessing the impact of 
populism on responsiveness. I conducted the interviews in the fall of 2009, before 
Public Affairs entered the electoral campaign. My respondents were almost unanimous 
in their claim that the Czech Republic lacked populist parties bringing up the stability of 
the Czech party system, the presence of the Communist Party as a outlet for protest 
attitudes serving as a replacement of full-fledged populist parties, or the absence of 
large minority or common enemy as a mobilization tool for populists. The rise to 
prominence of Public Affairs marked the reemergence of populism in the Czech 
                                                
138 Field research, interview #6, the Czech Republic 
139 Field research, interview #13, the Czech Republic 
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Republic albeit in a more benign form. Public Affairs is a typical example of populism 
exhibiting a personalistic leadership style, an anti-establishment stance criticizing the 
elites for their corrupt practices, emphasizing the importance of measures of direct 
democracy such as referenda (Mares, 2011). Had I conducted the interviews when 
Public Affairs emerged as a national political force, it is likely that my respondents 
would have identified VV’s populist features. Overall, the interviews offer mixed and 
conflicting perspectives on the potential effects of populism in the Czech Republic but 
they are a useful starting point to explore the impact of Public Affairs on 
responsiveness. 
Importance of Corruption in the 2010 campaign 
In evaluation of responsiveness, I focus on corruption given high salience of the 
issue in the Czech Republic.140 Prior to evaluating the relationship between populism 
and different components of responsiveness in the area corruption, it is important to 
establish the importance of corruption in the course of the 2010 Czech campaign and 
more specifically, in the campaign of Public Affairs.  
Corruption in the Czech Republic has been a problem emphasized by 
international agencies for quite a while. Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index of the Czech Republic has been deteriorating slowly but steadily since 
2008 (Table 5-1).  
What Grzymala-Busse (2007) describes as “state capture” is elite’s exploitation 
of public resources which has its roots in power alternation between Czech largest 
political rivals – Social Democrats (CSSD) and Civic Democrats (ODS). 
                                                
140 The 2010 election was not only about corruption, as other issues, such as budget deficit, 
unemployment and economic reforms were emphasized. Future research can include other salient issue 
areas in assessment of populism’s effects.  
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Table 5-1 Corruption Perception Index, (CPI) Among 12 New EU Members 
Country  2008 2009 2010 2011 CPI rank in 2011 
Estonia 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.4 29th 
Cyprus 6.4 6.6 6.3 6.3 30th  
Slovenia 6.7 6.6 6.4 5.9 35th  
Malta 5.8 5.2 5.6 5.6 39th  
Poland 4.6 5 5.3 5.5 41st  
Lithuania 4.6 4.9 5 4.8 50th  
Hungary 5.1 5.1 4.7 4.6 54th  
Czech Republic 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.4 57th  
Latvia 5 4.5 4.3 4.2 61st 
Slovakia 5 4.5 4.3 4 66th  
Romania 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 75th  
Bulgaria 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.3 86th  
Source: Transparency International website available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011), accessed 
on January 27, 2012. Corruption Perception Index is a composite index combined from public opinion 
surveys about perceptions of corruption, ranking countries on a scale 0-10 (where 0 indicates a highly 
corrupt country).  
 
Both parties have been ascribed the blame for voter disaffection and frustration with the 
political process. Following the 2006 election, the lower chamber was split in half 
between center-right and center-left parties and only 7 months later, the center-right 
ODS created coalition government. In 1999, ODS and CSSD joined efforts to introduce 
constitutional changes to limit the role of smaller parties in the political system which 
was largely seen by citizens as an act of collusion among corrupt establishment 
(Deegan-Krause 2006).  
A decade later, the record of corrupt practices has not improved. In 2011, for 
example, a study by doctoral students at Charles University found evidence of opaque 
practices in public tenders, as none of the tenders between 2006 and 2010 met 
international standards. The researchers came up with “zIndex” of public procurement 
that shows no official government record of 67% of the $19 billion spent in that time 
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period for public procurement, while 11% of the tenders had only one bidder.141 
Negative public perception about corruption (80% of respondents in the public opinion 
poll in March 2011 considered corruption as the most important problem requiring 
urgent attention) and negative international agency reports (the Czech Republic was 
ranked 22nd among 27 European Union members on Corruption Perception Index by 
Transparency International) were used by anti-establishment challengers during 
parliamentary elections. The election of two newly established parties – Public Affairs 
and TOP09 – in 2010 was seen as a signal of voter frustration with “political 
dinosaurs”.142  
Corruption was arguably the most important issue during the 2010 Czech 
parliamentary election (Stegmaier and Vlachová 2011). The 2010 Czech National 
Election Study shows that 14.3% of the voters identified corruption as the most 
important issue, second only to budget concerns (Figure 5-1).  
Public Affairs voters were more likely to list corruption as the most important 
political issue than voters of other parties that cleared the electoral threshold.143 
Moreover, Public Affairs was better positioned to tackle corruption than other parties. 
Table 5-2 shows cross-tabulation of voters who identify corruption as the most 
important political problem and parties best at dealing with the problem. Those who 
identified corruption as the most important political problem were on average 20% 
                                                
141 “Students Index Corruption” The Prague Post, February 2, 2011. Available at 
http://www.praguepost.com/news/7339-students-index-corruption.html, accessed on September 4, 2011.  
142 “State Capture.” The Economist, November 2, 2011. Available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/11/czech-politics, accessed on January 5, 2012 
143 VV voters were 4% more likely than CSSD voters, 5.2% more likely than ODS voters and 7.4% more 
likely than KSCM voters to consider corruption the most important political issue at the time of 2010 
election (Pearson’s Chi-Square significant at .05 level, two-tail test). 
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more likely to name Public Affairs as the party best to deal with the problem than all 
parties.  
Figure 5-1 Most Important Political Problem Identified by Respondents  
 
Note: Q.4a ‘What is the most important political problem facing the country?’ from the Czech National 
Election Study, June 2010. The data is available on the website of the Czech Social Science Data Archive 
of the Institute of Sociology (http://archiv.soc.cas.cz/). I thank Martin Vávra at the Czech Academy of 
Sociological Research for helping me get access to these data.  
 
Table 5-2 Parties Best to Address the Most Important Problem  
Party best to deal  
with corruption 
The most important political problem  
Corruption Other problems 
Public Affairs (VV) 37 (37.4%) 62 (62.6%) 
KSCM 10 (12.3%) 71 (87.7%) 
CSSD 28 (17.2%) 135 (82.8%) 
TOP09 29 (18.6%) 127 (81.4%) 
ODS 16 (9.6%) 150 (90.4%) 
Other 12 (28.6%) 30 (71.4%) 
Source: Czech National Election Study, June 2010. The data is available on the website of the 
Czech Social Science Data Archive of the Institute of Sociology (http://archiv.soc.cas.cz/). I 
thank Martin Vávra at the Czech Academy of Sociological Research an for helping me get 
access to these data. 
Note: Q.4a What is the most important political problem facing the country? N=707 
         Q.5a Which party is best at dealing with the most important problem? N=1857 
‘Most important problem’ is a dummy variable coded as 1 if corruption is viewed as the most 
important problem and 0 if other problems are viewed as the most important.   
Pearson Chi Square=36.810 (p<.001) (2-sided test). df=5, N=707. 
 
Compared to 2006 election, corruption became more politicized during the 2010 
campaign as the newly created parties – Public Affairs and TOP09 – addressed the issue 
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more prominently in their election programs. Figure 5-2 shows the differences in the 
salience of corruption in election manifestos among Czech parties. According to the 
figure, 6.2% and 4.9% of statements in manifestos of Public Affairs and TOP09 
respectively, contained references to corruption – more than the total number of 
corruption-related statements of the other five parties combined. 
Figure 5-2 Salience of Corruption in Election Manifestos
 
Note: The figure is based on the data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). The variable used 
in the figure is ‘per304 Political Corruption’ defined as the “Need to eliminate corruption, and associated 
abuse, in political and public life.” The horizontal axis represents the percentage of (quasi-) sentences 
with references to corruption as a total number of (quasi-) sentences. The dataset and the codebook that 
includes a detailed description of the coded variables is available on the website of the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/).  
  
New parties are usually better positioned to do especially well using anti-
corruption appeals given the distance from the establishment of their leaders and 
members. Radek John’s journalistic experience and his focus on investigation of corrupt 
practices made him a star in Czech households and placed anti-corruption message in 
the center of the party’s electoral campaign (Haughton and Deegan Krause 2011, 
397).144 
                                                
144 As Public Affairs became associated with corruption scandals, the benefit of the doubt that voters gave 
to the new anti-establishment party was lost and party’s popularity plummeted First, Vit Barta was 
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In short, the electoral campaign of Public Affairs was shaped by poor corruption 
standing of the Czech Republic abroad and deteriorating perceptions of corruption at 
home. Little attention paid by the Czech mainstream parties to address corruption 
problems created a fertile soil for Public Affairs to build its discourse on anti-corruption 
activities.  
Cabinet Appointments and Public Support 
Public Affairs (VV) was a party of political outsiders that participated in the 
Prague municipal elections prior to 2010 but remained largely unknown nationally and 
emerged as a national power during the 2010 electoral campaign. The cabinet 
appointments laid out a foundation for the future corruption scandals. Public Affairs 
was seeking the Interior Ministry as a priority claiming that their anti-corruption 
program would be best pursued with Radek John heading the Ministry. The former 
investigative journalist was the formal founder of Public Affairs and his name was well 
known in the Czech households for his anti-corruption investigations. While John was 
considered to represent “the face” of the party, Vit Barta was often portrayed in the 
media as the party’s unofficial leader and main financier. Barta was appointed as 
Minister of Transport. These two appointments produced controversy because of high 
potential for conflict of interest with ABL, one of the largest security agencies in the 
country, which was founded and owned by Barta. The suspicion of involvement of 
ABL’s personnel as Interior Ministry consultants and direct participation of ABL in 
Interior Ministry tenders prompted justified criticism. Moreover, when Prime Minister 
                                                                                                                                          
accused of using his former security company ABL for political purposes against the party’s opponents. 
Seconds, Barta himself was tied to a corruption scandal following allegation that he had bribed Public 
Affairs’ deputies in exchange for their loyalty and silence about party financing. Barta resigned as 
Minister of Transport and was stripped of his deputy immunity so that criminal charges could be filed.  
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(PM) Necas announced that most important decisions in the Ministry of Interior were 
made by Barta rather than by the Minister of Interior John, suspicions in VV’s genuine 
intentions in the corruption fight resurfaced. Corruption scandals and internal party 
struggles were one of the main factors explaining the decline of public support for the 
party between May 2010 and December 2011 (Figure 5-3).  
Figure 5-3 Public support of Public Affairs (Věci Veřejné)  
Source: Czech Public Opinion Research Center (CVVM) available at http://nesstar.soc.cas.cz/webview/. 
Respondents were asked ‘Which party would you vote for if the Chamber elections were held this week?’ 
Note: The sample size of the surveys varies from N=979 to N=1306 (the average for all surveys 
N=1055). The sample corresponds to the structure of the population of the Czech Republic by socio-
demographic characteristics (gender, education, age) and by region. Unfortunately, the margins of error 
were not reported in the surveys. 
 
Overall, cabinet appointments created an early foundation for criticism of the Public 
Affairs intentions, given strong conflict of interest between its leader’s business 
interests and the party’s public commitment to address corruption. As a result, the 
benefit of the doubt that voters gave to the new anti-establishment party was lost and 
VV’s anti-corruption mandate was severely undermined.   
Mandate Responsiveness 
Mandate responsiveness reflects program clarity and clarity of electoral options. 
By presenting clear and distinctive programs, political parties offer voters an option of 
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ex ante control (Roberts 2010, 6). A mandate-responsive government sends their voters 
clear and distinctive message via electoral programs and other channels of 
communication. In this section, I analyze whether Public Affairs is more mandate 
responsive than other political parties by (a) examining standard deviations of voter left-
right ideological self-positioning with left-right positioning of parties expressed by all 
respondents; and (b) comparing the degrees and frequencies of web press releases 
related to corruption. 
The literature on populism has recognized ideological “empty heart” (Jasiewicz 
2008) and chameleonic features of the phenomenon (Taggart 2002). By promising 
something to everyone, populists exhibit ideological vagueness. However, along with 
ideological vagueness they can present a rather coherent view on issues that defy left-
right categorization, such as anti-corruption stance or appeals to bring higher elite 
responsiveness and accountability. Therefore, my expectations of mandate 
responsiveness are mixed. On the one hand, Public Affairs may display a lower degree 
of mandate responsiveness than other parties because of its vague ideological profile. 
On the other hand, Public Affairs’ emphasis on a specific issue, such as corruption, in 
its web communication sends the voters a signal of program clarity at least on some 
issues.  
(a) Voter Left-Right Ideological Self-Positioning 
Previous research measured mandate responsiveness by looking at standard 
deviations of expert scores on various political dimensions (Roberts 2010). Some 
democratization scholars have emphasized a close relationship between elite and mass 
political attitudes suggesting that the former is a function of the latter (Ulc 1993, 
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Carpenter 1997). In the absence of data on elite perceptions for the most recent election, 
I compare standard deviations of voter left-right ideological self-positioning with left-
right positioning of parties expressed by all respondents, using the results of the Czech 
National Election Study conducted in June 2010.145 Higher standard deviation indicates 
lower homogeneity of support for each party and may suggest a weaker-defined 
ideological profile of the party. This measure of mandate responsiveness shows an 
ideological component of populism. Jasiewicz (2008), for example, uses this element to 
measure the “ideological empty heart” among Polish populist parties. Following 
Jasiewicz, I assume that the location of a party on the ideological extreme combined 
with low standard deviation indicates a well-defined ideological profile of the party, 
while high deviation combined with location of the mean in the middle of ideological 
spectrum signals weak ideological profile.  
(b) Web Press Releases 
In addition to looking at standard deviations as a measure of mandate 
responsiveness, I rely on such element of mandate responsiveness as website 
communication related to corruption and anti-corruption statements. All five Czech 
parties holding seats in the lower chamber actively use websites as a communication 
tool with their constituencies. In addition to electoral programs and information about 
individual party members and leaders, parties provide information on their positions on 
various issues, publish press releases, newspaper columns and other communication 
with the media, and rebroadcast appearances on TV. Therefore, website communication 
is an important tool of mandate responsiveness.  
                                                
145 I thank Martin Vávra from the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech 
Republic for helping me get access to the data. 
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In order to evaluate the differences in the degree of mandate responsiveness 
between populist and mainstream parties, I review press releases published by political 
parties on their websites. Because I evaluate mandate responsiveness related to a 
specific issue of corruption, I look at frequencies of references to corruption in press 
releases between May 2010 and December 2011. The parliamentary election was held 
on May 28-29, 2010 and corruption was one of the main election themes. The beginning 
of the analysis in early May helps capture some of the electoral campaign spirit and 
examine the prominence of corruption in press releases prior to the election.  
The goal of this analysis is to capture mandate responsiveness in website 
communication among Czech political parties. This aspect of mandate responsiveness is 
measured as frequency and intensity of featuring corruption in press releases published 
on parties’ websites. I expect to find differences in mandate responsiveness between the 
populist Public Affairs, on the one hand, and the rest of parliamentary parties, on the 
other hand. More specifically, I expect Public Affairs to display higher rate of 
responsiveness in communication on corruption for the following reasons. First, 
corruption was one of Public Affairs’ main electoral campaign issues. Previous sections 
showed how Public Affairs’ intentions to address corruption were reflected in voter 
perceptions: Public Affairs was more likely to be mentioned as the party best to deal 
with corruption among those voters who identified corruption as the most important 
political problem (see Table 5-2).  
 Second, according to the coalition government agreement, Public Affairs 
received four ministry portfolios, including Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of 
Regional Development. These two ministries are the key institutions in combatting 
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corruption. Public Contracts and Central Purchases Department, Crime Prevention 
Department and Police Department are subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, 
while Ministry of Regional Development provides guidance on public procurement. 
Public procurement is seen as one of the most corrupt areas in the Czech Republic, and 
having received ministerial positions, Public Affairs was well positioned to have an 
influence in combatting corruption.  
Overall, the enhanced effort by Public Affairs to focus on corruption in web 
communication is one of the keys to party’s credibility. Being a relatively new political 
party competing nationally, and not having a strong core constituency, Public Affairs 
strongly relied on anti-corruption rhetoric to generate electoral support. Communication 
with constituencies reflecting the party’s agenda, policy proposals and policy 
achievements on anti-corruption measures demonstrate party’s commitment to the cause 
and its responsiveness to the voters. Communication via the websites serves as an 
important element of mandate responsiveness.  
Voter Left-Right Ideological Self-Positioning 
This section discusses standard deviations of voter left-right ideological 
positions as a measure of mandate responsiveness. Table 5-3 present the mean scores of 
self-placements among party constituencies. The positioning of parties based on voter 
left-right self-identification is quite consistent with the literature (Benoit and Laver 
2006, Deegan-Krause 2006). The bases of competition in the Czech party system have 
been largely a reflection of a left-right socioeconomic cleavage with ODS (Civic 
Democratic Party) and CSSD (Czech Social Democratic Party) representing the 
opposite sides of the ideological spectrum. The liberal newcomer TOP09 is positioned 
155 
on the right close to ODS and the unreformed Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia (KSCM) is on the left, while the rest of the parties are located closer to the 
middle of the spectrum. TOP09 has been portrayed as an anti-establishment party but its 
known leadership and clear ideological profile does not allow us to classify it as 
genuine protest anti-establishment party. It is located slightly left of ODS on the left-
right scale and it has second lowest standard deviation among all parties. This indicates 
that TOP09 supporters display a clearly defined ideological profile of the center-right 
party despite the fact that TOP09 is a newly created party from a fractured KDU-CSL 
and it built is support on their leader competence and lack of corruption scandals 
(Haughton and Deegan Krause 2011). 
The constituencies of Public Affairs also place their party slightly to the right of 
the center but high standard deviation is a signal of weaker ideological profile compared 
to other parties. Only non-voters and supporters of another protest party Suverenita and 
the newly created center-left Party of Civic Rights (SPO) show a less clear ideological 
profile.146  
Table 5-3 Left-Right Self-Positioning of Party Constituencies 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
VV 133 0 10 6.549 1.828 
KSCM 117 0 10 1.872 1.750 
CSSD 271 0 10 3.188 1.734 
Green 27 1 9 5.259 1.723 
KDU 34 2 9 5.765 1.597 
TOP09 197 0 10 7.538 1.590 
ODS 216 2 10 8.190 1.542 
Source: Czech National Election Study 2010 available at http://archiv.soc.cas.cz/. Q22: Where do you 
place yourself on the left-right ideological scale?Left-0, Right-10. The table only includes political 
parties that cleared the electoral threshold in the 2010 and 2006 parliamentary elections to the lower 
chamber. Smaller parties – SPO, Suverenita – and non-voters are not included in the table. 
                                                
146 The descriptive statistics for these groups of respondents are not shown in the table. 
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For a more visual representation of the data, I report the Kernel density 
distributions of self-placements on the left-right ideological scale among party 
constituencies.147 Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5 show the differences in distributions among 
the Czech parties. The plots suggest that KSCM, TOP09, and ODS have more clear 
ideological profiles: their distributions are more narrow and are either left-skewed or 
right-skewed. The distributions of KDU and the Greens are close to normal with means 
of 5.765 and 5.259 respectively. They are also more narrowly distributed. On the other 
hand, Public Affairs and CSSD have wider distributions, which suggests that the 
constituencies of these parties have less agreement on their ideological profiles.  
Table 5-4 Mean Placements on the Left-Right Scale Among All Respondents  
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
KSCM 1699 0 10 1.210 1.792 
CSSD 1694 0 10 2.665 2.003 
KDU 1582 0 10 5.356 1.947 
Green 1546 0 10 5.633 1.782 
VV 1521 0 10 6.686 1.946 
TOP09 1632 0 10 7.894 2.046 
ODS 1693 0 10 8.265 2.049 
Source: Czech National Election Study 2010 available at http://archiv.soc.cas.cz/. Q21: Where do you 
place the following political parties on the left-right ideological scale? Left-0, Right-10. The table only 
includes political parties that cleared the electoral threshold in the 2010 and 2006 parliamentary 
elections to the lower chamber. Smaller parties – SPO, Suverenita – and non-voters are not included. 
 
Table 5-4 shows the mean left-right scores given to each major party by all 
respondents. While the left-right positioning of parties makes sense, large standard 
deviation received by ODS, TOP09 and CSSD is puzzling, especially when it comes to 
ODS and CSSD. These major Czech parties have been competing against each other 
since the collapse of communism and they represent clear ideological right-left choice 
                                                
147 I use kernel densities to plot the distributions splitting them into two graphs with three parties in 
Figure 5-4 (VV, KDU and Green) and four parties in Figure 5-5. Placing all seven parties on the same 
graph makes it difficult to distinguish between the parties and interpret the distributions. The scales of the 
y-axis are similar in both figures and they are therefore comparable. 
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for the Czech voters. Whereas party constituencies show more consistent positions as 
far as their own party’s ideological stance is concerned, there is a higher degree of 
disagreement about these parties’ left-right positioning among public in general.  
Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7 offer a visual representation of Table 5-4. They report 
the differences in Kernel density distributions of left-right positioning among Czech 
parties. Whereas relatively moderate standard deviations of Public Affairs in Table 5-4 
are puzzling, Figures 5-6 and 5-7 offer a more clear depiction of ideological clarity 
among Czech parties. The graphs show quite a wide distribution for Public Affairs 
(Figure 5-6), which in combination with positioning of the distribution in the middle of 
the left-right scale suggest a less clear ideological profile of the populist party. The 
distribution of CSSD looks similar to that of Public Affairs, although in a diametrically 
opposite direction. The distributions of KDU and the Greens are narrow and close to 
normal, indicating the agreement among respondents about these parties’ ideological 
profiles. The distributions of other parties – ODS, TOP09, and KSCM – are vividly 
skewed towards either right or left suggesting that respondents are more certain about 
these parties’ left or right positions. Overall, although the evidence about lower 
ideological clarity of Public Affairs is not conclusive, there are ample reasons to argue 
that Public Affairs exhibits lower degree of mandate responsiveness compared to other 
parties. In self-positioning of its constituencies on the left-right scale, Public Affairs 
records the highest standard deviation; it also shows a relatively wide distribution of 
responses in the middle of the left-right scale. 
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Figure 5-4 Left-right Self Positioning of Party Constituencies-1 148 
 
Figure 5-5 Left-right Self Positioning of Party Constituencies-2   
 
                                                
148 Figures 5-4 and 5-5 are based on the data from Czech National Election Study 2010 available at 
http://archiv.soc.cas.cz/. Q22: Where do you place yourself on the left-right ideological scale? Left-0, 
Right-10.  
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Figure 5-6 Parties’ Placements on the Left-Right Scale by All Respondents-1149  
 
Figure 5-7 Parties’ Placements on the Left-Right Scale by All Respondents-2 
 
                                                
149 Figures 5-6 and 5-7 are based on the data from Czech National Election Study 2010 available at 
http://archiv.soc.cas.cz/. Q21: Where do you place the following political parties on the left-right 
ideological scale? Left-0, Right-10. 
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Web Press Releases 
To analyze mandate responsiveness in web communication, I examined the 
websites of five Czech parties with parliamentary seats in the lower chamber having 
analyzed 3,497 press releases, 14.9% of which contained a reference to corruption. The 
articles were divided into three groups that indicate a degree of intensity of referencing 
corruption in press releases. Higher intensity of featuring corruption is a proxy for high 
mandate responsiveness. Articles mentioned only once or twice were coded as 1; 
articles where corruption is mentioned several times were coded as 2; articles which 
main theme is corruption were coded as 3. A useful cue for coding the article as 3 was 
whether it contained the word “corruption” in the title.  
Table 5-5 offers comparisons of mandate responsiveness among Czech parties in 
web press releases. The table reports cross-tabulations for corruption-related press 
releases (column, press releases where corruption was mentioned once or twice, 
multiple times, and where corruption was the main theme. The table also provides 
significance tests that assess differences in the frequency with which Public Affairs 
issued press releases featuring corruption in comparison to the other parties. For most 
indicators – columns 2-4 – the Pearson Chi-Square statistics are highly significant at the 
1% level and for articles where corruption was the main theme the Pearson Chi-Square 
is significant at the 10% level.  
The table indicates that corruption was featured most prominently in press 
releases by Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) and Social Democratic 
Party (CSSD). Their share of press releases related to corruption as a share of the total 
number of press releases was 16.1% and 15.8% respectively, compared to 15.5% 
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recorded by Public Affairs. Public Affairs was outperformed by other major parties in 
frequency of corruption-related press releases when corruption was mentioned once or 
twice.  
Table 5-5 Related to Corruption Press Releases on Parties’ Websites 
Party Total 
number 
of press 
releases  
Press 
releases 
related to 
corruption 
Frequency of featuring corruption 
Corruption 
mentioned 
once or twice 
Corruption 
mentioned 
multiple times 
Article’s main 
theme is 
corruption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VV 1034 160 (15.5%) 46 (4.4%) 81 (7.8%) 33 (3.2%) 
ODS 532 35 (6.6%) 26 (4.9%) 4 (0.8%) 5 (0.9%) 
CSSD 1092 172 (15.8%) 112 (10.3%) 28 (2.6%) 32 (2.9%) 
KSCM 552 89 (16.1%) 61 (11.1%) 10 (1.8%) 18 (3.3%) 
TOP09 287 35 (12.2%) 13 (4.5%) 15 (5.2%) 7 (2.4%) 
Total 3497 491 (14.0%) 258 (7.4%) 138 (3.9%) 95 (2.7%) 
Pearson Chi-Square  31.742*** 45.357*** 68.925*** 8.128* 
df  4 4 4 4 
N  3497 3497 3497 3497 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Percentages in brackets indicate the share of featuring corruption within a party variable.  
Table is based on the author’s coding and calculations. Articles mentioned only once or twice were coded 
as 1; articles where corruption is mentioned several times were coded as 2; articles which main theme is 
corruption were coded as 3. A useful cue for coding the article as 3 was whether it contained the word 
“corruption” in the title. 
 
More interesting results come from the comparison of intensity of featuring 
corruption. All major parties except for Public Affairs display frequent but less 
concentrated references to corruption. The overwhelming majority of press releases 
were those where corruption was mentioned once or twice. The total share of press 
releases related to corruption recorded by Public Affairs differs only by a few tenth of a 
percentage, compared to that of other parties. Public Affairs lags behind other parties in 
press releases where corruption was mentioned once or twice but it demonstrates a 
higher rate of intensity in references to corruption. Eighty one (7.8%) press releases by 
Public Affairs referenced corruption multiple times indicating the heightened effort by 
Public Affairs to be more specific about its core campaign issue. Finally, Public Affairs 
published the most number of press releases (33) where corruption was the main theme, 
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although its share of featuring corruption is not the highest compared to other parties 
and it differs slightly from that of other parties.  
When it comes to the nature of specific corruption-related references, not 
surprisingly, the opposition CSSD and KSCM used press releases to criticize the 
government and Public Affairs in particular for empty electoral promises to address 
corruption problems. In many press releases, parties other than Public Affairs made a 
clear reference to Public Affairs’ anti-corruption appeals, citing its electoral promises to 
combat corruption. For example, in October 2010, CSSD and KSCM published press 
releases criticizing the Interior Minister (who was also Public Affairs’ leader) for failing 
to respond to its own electoral promises of addressing corruption. Both opposition 
parties blamed Public Affairs for inaction claiming that during the first 100 days in 
office the government’s only measure was the release of an anti-corruption manual for 
citizens and police officers. 
Most press releases featuring corruption as the main theme by TOP09 focused 
on transparency in party finance, attempting to distance itself from corruption scandals 
erupted among coalition partners ODS and Public Affairs. Despite several high profile 
corruption scandals among its own members, ODS chose not to focus on the scandals in 
its communication. In press releases that featured corruption most prominently ODS 
emphasized the government’s anti-corruption strategy and enforcement of anti-
corruption measures.  
Current literature suggests that populist parties reflect voter discontent with the 
political system and elites whereas a populist contender is expected to increase 
responsiveness. If a party sends clear and distinctive message via their electoral 
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program and articulates future policy directions, voters are offered certain confidence 
and predictability. Mandate responsiveness gives citizens a chance for ex ante control of 
their representatives. The evidence that Public Affairs displayed stronger mandate 
responsiveness compared to other parties is mixed.  On the one hand, the electoral 
program and slogans used by Public Affairs focused on the problems of corruption, 
transparency, and fiscal responsibility. The results of National Election Study indicate 
that corruption was the second most important issue of the campaign. The crosstab 
analysis shows that the issue of corruption was “owned” by Public Affairs and that 
Public Affairs was better positioned to address the corruption problem. The evaluation 
of secondary sources (newspaper articles) also suggests that the media recognized 
corruption as one of the central VV’s campaign issues, thus indicating populisms’s 
ability to display a strong anti-corruption mandate.  
This analysis also suggests that populist parties, such as Public Affairs, use web 
communication as a tool of mandate responsiveness more prominently than other 
political parties. When examining the intensity of addressing corruption as one of the 
core electoral campaign issues, I find that the focus on anti-corruption messages by 
mainstream parties are partially a function of prominence of the issue in the Public 
Affairs’ electoral campaign. In other words, Public Affairs’ focus on combating 
corruption prompted other parties to hold the challenger accountable. The basis for this 
conclusion is the fact that most of the press releases published by mainstream parties 
contained explicit criticism of Public Affairs for corruption scandals within the 
governing coalition, for not addressing corruption more prominently, and for violating 
its electoral mandate to the voters. The feedback by mainstream parties was even more 
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pronounced because the government coalition, and Public Affairs in particular, got 
embattled with internal corruption scandals. 
On the other hand, Public Affairs exhibited week mandate responsiveness 
measured as standard deviation of the left-right self-positioning of party supporters. 
This measure is an imperfect measure of mandate responsiveness but it indicates that 
Public Affairs’ ideological position is not uniformly agreed on even among its 
constituencies. Public Affairs’ voters show a larger spread on the left-right self-
positioning compared to all other major parties, which indicates that Public Affairs 
voter beliefs are less consistent than perceptions of voters of other parties. Overall, apart 
from strong anti-corruption rhetoric, Public Affairs was unable to display strong 
mandate responsiveness. 
Policy Responsiveness 
In this section, I examine (1) oral questions referred to the prime minister and 
the cabinet during legislative sessions and (2) the legislative record of Public Affairs. 
Using oral questions and legislative record on corruption-related issues as a proxy for 
policy responsiveness, I seek to evaluate the effect of populism on policy 
responsiveness. Do representatives of Public Affairs use oral questions more 
prominently than representatives of mainstream parties? How do members of 
parliament (MPs) use their time during the oral question sessions and how do they 
prioritize anti-corruption discourse on their agenda? Can oral questions give an insight 
about the relationship between populism and policy responsiveness? Do anti-corruption 
legislative initiatives of Public Affairs tell us anything about the effect of populism on 
policy responsiveness?  
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Oral Questions (Interpellations) 
Examining oral questions during parliamentary debates seems an appropriate 
way to assess policy responsiveness among members of parliament. While these 
sessions are primarily used by the opposition parties to make inquiries to the prime 
minister and the cabinet about government’s policies, the members of the governing 
parties can use the parliament floor as a symbolic way of displaying to their 
constituencies the level of their engagement with the most urgent policy issues. During 
the question session, the members of parliament are not constrained by their party 
discipline and can speak openly about policies and problems. In other words, the 
autonomy of speech during the oral questions session for individual MPs is higher than 
during voting. This measure of policy responsiveness may be affected by the 
government status of Public Affairs. Because oral questions during the floor debate are 
addressed to the prime minister and the cabinet, party members of the governing 
coalition may be reluctant to scrutinize their coalition allies. However, they may still 
use oral questions as a symbolic sign to show their legislative behavior to their 
constituents.   
Czech Parliament Legislative Rules and Procedures 
The session of oral questions (interpolations) is held each Thursday from 2:30 
p.m. to 6 p.m. The prime minister is questioned during the first part of the oral question 
session – from 2:30 p.m. to 4 p.m., followed by the questions to other members of the 
cabinet.150 There is no limit on the number of questions an MP can submit and each MP 
may submit a question to the prime minister and a question to a specific member of the 
                                                
150 The Law on the Rules of Procedures of the Chamber of Deputies, available at http://www.psp.cz/.  
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cabinet. However, if more than one question is submitted, the addressor should specify 
the order of questions (1) to the prime minister and (2) to other members of the cabinet.  
The order of questions is determined by a random draw on the day of the oral 
question session. If an MPs submits more that one question, the random draw is held for 
the pool of questions given the first order and then for the pool of second and third 
order questions. If a member of the cabinet is absent from the chamber or cannot answer 
a question, she is mandated to provide a response in writing. If a deputy is not satisfied 
with the response, the question can be added to the agenda of the following session. 
Although there is no limit on the number of questions that can be asked by a 
representative, the order of questions asked by each MP may be a useful cue for 
establishing the prominence of corruption discourse on the party’s agenda. When 
representatives submit more than one question, they have to rank their questions by 
importance, because the random draw will include only one of their questions at a time. 
Other questions with lower ranked order (lower importance) will be included in the next 
random draw, and so on. If the corruption-related question is ranked lower on the list of 
importance, it may not reach the floor of the parliament at all if the time runs out and/or 
there are too many questions asked by other representatives.  
Data 
I reviewed 707 oral questions asked by the Czech MPs during ten sessions of the 
sixth parliament (September 2010-December 2011) identifying questions that included 
references to corruption. This data is available on the website of the Czech parliament 
in the Czech language and I relied on Google translate service and my own knowledge 
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of Slavic languages to understand the general meaning of the questions.151 The question 
subject was to be submitted by the representatives to be included in the pool of 
randomly drawn questions and I relied on the subjects during the initial coding. 
Subjects, such as “in the fight against corruption,” “the suspicion of corruption,” or 
“regarding the continuation of corrupt practices” offered easily identifiable questions 
related to the corruption theme. However, when I reviewed the questions in more depth, 
I added other themes to corruption-related coding and included references to 
transparency in politics, bribes, government procurement or military contracts. Two 
latter themes were included because they were part of corruption scandals followed by 
the resignation of members of the cabinet.  I also identified a number of subjects that 
were labeled as “ethics in politics,” which I initially thought to be related to corruption. 
However, during a closer examination of these questions, I realized that most of them 
inquired about issues other than corruption and therefore were not coded as corruption-
related questions. In the cases when questions were not asked from the floor – because 
either time ran out or the addressor was absent in the chamber – I could make 
judgments about its reference to corruption only based on the subject. The descriptive 
data is presented in Table 5-6.  
Table 5-6 Frequency of Oral Questions Asked by Members of Parliament  
MP’s Party Total number 
of oral 
questions 
Number of oral 
questions related 
to corruption 
Seats in a 
chamber 
Corruption questions 
adjusted for seats in 
chamber 
CSSD (Social Democrats) 550 34 56 0.607 
KSCM (Communist Party) 93 1 26 0.038 
ODS (Civic Democrats) 51 1 53 0.019 
VV (Public Affairs) 10 5 24 0.208 
TOP09 3 0  41 0.000 
Total 707 41 200 0.205 
Note: The data is based on the author’s coding and calculations. 
                                                
151 Data available on the website of the Czech parliament at http://www.psp.cz/.   
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The table shows that between September 2010 and December 2011, the representatives 
from opposition parties – CSSD and KSCM – were most active in submitting oral 
questions accounting for 550 and 93 oral questions (78% and 13% out of the overall 
number of questions respectively) – a disproportionately large share of requests 
compared to other parties. When adjusting for the number of seats held by each party in 
the chamber, corruption was featured most prominently by the CSSD representatives 
followed by the Public Affairs members. Previous research has shown that opposition 
parties are usually the primary initiators of oral interpellations (Bruteig 2010). They use 
the floor of the parliament to display criticism of the governing coalition, so a large 
share of requests by CSSD and KSCM is not surprising. Therefore, given the structure 
of these sessions, it would be incorrect to suggest that the coalition government parties 
– ODS, TOP09 and Public Affairs – were not policy responsive.  
Public Affairs MPs submitted only five questions on issues related to corruption, 
transparency, and public procurement. Despite the overall low amount of oral questions 
related to corruption, these questions account for half of the total number of questions 
submitted by representatives of Public Affairs, suggesting that perhaps Public Affairs 
members of parliament do not make significant efforts at using oral questions as a tool 
of policy responsiveness. But in rare cases when they do, corruption is addressed more 
prominently than by representatives of other parties.  
Among more interesting findings arising from the research of this part of 
parliamentary debate is the timing of asking corruption-related questions and their 
importance compared to other issues. When coding the data, I included the ranking of 
corruption-related question identified by the MPs which was an indication of the 
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importance of corruption. I also showed the total number of questions to the prime 
minister and to the members of the cabinet.  
In some cases, the representatives posed questions to both the prime minister 
and to the members of the cabinet. For example, representative Jiri Paroubek (CSSD) 
registered 20 oral questions on December 9, 2010 (four of those were posed to the PM 
and 14 to the members of the cabinet). The four questions to the PM were related to 
unemployment, the use of EU funds (2 questions) and commerce. Paroubek also 
registered 14 questions to the members of the cabinet. Corruption was on the MP’s 
agenda, as two of the fourteenth questions were related to corruption but in the order of 
questions Paroubek ranked these two questions as the third and the fourteenth. The time 
allocated for oral interpellations allowed Paroubek to ask his third question related to 
corruption but not the fourteenth question. On another occasion, representative Ladislav 
Šincl (CSSD) registered seven oral questions and random drawing allowed him to ask 
all three of his corruption-related questions ranked as 3rd, 4th, and 7th. These examples 
suggest that corruption has a variable importance on the agenda of political parties and 
members of parliament. 
Table 5-7 Frequency of Ranking Corruption-Related Questions by Czech MPs 
Ranking of corruption-
related question 
Frequency Percent 
1 20 48.8 
2 8 19.5 
3 4 9.8 
4 5 12.2 
5 1 2.4 
7 1 2.4 
8 1 2.4 
14 1 2.4 
Total 41 100.0 
Note: The data is based on the author’s coding and calculations. 
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Table 5-7 reports the frequencies of ranking corruption-related questions by the 
Czech members of parliament. The table shows that when MPs asked questions related 
to corruption they rank them quite high in the order of questions: they were ranked as 
the top priority questions in 20 cases (48.8% of the questions) and under the second and 
third rank in 8 and 4 cases (19.5% and 9.8% respectively). In other words, when 
inquiring about corruption, the representatives of Czech parties are more likely to rank 
the corruption-related question on the top of the importance list. The table also shows 
that a low rank of questions on corruption are very infrequent among Czech MPs; only 
once were corruption-related questions ranked under the 5th, 7th, 8th, and 14th numbers. 
The timing of asking questions indicates that inquiries were made in clusters of 
sessions rather than spread proportionally throughout them. The first 23 questions on 
corruption were asked during the first five legislative sessions and the last 18 questions 
were asked during the next ten legislative sessions. Such distribution of questions has 
likely to do with corruption scandals periodically emerging within the governing 
coalition.  
The grouping of corruption-related questions asked by representatives of Public 
Affairs shows an interesting dynamic of (1) how Public Affairs is held accountable to 
its anti-corruption program and (2) how the opposition parties’ criticism affected the use 
of questions asked by the populist party. On December 9, 2010, Jiri Paroubek (CSSD) 
posed a question to Prime Minister Necas about government’s mandate to deal with 
corruption in which, he quoted from the coalition agreement and criticized the 
government for failing to address the problem: 
Dear absent Prime Minister, your coalition is committed as one of the key 
objectives which is the fight against corruption and bureaucracy… After the 
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events of the Ministry of Environment I can not believe that you still have the 
courage to talk about your government as a government fighting against 
corruption… Do you think that your government still has a moral right to fight 
against corruption and abuses on power in politics and public 
administration? How is it possible that the coalition parties, who so vehemently 
criticized the behavior of their predecessors, fell even deeper [in corruption 
scandals]? 
Paroubek’s inquiry about corruption had an interesting effect on the corruption 
discourse of the interpellation session the following week. Both Prime Minister Necas 
and Radek John, Minister of Interior at that time, were absent from the chamber on 
December 9 and the inquiries about corruption seemed to force Public Affairs to 
publicly address corruption-related questions from the floor of the parliament. First, 
Radek John made himself available for oral questions but more importantly, four 
corruption-related questions were posed to Radek John – all from the MPs of his own 
party, Public Affairs. It would be a speculation whether or not the arrival of John to the 
chamber and the questions by the Public Affairs’ MPs were orchestrated by the populist 
party’s leadership. However, given its anti-corruption platform, Public Affairs used the 
floor of the parliament to publicize its achievements in anti-corruption area as a 
symbolic sign of policy responsiveness. No Public Affairs MP has used the oral 
interpellation session prior to December 16, 2010 to inquire about corruption and only 
once after December 16 was the floor of the parliament used to advocate for this highly 
important for Public Affairs issue. 
Overall, this example suggests that by criticizing Public Affairs for lack of 
action on corruption, the opposition was successfully leading the debate, rather than the 
other way around. The frequency and the rate of corruption-related questions during the 
first ten sessions of the 2010 parliament indicates that Public Affairs used this element 
of policy responsiveness less prominently than the opposition parties, CSSD in 
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particular. Contrary to my expectations that Public Affairs would be leading the debate 
on anti-corruption discourse, the populists were forced to defend their positions on this 
arguably most important issue of their program.  
To further investigate the relationship between populism and policy 
responsiveness, I analyzed the frequency of questions related to corruption during the 
previous parliamentary tenure (2006-2009). Whereas 41 out of 707 (5.8%) oral 
questions were related to corruption in 2010-2011 parliament, only 13 out of 1922 
(0.7%) oral questions asked between 2006 and 2010 by members of all parliamentary 
parties were focused on corruption.152 In other words, corruption clearly became a more 
prominent issue after the 2010 campaign, as it received more attention between 
September 2010 and December 2011 than during four years of the previous 
parliamentary tenure. Such an increase in inquiries about corruption can be attributed to 
high profile corruption scandals that erupted within the governing coalition. However, 
the conjunction of two conditions – Public Affairs’ focus on anti-corruption rhetoric 
combined with Public Affairs’ subsequent involvement in corruption scandals – highly 
politicized corruption, elevating the importance of the issue among the citizens and the 
elites. Corruption scandals have been quite frequent in the Czech Republic in the past 
but previously they did not create such a resonance in the lower chamber. It is plausible 
that because corruption became one of the most important campaign issues, the leeway 
for error became so narrow that any misconduct by the elites brought more uproar than 
it did in the past. Corruption scandals is the most proximate cause explaining the 
increase in the number of inquiries about corruption, whereas the deeper causes can be 
                                                
152 Overall, 21 corruption related questions were on the daily agenda but they were omitted because time 
ran out. 
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found at the level of party discourse and electoral strategies which politicized corruption 
and led to higher degree of inquiries by all parties, thus capturing populism’s effect on 
policy responsiveness.  
The evidence suggests that the dramatic increase in the overall number of 
corruption-related questions asked by all parties – 41 out of 707 during the sixteen 
months of the sixth Czech parliament compared to 13 out of 1922 during four years of 
the fifth parliament – is the outcome of the anti-corruption discourse of Public Affairs. 
Public Affairs elevated the importance of the corruption problem during the election 
campaign, which brought higher awareness of corruption among the elites prompting 
other parties to become more inquisitive about corruption.  
Legislative Record of Public Affairs 
The number and frequency of oral questions on the floor of the parliament are 
used in this chapter as measures of policy responsiveness. The unit of analysis is oral 
questions by individual members of parliament. Policy responsiveness can also be 
analyzed using a party’s legislative record as the unit of analysis. This change will help 
establish whether Public Affairs’ legislative record in combatting corruption is 
consistent with the party’s electoral pledges.  
A series of legislative initiatives by the coalition government is a good indicator 
of government’s policy responsiveness, although it is difficult to clearly isolate the 
individual role of Public Affairs using this measure. In November 2010, the Ministry of 
Interior headed by the Public Affairs’ leader adopted the Code of Ethics outlining 
practices that regulated ethical aspects of public servants. In addition to promoting 
ethical standards of behavior internally, within government agencies, the Code of Ethics 
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was an important symbolic signal sent to the citizens in an attempt to gain public trust. 
Following the adoption of the Code of Ethics, three representatives of Public Affairs 
used the floor of the parliament to question the Minister of Interior about government’s 
anti-corruption actions. The only three ministries that had adopted the code were headed 
by representatives of Public Affairs. 
Earlier, in September 2010, Public Affairs offered a draft anti-corruption plan 
which was strongly criticized by Transparency International Czech Republic (TIC), an 
anti-corruption organization. Following the introduction of the plan, TIC’s 
representative Václav Lásk quit the anti-corruption council created by Public Affairs 
because he argued that the plan had been used as a tool for local election campaign held 
in October 2010 rather than a genuine anti-corruption mechanism.153 The draft anti-
corruption plan was converted into anti-corruption strategy consisting of 57 proposals 
that included provisions about public tenures, lobbying practices, and suggested longer 
prison terms for public servants convicted of corruption. The plan was also criticized by 
the experts because it was quite vague in the areas of public procurement, lobbying and 
campaign financing – the key areas where corruption was especially high.154 In August 
2011, Deputy PM Karolina Peake (a member of Public Affairs) formed an Anti-
Corruption Committee of seven Cabinet members to serve as the main body for 
                                                
153 Lehane, Bill. “Ministry Defends Anti-corruption Plan - News”, Prague Post, September 22, 2010. 
Available at http://www.praguepost.com/news/5803-ministry-defends-anti-corruption-plan.html, accessed 
on September 5, 2011.  
154 Thompson, Emily. “John Unveils Anti-corruption Plan - News”, Prague Post, December 22, 2010. 
Available at http://www.praguepost.com/news/6931-john-unveils-anti-corruption-plan.html, accessed on 
May 5, 2011.  
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monitoring and combating corruption. Three of the seven members represented Public 
Affairs.155  
Overall, the government claimed to have taken action on 40 of the 84 points of 
its anti-corruption strategy in early 2012. These measures were highly publicized by 
Public Affairs as party’s own achievements, given that public officials in charge of 
these initiatives were members of VV. At the same time, domestic and international 
perceptions of corruption in the Czech Republic have not improved due to a number of 
high-profile corruption scandals that shook the governing coalition.  
Three high ranking public officials from the senior coalition partner ODS 
became involved in corruption scandals undermining the government’s pledge to 
combat corruption. In December 2010, Martin Bartak, the deputy finance minister (ex-
deputy defense minister), resigned after being charged with soliciting a bribe from 
former US ambassador for granting a supply contract for the Czech army from Tatra 
trucks. William Cabaniss, the former US ambassador joined Tatra trucks, the company 
which won a $145 million supply contract in 2006.156 Pavel Drobil, minister of 
environment, also an ODS member, resigned to avoid a non-confidence vote, following 
allegations of corruption in the ministry. Drobil’s advisor was recorded talking about 
manipulating the tender for water treatment facility in exchange for a 3 billion crown 
payment. Drobil was confronted by the director of the State Environment Fund and 
                                                
155 Buehrer, Jack. “Peake Forms Anti-corruption Group - News”, Prague Post, August 17, 2011. 
Available at http://www.praguepost.com/news/9856-peake-forms-anti-corruption-group.html, accessed 
on December 17, 2011. 
156 “Two People Charged in Army’s Tatra Trucks Deal.” Prague Monitor, December 1, 2011. Available 
at http://praguemonitor.com/2011/12/01/two-people-charged-armys-tatra-trucks-deal, accessed on May 5, 
2012. 
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captured on tape trying to cover up for his advisor.157 In March 2011, Defense Minister 
Vondra, an ODS member, was accused of overcharging for audiovisual equipment from 
the contractor ProMoPro by $27 million at the time of his appointment as deputy prime 
minister for European Affairs in 2009.  
As with many other new parties running on anti-corruption platform, what 
helped Public Affairs win power, came back to haunt the party, as VV itself became a 
center of corruption scandals creating a substantial blow to party’s legitimacy. VV’s 
informal leader Vit Barta was accused by his fellow MPs Kristyna Koci and Jaroslav 
Skarka for bribing them in exchange for loyalty to the party.  MP Krystina Koci claimed 
that Barta bribed her with $27,000 and Jaroslaw Skarka asserted to have been receiving 
$3,200 monthly payments for keeping the details of party financing a secret. Barta did 
not deny to have paid the MPs but he argued those were loans.158  The media claimed to 
have documented examples of bribing the MPs with $10,000 in envelopes. After these 
accusations, Koci and  Skarka were expelled from VV and Barta resigned from his 
Minister of Transport position. The official party leader Radek John resigned as 
Minister of Interior the same month. Another scandal involved Education Minister Josef 
Dobeš (Public Affairs) who was charged with misappropriation of the funds from the 
European Commission (EC). The EC’s audit found a large number of unexplained 
payments and considered cutting funds to the ministry.159  
                                                
157 Richter, Jan. “Radio Prague - Environment Minister Steps down Amidst Corruption Scandal.” Český 
Rozhlas, December 15, 2010. Available at http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/environment-minister-
steps-down-amidst-corruption-scandal, accessed on September 5, 2011. 
158 Buehrer, Jack. “VV Implosion Sparks Latest Gov’t Crisis - News.” Prague Post, April 13, 2011. 
Available at http://www.praguepost.com/news/8252-vv-implosion-sparks-latest-govt-crisis.html, 
accessed on October 15, 2011. 
159 Cunningham, Benjamín. “Dobeš Again Caught in Scandal” Prague Post, January 4, 2012. Available at 
http://www.praguepost.com/news/11631-dobes-again-caught-in-scandal.html. Accessed on May 5, 2012.  
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In sum, these high-profile scandals produced substantial damage to VV’s 
legitimacy, as a party building its support on anti-corruption discourse. Therefore, the 
policy responsiveness record of Public Affairs is rather mixed. On the one hand, having 
received cabinet portfolios, critical to addressing corruption, Public Affairs introduced a 
number of anti-corruption initiatives. Despite criticism, these measures sent an 
important symbolic signal about party’s policy responsiveness, as Public Affairs was 
following its mandate and electoral promises to combat corruption. On the other hand, 
corruption scandals among leaders of Public Affairs largely discredited its mandate 
suggesting that “no party in power can avoid the presumption of corruptibility” 
(Haughton et al. 2011, 401). As Public Affairs was going through corruption turmoil, 
the party’s own MPs showed dissatisfaction with Barta’s personalistic leadership 
blaming the leadership in departing from its core values, namely corruption. According 
to one of the MPs,  “Barta [is] losing a bit of perspective of the average VV voter who 
put him in the first place…they need to be out there pointing fingers at corruption, over 
and over again.”160  
Conclusion 
The concern about democratic responsiveness in Eastern Europe is well 
warranted given weak or non-existing history of democratic rule. In the early 90s, in the 
midst of problems related to political and economic transitions, the elite preoccupation 
with building democratic institutions and liberal economies corresponded to the public’s 
general desire to move away from communism. In the recent years, the growing 
scholarly interest in responsiveness and representation in Eastern Europe can be 
                                                
160 Buehrer, Jack. “Bárta Sparks Divisions Within VV.” Prague Post, March 30, 2011. Available at 
http://www.praguepost.com/news/8053-b%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%BDrta-sparks-divisions-within-
vv.html, accessed on May 5, 2012. 
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explained by pessimism about ability of politicians to be responsive and citizens’ 
limited capacity to display coherent policy preferences and demand certain policies 
from their elected representatives.  
This chapter looks at two components of responsiveness focusing on the Czech 
Republic, seeking to evaluate whether populist parties are more responsive than their 
counterparts. Disaggregation of responsiveness into mandate responsiveness and policy 
responsiveness helps examine various ways in which populism may affect this 
dimension of democratic quality.  
The elite interviews conducted in the Czech Republic in 2009 set a useful 
starting point for analysis in this chapter. Although the interviews were conducted 
before populist Public Affairs came to prominence on the national stage, the comments 
by my interview respondents about the potential effect of populism allowed me to 
examine the limited impact of populism on responsiveness.  
Does populism contribute to higher degree of responsiveness in the political 
system? The central claim of the chapter is that the relationship between populism and 
responsiveness is mixed, and populism’s effect on individual components of 
responsiveness varies. Mandate responsiveness, as measured in this chapter, reflects 
voter perceptions about ideological clarity of political parties and coherence of their 
ideological platform along with parties’ ability to focus on a specific issue consistent 
with their electoral promises. Although imperfect, these measures give an idea about 
how party constituencies perceive a populist party and whether populism’s emphasis on 
a specific issue dimension, such as corruption, is converted into clear voter perceptions 
about party goals. The evidence indicates that Public Affairs showed lower mandate 
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responsiveness compared to other political parties based on voter perceptions of parties’ 
left-right ideological positioning. Among its own voters, Public Affairs displayed a 
larger degree of ideological incoherence, which can be expected, knowing that populists 
often use vague language to promise a little bit of everything to everyone. On the other 
hand, in its rhetoric, Public Affairs focused on corruption placing the issue in the center 
of electoral campaign; Public Affairs’ ability to create a clear image of anti-corruption 
party in voter perceptions indicates a high degree of mandate responsiveness.  
In another the aspects of mandate responsiveness – web press releases – 
populism’s effect is most pronounced. The evidence indicates that Public Affairs used 
web communication as a tool of mandate responsiveness more intensely than other 
parties when addressing its core campaign issue, namely corruption. Whereas Public 
Affairs lagged behind other parties in the frequency of corruption-related press releases 
(where corruption was mentioned once or twice), it displayed a higher intensity of 
featuring corruption in press releases where corruption was mentioned multiple times.  
As far as policy responsiveness is concerned, the record is also mixed. On the 
one hand, the MPs of Public Affairs showed lower rate of responsiveness when it comes 
to inquiries related to corruption from parliament floor. This, however, may be 
explained by imperfect measurement of policy responsiveness. The oral question part of 
the debate was mainly used by the opposition MPs who used the floor as a tool to 
criticize the government. The questions were directed either to the prime minister or to 
the cabinet and therefore, were used infrequently by Public Affairs or its coalition 
partners who were reluctant to place their own coalition members under scrutiny. The 
opposition was successfully leading the debate by criticizing Public Affairs for inaction 
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on the corruption agenda and Public Affairs was forced to defend its positions on this 
important issue of their program. The sequence and frequency of five corruption-related 
questions asked by representatives of Public Affairs from the floor of the parliament on 
December 16, 2010 suggests that these questions were likely to have been orchestrated 
by the populist party’s leadership. No Public Affairs MP has used the oral interpellation 
session prior to December 16 to inquire about corruption and only once after December 
16 was the floor of the parliament used to inquire about corruption. 
On the other hand, the legislative record suggests that Public Affairs stuck to its 
electoral promises, namely combatting corruption. A number of anti-corruption 
initiatives introduced by Public Affairs serve as a useful example of policy 
responsiveness even though the record of policy responsiveness was damaged by 
corruption scandals within government coalition and more specifically, among the 
leadership of Public Affairs. Moreover, based on the frequency of corruption-related 
questions as an overall share of oral questions asked from the floor of the parliament, 
Public Affairs displayed much higher degree of policy responsiveness, compared to 
other parties, despite the infrequent reference to this channel of policy responsiveness. I 
also find that the anti-corruption campaign used by Public Affairs had a positive effect 
on other political parties. The focus on corruption by Public Affairs prompted 
mainstream parties to address corruption more prominently than parties did in the past, 
as suggested by the dramatic increase in the number of corruption-related oral questions 
asked from the floor of the parliament.  
This chapter examined the impact of populism on responsiveness in the area of 
corruption discourse but it is reasonable to expect that the effect of populism on 
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democratic responsiveness is not uniform across various contexts and issue dimensions. 
First, it is contingent on the issue dimension used by populists; some issue dimensions 
are used more prominently and can be politicized more successfully. Corruption is an 
important element of populism’s anti-elite criticism but it is not the only issue 
dimension prominent in populist campaigns. Future research may benefit from 
analyzing how populism affects responsiveness to the citizen concerns in other issue 
areas, such as nationalism, language use, provision of socioeconomic benefits, 
extension of rights, to name a few. 
Second, depending on the government status of the populist party, its effect on 
responsiveness may be more or less pronounced. A populist party that remains out of 
the government coalition will have a limited impact on policy responsiveness unless its 
proposed policies are shared by the parliamentary majority. Still, populist parties in 
opposition can use parliamentary debates as an alternative tool of policy responsiveness, 
raising problem awareness through parliamentary speeches and oral questions.   
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Chapter 6 Protest Mobilization in Ukraine 
 
This chapter analyzes populism’s impact on democratic quality in Ukraine using 
the case of Svoboda, the populist radical right nationalist party. Although the impact of 
Svoboda on democratic quality in Ukraine is yet to be seen, there are some areas where 
the potential for this impact is more likely. The highest potential for impact on 
democratic quality of Svoboda’s populism is in the area of protest mobilization. How 
successful is populism at mobilizing citizens to vote, contact politicians, and participate 
in lawful demonstrations and protests? Is mobilization associated with electoral support 
of populism? Do political protests organized by populists represent a constructive or 
destructive dimension of democratic quality?  
This chapter analyzes the potential of populism’s impact on democratic quality 
in Ukraine, focusing primarily on the dimension of mobilization and participation. The 
chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly describe populist characteristics of Svoboda 
and outline the conditions that created favorable environment for emergence of a radical 
right populist party. Second, I discuss the party’s recent electoral success. Third, I 
analyze Svoboda’s impact on several forms of participation by examining bivariate 
correlations between the populist party’s vote share and voter turnout, contacts with 
politicians, and participation in peaceful demonstrations. I test the following three 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6. Political participation will be higher in regions where populist support is 
stronger. 
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I measure political participation as electoral turnout, frequency of contacts with 
politicians and participation in peaceful demonstrations using the data from European 
Social Survey 2008, 2010, and 2012 rounds. 
The bivariate correlation analysis helps establish the relationship between 
populism and participation but falls short of linking the two variables causally. The last 
section assesses Svoboda’s impact on mobilization by examining the data on protest 
activities in Ukraine in 2009-2011. By looking at the protest data – the types of protests 
populists engage in, the level of violence, government’s attempts to crack down on 
protests, and collaboration between Svoboda and other parties in protests – we are 
learning about the impact of populist mobilization on democratic quality.  
Hypothesis 7. Populist parties are likely to mobilize citizens to participate in political 
protests more frequently than other parties. 
Whereas active citizen participation in protest activities largely has a positive 
impact on democratic quality, violent protests may result in negative consequences for 
democratic quality. The democratic literature indicates that political violence negatively 
affects the ability of citizens to actively practice their rights. If populism elevates the 
level of violence in society, this has negative consequences on democratic quality. 
Hypothesis 8. Populism exhibits higher level of violence during political protests 
compared to mainstream parties, having negative consequences for democratic quality. 
Mobilization capacity by political parties is measured using the Protest and Coercion 
data collected by the Ukrainian Center for Society Research.  
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Radical Right Populism in Ukraine 
Svoboda seems to represent a clear-cut example of populism in Ukraine. It 
meets two out of three characteristics of populism established in earlier chapters. First, 
by criticizing the elites from both pro-Russian and pro-Western parties, Svoboda shows 
it anti-establishment stance. On one hand, Svoboda criticized Party of Regions for its 
pro-Russian stance, specifically, for signing the Kharkiv accords extending the lease 
rights of the Ukrainian territory for the Russian navy. On the other hand, it positions 
itself as an alternative to democratic forces of the Orange coalition that “betrayed 
Maidan’s ideals.” Svoboda uses people-centric appeals towards all Ukrainians, warns 
about oppression and genocide of Ukrainians by external powers.  
In 2004 Ukraine came to Maidan. We hoped that the national idea would defeat 
corruption, betrayal and deceptions of government, whereas all leaders of the 
Orange Revolution would unite and guarantee the unity of pro-Ukrainian 
political forces. This unity could have become the foundation of Ukraine’s 
revival. However, once “orange” leaders got power, all Maidan’s promises were 
forgotten and it turned out these leaders were just “painted foxes”, the gang of 
Kuchmists, Communists and KGB-ists, their apprentices and followers. 
Moreover, under euphoria of victory obtained by the Ukrainian people the 
orange chiefs completely forgot about ordinary Ukrainians.161 
 
Second, the classification of Svoboda as a populist party is echoed in the 
literature. Kuzio (2010) offers a systematic analysis of Ukrainian populism identifying 
populist parties using ten characteristics. He finds that Svoboda meets all ten 
characteristics suggesting that it “most closely resembles European populist parties.”162 
The definition adopted in this study is not incompatible with Kuzio’s definition. 
Kuzio’s ten characteristics of populism are quite exhaustive but they can be grouped in 
larger categories without jeopardizing the integrity of the definition. Overall, Kuzio’s 
                                                
161 “Oleh Tyagnybok: Prychyny Zrady Idey Maidanu” 9/11/2007, Available at 
http://www.tyahnybok.info/diyalnist/komentari/003053/, accessed on May 16, 2012. 
162 Ibid., 4. 
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classification of Svoboda as a populist party confirms the classification used in this 
study, even though my definition of populism is slightly different.163  
Third, content analysis of Ukrainian party programs shows that Svoboda 
exhibits higher level of populism compared to other political parties. Figure 6-1 shows 
the percentage of populist statements in each party document comparing the degree of 
populist elements across cases (parties) and over time – in 2006 and 2007 elections. 
Figure 6-1 Share of Populist Statements in Party Programs, 2006 Parliamentary 
Election and 2007 Parliamentary Election 
 
Note: The share of populist statements in party programs is based on the author’s evaluation of electoral 
manifestos of Ukrainian parties in 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections using three components of 
populism established in this dissertation (see chapter 2 for a detailed description of populist components. 
The number of populist statements was standardized taking the total number of statements in a party 
program as a base. 
 
                                                
163 For example, five characteristics – anti-elite and anti-establishment (3), anti-corruption (4), anti-
American (5), anti-NATO (6), and anti-EU (7) – can be combined into a larger anti-establishment 
category. A party characterized by anti-establishment stance and ideological vagueness can combine the 
above-mentioned characteristics or use them selectively by changing its program, appeals, or the 
definition of “the other” depending on political necessity. Charismatic leadership (1) is often a result of 
weak ideological appeals and therefore can be associated with ideological vagueness. Party ideologies 
change because personalistic and charismatic leaders create parties as “vehicles for their personal 
ambitions” and therefore they “tell voters what they want to hear” (Pop-Eleches 2010). Kuzio’s second 
characteristic – socioeconomic redistributive policies (2) can be associated with people-centric appeals. 
The last three characteristics used by Kuzio – xenophobia, anti-immigration, and anti-multiculturalism – 
are largely defining characteristics of radical right populist parties rather than core elements of populism.  
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There are several reasons to suggest that Svoboda’s impact on democratic 
quality is limited. First, the party’s core appeals are predominantly related to questions 
of Ukrainian identity – morality, lustration, the role of Ukrainians in positions of power 
and immigration. Even though the salience of nationalist appeals has increased over the 
years, it is quite marginal among Ukrainians compared to the salience of socioeconomic 
appeals. Public opinion polls indicate that central problems concerning Ukrainians are 
socioeconomic.164 Parties which are unable or unwilling to offer their constituencies 
socioeconomic promises are less likely to show strong electoral performance and 
influence policy agenda. The ability of Svoboda to address socioeconomic issues is also 
questionable given the party’s inexperience in governance.  
Rovira Kaltwasser and Mudde (2012) argue that populism is less threatening for 
democracy at the sub-national than at the national level. However, this does not mean 
complete irrelevance of Svoboda’s appeals, given the party’s strong representation in 
local and regional councils in Western Ukraine. Overall, it would be a stretch to expect 
significant policy impact as a result of Svoboda’s populism, especially in economic 
sphere. However, we may expect Svoboda’s populism to have an impact in such aspects 
of democratic quality as party competition, citizen mobilization and participation.  
As far as mobilization is concerned, regional effects from a party like Svoboda 
matter because of the virtuous cycle of activism. Historically, Western Ukraine has 
shown higher levels of activity among citizens; political, cultural and religious life was 
more vibrant in Western regions. Higher vibrancy of political and social life in Western 
Ukraine has produced more interest among citizens to associate with one another and 
                                                
164 Public Opinion in Ukraine 2011. International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), October 29, 
2011.  
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demand accountability from the government. This could reduce costs for a political 
party to mobilize citizens and bring them together to aggregate interests, protest against 
government encroachment or in favor of certain policies, leading to higher levels of 
political activity. In sum, the emergence of a nationalist party in Western Ukraine, 
creates a positive self-reinforcing feedback loop: more active civil and political society 
creates a fertile environment for Svoboda’s rise, which in turn further mobilizes 
citizens.  
A Fertile Environment for Emergence of a Populist Party? 
The combination of structural and institutional factors created favorable 
conditions for the emergence of an extreme right populist party in Ukraine. First, 
Svoboda filled power vacuum created in the nationalist political spectrum. Since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the distribution of power in Ukrainian politics has been 
largely characterized by the regional cleavage. Presidential and parliamentary elections 
were a reflection of this regional divide. Western Ukraine was represented by pro-
western, pro-EU oriented politicians, whereas the Eastern and Southern Ukraine was 
represented by pro-Russian, Eurosceptic parties and presidents. Such a division brought 
to power coalitions which were not typical from the Western perspective because they 
united parties with seemingly irreconcilable programs and electorates. It is what 
Umland (2011), calls “civilizational and geostrategic orientations” that explain the 
coalition among the Party of Regions representing financial and industrial capital, the 
Communist Party and the Socialist Party in 2006-2007 and among Party of Regions, the 
Communist Party and Labor Party since 2010.165  
                                                
165 Umland (2011).  
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Numerous attempts to create a viable right-wing party over the last two decades 
have not been very successful. Parties with strong nationalist appeals - Narodny Ruh 
(People’s Movement), Ukrainian Republican Party, Ukrainian Nationalist Assembly 
(UNA-UNSO), Reforms and Order (PRP), among others - were either damaged through 
internal infighting or were absorbed by party blocs headed by Victor Yuschenko (Our 
Ukraine) or Yulia Tymoshenko (BYT).166 The same is true about individual far right 
politicians: they ended up being included in moderate right-wing parties or electoral 
blocs. One of the precursors of all nationalist parties – Narodniy Ruh was originally an 
organization uniting representatives of various ideologies – from radical nationalists to 
communists – and their central goal was independence. Because the movement united 
such a broadly based groups of ideologies and politicians, it could not focus exclusively 
on the nationalist agenda. The creation of Svoboda is therefore can be seen as an effort 
to fill the gap in the nationalist spectrum that existed in Ukraine since independence 
years.  
Second, nationalist populism was a response to the failure of existing elites to 
offer real solutions to the current problems. Public opinion polls indicate that the levels 
of trust in representative institutions among Ukrainians have been declining in the last 
decade, which indicates that both main political forces alternating in office were 
responsible for that decline.167 Figure 6.2 displays the declining levels of trust in 
representative institutions among Ukrainians. The dramatic decline in trust between 
                                                
166 Rudenko (2009).  
167 Two main political forces can be broadly called the “Orange” and the “Blue” camps, following the 
2004 political upheaval. The Orange coalition was represented by president Victor Yuschenko who was 
in power in 2005-2010, prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who was in power in 2005 and 2007-2010.  
The Blue Coalition was represented by Victor Yanukovych who was prime minister in 2006-2007 and 
president since 2010.  
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2004 and 2006 can be linked to dysfunctional parliament, inability to create a stable 
majority coalition and continuous infighting among parties.  
Figure 6-2 Levels of Trust in Representative Institutions in Ukraine 
 
Source: European Social Survey (ESS) Round 2 Data (2004), valid N (listwise)=1639; ESS Round 3 
(2006), valid N (listwise)=1745; ESS Round 4 (2008), valid N (listwise)=1648; ESS Round 5 (2010), 
valid N (listwise)=1687.  
Q: How much do you personally trust each of the following institutions? 1 means you do not trust an 
institution at all, and 11 means you have complete trust (the data was rescaled from the original 0-10 
scale).  
Variables: trstprl; trstplc; trstprt; trstlgl; trstplt 
Note: The vertical axis shows average levels of trust based on the European Social Survey data, on a 
scale 0-10, where 0 indicates low trust, and 10 indicates high trust. 
 
Svoboda’s success in regional elections was also linked to the elite failures to 
offer viable solutions to various problems. Political analysts negatively assessed 
Svoboda’s victories in the 2010 election explaining it by failures of moderate right 
parties of Our Ukraine bloc and president Yuschenko, gas deals with Russia signed by 
the Tymoshenko’s government, colluding practices between BYT and Regions, and 
power encroachment by Party of Regions.168 The dissatisfaction of voters was related to 
                                                
168 Shekhovtsov (2011); Umland (2011); “Nadriv Regionov, Proriv Svoboda I Nariv Bat’kivschyny,” 
Ukrainska Pravda, November 2, 2010, Available at 
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continuous infighting within the Orange coalition and later to the possibility of a cartel-
like “broad coalition” between BYT and Party of Regions.  
The “broad coalition” became a strong point of contention in the society and 
was successfully used by Svoboda to mobilize voters. The goal of the broad coalition 
was to change the constitution, enabling election of president by parliament and 
extending the parliament’s term limits. Negotiations about coalition lasted for weeks in 
complete secrecy from the public but the coalition was never created.169 Once the 
information about negotiations was leaked to the media, the polls showed that public 
opinion was vehemently opposed to the terms of the coalition. According to the public 
opinion poll conducted by Razumkov Center, 63.7% respondents were opposed to the 
coalition between two major political forces.170 Svoboda’s reaction to the possibility of 
broad coalition was typical for a populist party building its support on anti-
establishment appeals. The party leader Tyahnybok demanded to dissolve the 
parliament, set the date for a new election, organize national referendum to determine 
the institutional design of Ukraine’s party system, and initiate lustration. In addition, 
Svoboda denounced the “anti-constitutional coup” calling for protests and acts of civic 
disobedience: “Finally, the hidden became clear…Kremlin’s puppets and ‘painted 
foxes’ took off their masks which had allowed them to fool Ukrainians in recent years. 
Collusion between oligarchic clans is covered up by fairytales about heroic ‘battle with 
crisis,’ desire to unite the country and requirements of stability.”171  
                                                
169 Nayem and Leshenko (2009). 
170 “Ukraintsam ponravilas pozitsia Yanukovicha po koalitsii”. Segodnya, June 8, 2009. 
171 “Zayava Olega Tyagnyboka Shodo Namiriv Oligarhichnyk Klaniv Sformuvaty Tak Zvanu Shyroku 
Koalitsiu,” June 2, 2009, Available at http://www.svoboda.org.ua/dokumenty/zayavy/010733/, accessed 
on April 27, 2012. 
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Even though Svoboda shares some values with two Orange coalition groups –  
Tymoshenko’s bloc (BYT) and Yuschenko Our Ukraine bloc - it was nevertheless a 
strong critic of foreign policies pursued by prime minister Tymoshenko, specifically 
following the gas agreement signed with Russia: “It was Tymoshenko’s friendship with 
the ‘Russian tsars’ Medvedev and Putin that impacted Galician voters. It was the worst 
blow for them, which backfired on the Tymoshenko bloc and helped us.”172 Svoboda 
criticized both leaders of the Orange coalition for betraying the revolution on 
Maidan.173 The leader of the “Blue coalition” Yanukovych was also criticized for 
usurpation of power that transformed Ukraine into a “colony for enriching of oligarchs-
foreigners and foreign countries.”174 Specifically, Yanukovych was blamed for signing 
the Kharkiv accords extending the lease of the Black Fleet in Crimea to Russia until 
2042 in exchange for cheap gas. 
Third, nationalist electoral choice became a viable alternative “to the usual 
choice between the greater and the lesser of two anti-Ukrainian evils.”175 Svoboda 
positions itself as a “third force” – an alternative to either Orange or Blue coalitions and 
a response to the perpetual crisis of governance and protest against uncontrollable 
power of the oligarchs depriving the citizens of ability to affect policies. Tyahnybok 
describes Svoboda as “the only right-wing party able to protect the interests of 
Ukrainians”176 clearly appealing to frustrated supporters of the right-wing Our Ukraine 
                                                
172 Tyahnybok quoted in Shekhovtsov (2011, 221). 
173 “Reityng Svobody zrostaye bo vlada ne dbaye pro Ukraintsia-patriota”, VO Svoboda, July 27, 2011, 
available at http://www.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/komentari/023274, accessed on April 28, 2012. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Tyahnybok quoted in Johnson (2010). 
176 “Reityng Svobody zrostaye bo vlada ne dbaye pro Ukraintsia-patriota”, VO Svoboda, July 27, 2011, 
available at http://www.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/komentari/023274, accessed on April 28, 2012. 
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bloc.177 Svoboda’s rhetoric is directed at those groups of the population who are 
“disillusioned by the deceits which littered the long descent from the moral high ground 
of the Orange Revolution.”178 One of Svoboda’s main electoral issues – lustration – is 
portrayed by party’s leaders as a key tool to address endemic corruption: 
We support lustration, or de-oligarchization. If the way oligarchs earned their 
money is not fair, they should pay extra for their companies or companies 
should be nationalized. The mechanism of lustration assumes purification of 
power from corrupt and criminal connections inherited from Soviet times – 
those who have gone through political blessings by Brezhnev, Scherbitskiy, 
comsomol, and party bureaucrats. Our society is infiltrated by KGB agents. We 
should get rid of them all.179 
 
Fourth, the nationalist party represented the opposition to what Svoboda calls 
“Kremlin’s imperialism.” According to one of Svoboda’s representatives:  
[our] program is a program of protection of Ukraine and Ukrainians from a 
threat – internal or external; from economic, cultural, and political heritage of 
Moscow’s occupation. We want to bring Ukrainians to power… We must free 
our information space from Russian occupation. This occupation influences 
people. They don’t participate and don’t vote because they are not aware of the 
occupation, because they are fixed on their TV screens. They ask ‘what 
occupation?’180  
 
Similar to Plato’s Cave allegory, Svoboda seeks to free Ukraine from Moscow’s 
dominance - from energy dependence, from prevalence of Russian language in daily 
use, and from cultural dominance. Taygnybok emphasizes the “conflict of interests” 
between Russia and other former Soviet states:  
While the Kremlin remains infected with the bacilli of imperialism, it will 
oppose to any country, which seeks to leave the Russian orbit. A weak and 
geopolitically ambiguous Ukraine will only encourage ever-greater Russian 
interference. Ukraine needs a state with a nationally-conscious administration 
                                                
177 Mustafin (2008).  
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179 Field Research, interview #15 with Svoboda’s representative, Ukraine 2009.  
180 Ibid.  
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and a population united around a coherent national identity“ to preserve its 
independence.181  
 
Slogans and appeals directed against Russian dominance resonate relatively well in 
Western Ukraine but Svoboda has not been very successful in Eastern and Southern 
Ukraine, which have historically had cultural and family ties with Russia.  
In sum, several conditions mentioned above account for Svoboda’s success. The 
party was created and received most of its support in Western regions. Higher levels of 
earlier politically activism in the West produced initial favorable conditions for 
Svoboda’s success. Furthermore, the structure of the Ukrainian party system – lack of 
strong nationalist parties, as well as sporadic party competition with seemingly 
irreconcilable parties joining in government coalitions – contributed to the fertile 
environment for emergence of anti-establishment populist party. These developments 
helped the populist party bring into prominence questions of national identity, 
emphasizing the failures of two major political forces to deal effectively with problems 
of corruption and highlighting the confrontational nature of relationship with Russia. 
While Svoboda clearly brought these issues to prominence, it is too soon to tell whether 
they truly created a new basis of political competition based on the nationalist agenda. 
Svoboda has not been able to address socioeconomic problems which seem to be more 
salient for the public in general.  
Svoboda’s Electoral Success 
Svoboda is a relatively new political force and its electoral success has been 
limited to regional and local elections so far. Until 2004 Svoboda was known under the 
name of Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine (SNPU). The party was associated with 
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radical, racist, anti-Russian discourse and was using symbols, such as Wolfsangel, 
common for neo-Nazi organizations.182 In 2004 Svoboda has gone through dramatic 
reorganization hollowing down its radical, racist and militaristic stance, changing the 
name into All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda (Freedom), and replacing Wolfsangel by a 
three-finger fist as a party symbol.183 According to the party leader Oleg Tyahnybok, 
“somewhat inadequate symbol and party name” were an impediment for its positive 
image and support by wider groups. Relative moderation of Svoboda since 2004 made 
the party’s name and symbols more appropriate to the voters.  
Table 6-1 Regional and Municipal Election Results, 2010 
Region 
Svoboda’s vote share, 
2010 regional election 
Seats in regional 
councils 
Seats in city 
councils 
Ternopilska                                        34.69 50 (out of 120) 34 (60) 
Lvivska                                            25.98 41 (116) 55 (90) 
Ivano-Frankivska                                   16.60 17 (114) 29 (60)  
Volynska                                              7.44 6 (80) 14 (100) 
Rivnenska                                          6.34 5 (80) 6 (54) 
Khmelnytska                                        4.06 4 (104) 3 (60) 
Chernivetska                                       3.90 4 (104) 3 (60) 
Kyivska                                            3.48 5 (148)  
Zhytomyrska                                       3.48  2 (60) 
Vinnitska                                        2.95  2 (50) 
Note: Svoboda’s vote share in 14 other regions and Crimea varied from 0.26% to 2.4% but the party did 
not win any seats in regional or city councils. 
Sources: “Ofitsiyni Resultaty Vyboriv do Ternopilskoyi Oblasnoyi Rady”, March 18, 2009. Available at 
http://vgolos.com.ua/politic/news/32840.html?page=1, accesed on April 26, 2012;  
Kogut, Andriy, and Kateryna Sidash. Local Elections 2010. Report on 2010 Local Elections. Kyiv: 
Laboratoria zakonodavchyh initsiatyv, 2011. Available at  
http://parlament.org.ua/upload/docs/Local%20Election-2010-ua.pdf, accessed on March 27, 2012. 
“Resultaty Mistsevyh Vyboriv.” Ukrainska Pravda, November 8, 2010, available at 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2010/11/8/5552584/, accessed on March 27, 2012;  
“Analiz resultativ vyboriv do Lvivskoi Miskoi Rady”, November 11, 2010. http://opora.lviv.ua/?p=1055. 
 
Svoboda’s early electoral success was quite marginal even at the regional level. 
In the 2006 and 2007 national elections the party won 0.36% and 0.76% of the vote 
respectively but it gained important support in three regions in Western Ukraine having 
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won 5.62% (10 seats) in Lviv regional election, 6.69% (9 seats) in Lviv municipal 
election and 4.2% (4 seats) in Ternopil municipal election.184 The party’s biggest 
electoral success was the snap 2009 Ternopil regional election, where it obtained 34.7% 
and 50 out of 120 seats in the regional council.185 Finally, the 2010 regional election 
marked a significant breakthrough for Svoboda, as the party won representation in eight 
regional and municipal councils (Table 6-1).  
In earlier chapters, I defined populism using a family resemblance structure of 
concept formation. According to this definition, parties 1) showing lack of coherent 
ideology, situationally changing their positions and building their appeal on leader 
personality, 2) using people-centric promises and appealing to the common sense of the 
people with simplistic, direct language, and 3) demonstrating anti-establishment stance, 
criticizing elites for ignoring problems of ordinary people – belong to the family of 
populist parties. Svoboda meets the second and third feature of this definition but not 
the first one. Ideologically Svoboda is a highly coherent party. According to its leader, 
Oleg Tyahnybok, the party adheres to “clearly state policies and unchanging principles. 
We do not change our slogans to suit our audiences and always adopt the same 
positions whether in the east, west, north or south of the country.” Svoboda has been 
consistent in its outlooks on economic nationalism, anti-immigrant stances and criticism 
of the oligarchic clans. 
Svoboda’s program for the 2007 election – “Program for Protecting Ukrainians” 
– reflected the people-centric aspect of populism. One of Svoboda’s representatives 
explains:  
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185 “Svoboda Zirvala Dzhekpot.” Tyzhden, March 20, 2009. Available at 
http://tyzhden.ua/Publication/1655, accessed on April 20, 2012. 
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Our program is a program of protection of Ukrainians and Ukraine from a threat 
– internal or external; from cultural, political heritage of Moscow occupation. 
We want to bring Ukrainians to power. We are moving from the programmatic 
slogans “Independent Ukraine” to “Great Ukraine” to ensure the proper 
development of Ukrainian nation… We support a mono-ethnic state that should 
be governed by Ukrainians. We have very basic demands: so that others respect 
us as Ukrainians, don’t laugh at our language and respect our laws.186 
 
Svoboda stressed the existence of a deep division between common Ukrainians and the 
“ruling pseudo-elites” for bailing out their personal banks while ordinary Ukrainians 
lose their savings and failing to support the interests of Ukrainian businesses. The party 
denounced monopoly of foreign energy companies dominating Ukrainian energy 
market. Svoboda emphasized the need to protect Ukrainians from immigrants and create 
jobs for Ukrainian gastarbeiters encouraging them to return home. One of the central 
campaign messages was protection of citizens from foreign (Russian) media 
occupation, because the foreign media denigrate national pride of Ukrainians, mock at 
Ukrainian language and engage in anti-Ukrainian propaganda.187 These elements of 
Svoboda’s program show how the party fulfills the people-centric criteria of populism. 
Svoboda has been challenging the political establishment since reorganization of 
the party in 2004. It attacked the elites from all major political parties for engagement in 
corrupt practices and opaque deals in government procurement. Whereas major political 
parties during the 2010 regional and municipal election built their campaign on their 
leader popularity, Svoboda’s candidates used the campaign to criticize the 
establishment. The party’s campaign was quite negative as its rhetoric was directed 
against the ruling elites. For example, Svoboda promised to protect representatives of 
small and mid-size businesses and entrepreneurs by organizing peaceful rallies and 
                                                
186 Field Research, interview #15 with Svoboda representative, Ukraine, 2009. 
187 “Program of Defending Ukrainians,” 2007, Available on the website of Central Election Commission 
of Ukraine, at www.cvk.gov.ua. 
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protests against the new tax legislation.188 A substantial share of criticism had to do 
with ministerial appointments that, according to Svoboda, did not represent Ukrainian 
interests. Svoboda’s leader Oleh Tyagnybok denounced the appointment of Sergiy 
Tigipko as Minister of Social Policy:  
It’s highest cynicism when an oligarch heads the ministry of social policy. 
Tigipko’s social policies serve the interests of oligarchs who receive preferential 
treatment in taxation. Can a person who uses his own planes for transportation 
and who eats black caviar by buckets since the Soviet times, can this person 
understand problems of a Ukrainian citizen living in community housing and 
making a monthly wage that equals Mr. Minister’s lunch cost?189 
 
Svoboda’s candidates commonly used similar direct language criticizing the 
establishment and emphasizing the disconnect between the elites and ordinary people. 
Its main slogan We, in Our God Given Country was used to appeal to moral values of 
citizens. Overall, Svoboda’s criticism was directed against a broad spectrum of political 
establishment rather than a specific political party or candidate. 
The first general group criticized by Svoboda is ex-communists. The 
condemnation of communist connections that have remained intact through the early 
transition years and still persist today are at the core of the party’s anti-elite discourse. 
Svoboda suggests dealing with the problem of ex-informants through lustration. The 
second group under criticism is pro-Russian parties and politicians. President Victor 
Yanukovych was criticized for extending the Black Fleet lease in Crimea to Russia, for 
usurping the power and transforming Ukraine into a “colony for enriching foreign 
oligarchs and foreign countries.”190 The third group is the leaders of the Orange 
                                                
188 Kogut and Sidash (2011). 
189 Oleg Tyagnybok’s official website, available at http://www.tyahnybok.info/diyalnist/novyny/029167, 
accessed on April 20, 2012. 
190 “Reiting Svobody zrostaye bo vlada ne dbaye pro Ukraintsia-patriota”, VO Svoboda, July 27, 2011, 
available at http://www.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/komentari/023274, accessed on April 28, 2012. 
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coalition criticized by Svoboda for betraying the ideals of revolution on Maidan. 
Overall, broadly directed criticism against domestic elites for misusing Ukrainian 
natural resources, selling out the country to the foreigners, and not standing up for 
national interest, as well as against foreign elites strongly positioned Svoboda as an 
anti-establishment party. The established parties are seen by Svoboda to be unfit to 
represent the interests of Ukrainians and should therefore be replaced.  
Populism and Participation  
The ability of populist parties to mobilize constituencies has been recognized in 
the literature (Roberts 2012, Levitsky and Loxton 2012). According to previous 
sections, Svoboda’s campaign and discourse seem to represent citizens’ protest attitudes 
against the elites. To identify the scope of Svoboda’s mobilization effect I look at the 
degree of political participation across Ukrainian regions. Using bivariate correlation 
analysis I examine whether higher levels of political participation are related to 
Svoboda’s electoral support and whether the relationship changes over time. Political 
participation is measured by electoral turnouts, contacts with politicians, and 
participation in protest activities. 
I use the data on participation from European Social Survey (2004-2010) and the 
data on electoral support of Svoboda from the Central Electoral Commission of 
Ukraine. I run 8 linear regressions showing the relationship between Svoboda’s vote 
share over several election cycles and voter turnout. Unfortunately, the European Social 
Surveys do not include the data on Svoboda’s electoral record. The last parliamentary 
election data included in the survey is 2007, when Svoboda received 0.76% of the vote 
and was not coded in the survey. I therefore examine the relationship between 
199 
Svoboda’s actual electoral support and levels of political participation by regions 
(oblasts). This analysis is used as a substitution for the bivariate correlation taking into 
account the heteroskedasticity problem. The independent variables (one independent 
variable in each model) are: Svoboda’s vote share in 2006 parliamentary election, 
Svoboda’s vote share in 2007 parliamentary election, Svoboda’s vote share in 2010 
regional election and Tyagnybok’s vote share (Svoboda’s leader) in 2010 presidential 
elections. Each independent variable – Svoboda’s vote share – is regressed individually 
on two dependent variables – 2006 turnout and 2007 turnout. Table 6-2 reports the 
regression results.  
Table 6-2 Results of Linear Regression Adjusting for Robust Standard Errors: 
Svoboda’s Vote Share and Electoral Turnout 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 Variables 
Dep. Variable: 2007 
turnout 
Dep. Variable: 2006 
turnout 
 
 
S.E. Robust S.E. S.E Robust S.E 
Svoboda’s Vote Share, 2006 0.058** 0.058*** 0.038 0.038* 
 
(0.026) (0.019) (0.029) (0.021) 
Svoboda’s Vote Share, 2007 0.039** 0.039*** 0.023 0.023* 
 
(0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) 
Svoboda’s Vote Share, 2010 regional 0.004** 0.004** 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
2010 presidential election  
(vote for Tyagnybok) 0.025** 0.025*** 0.012 0.012 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
Observations 22 22 21 21 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Dependent Variable: 2007 turnout - columns (1) and (2); 2006 turnout – columns (3) and (4). 
The reduction in number of observations is due to data availability. ESS2007 did not survey Kyivska, 
Poltavska, and Khmelnitska regions; ESS 2006 did not survey Ternopilska, Khmelnitska, Cherkasska, 
and Chernovytska regions.   
Source: Data on Svoboda vote share is from Central Election Commission of Ukraine, available at 
www.cvk.gov.ua. Data on turnout is from European Social Survey (ESS) and is based on self-reporting by 
respondents. ESS Round 2 Data (2004); ESS Round 3 (2006); ESS Round 4 (2008); ESS Round 5 (2010). 
Q: Did you vote in the last parliamentary election? 
 
Because of the presence of heteroskedasticity in the sample, I used 
heteroskedastic-robust standard errors to correct for the bias. Column (1) shows the 
results for 2007 turnout and the standard errors reported are not adjusted for 
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heteroskedasticity. When adjusting for heteroskedastic robust standard errors, the 
correlation becomes significant at the higher, 1% level for 2006, 2010 regional and 
2010 presidential elections, whereas the coefficient for the 2007 election remains at the 
same level of significance. The standard errors also become smaller. The regression 
results for the second dependent variable – 2006 turnout – become significant at the 
10% level after adjusting the data for heteroskedasticity. 
Overall, the results show a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between populist support and participation. Although the correlation between these 
variables is not particularly strong, regions with higher rates of voter turnout are on 
average more likely to vote for Svoboda. 
Now, I look at other forms of participation, such as participation in 
demonstrations and frequency of contacts with politicians. Again, I run four linear 
regressions showing the relationship between Svoboda’s vote share over several 
election cycles and participation in demonstrations. The dependent variable is the level 
of participation in peaceful demonstrations in 2006.191 One independent variable is 
included in each model and the independent variables are: Svoboda’s vote share in 2006 
parliamentary election, Svoboda’s vote share in 2007 parliamentary election, Svoboda’s 
vote share in 2010 regional election and Tyagnybok’s vote share (Svoboda’s leader) in 
2010 presidential elections. Each independent variable – Svoboda’s vote share – is 
regressed individually on the level of participation in demonstrations in 2006. Table 6-3 
presents the results of the linear regression of the relationship between electoral support 
for Svoboda and participation in peaceful demonstrations. 
                                                
191 I ran similar regressions with participation in demonstrations in 2007 as the dependent variable but the 
coefficients came out insignificant before and after adjusting for heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 6-3 Results of Linear Regression Adjusting for Robust Standard Errors: 
Svoboda’s Vote Share and Participation in Peaceful Demonstrations in 2006 
 Variables Robust S.E. 
Svoboda’s Vote Share, 2006 0.061*** 
 
(0.017) 
Svoboda’s Vote Share, 2007 0.039*** 
 
(0.004) 
Svoboda’s Vote Share, 2010 regional 0.005*** 
 
(0.001) 
2010 presidential election (vote for Tyagnybok) 0.023*** 
 
(0.005) 
Observations 21 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Dependent Variable: Participation in peaceful demonstrations in 2006 
The reduction in number of observations is due to data availability. ESS2007 did not survey Kyivska, 
Poltavska, and Khmelnitska regions; ESS 2006 did not survey Ternopilska, Khmelnitska, Cherkasska, 
and Chernovytska regions.  ESS 2012 did not survey Kyivska, Poltavska, and Khmelnitska regions. 
Source: Data on Svoboda vote share is from Central Election Commission of Ukraine, available at 
www.cvk.gov.ua. Data on participation in demonstrations is from European Social Survey (ESS) - ESS 
Round 3 (2006); ESS Round 4 (2008); ESS Round 5 (2010).  
Q: Have you taken part in a lawful public demonstration in last 12 months? Participation rates are 
calculated based on means of levels of participation in each region (oblast).  
 
There is a positive and significant relationship between Svoboda’s vote share over 
several election cycles and participation in demonstrations. Similarly to the previous 
model, I used robust standard errors to correct for the heteroskedasticity bias. When 
adjusting for heteroskedastic robust standard errors, the correlations between the 
dependent variable and Svoboda vote share in 2006 and Svoboda vote share in 2010 
remain highly significant at the 1% level. The data suggests that in regions where 
Svoboda’s electoral support was higher, the frequency of participation in 
demonstrations was also higher. Because of the low magnitude of the coefficients it 
would not be correct to argue about the causal connection between populism and 
participation in demonstrations but overall, regions where Svoboda received higher 
electoral support are more likely to be more politically active.  
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In order to look closer at the relationship between populism and participation in 
demonstrations, I examine the survey data that allows me to study this relationship at 
the level of individual answers by the survey respondents. Table 6-4 reports the results 
of the cross-tabulation analysis between party proximity and participation in public 
demonstrations. Party proximity is captured by the question Which party do you feel 
closer to? Table 6-4 shows that citizens who feel closer to Svoboda are 12.5% more 
likely to participate in lawful public demonstrations than an average voter (Pearson Chi 
Square is significant at the 1% level).  
Table 6-4 Cross-Tabulation: Participation in Demonstrations and Party Proximity 
Party you feel closer to Yes No 
Svoboda 5 (17.9%) 23 (82.1%) 
Communist Party of Ukraine 8 (10.5%) 68 (89.5%) 
BYT/Batkivschyna 11 (5.6%) 184 (94.4%) 
Other parties 7 (5.3%) 125 (94.7%) 
Party of Regions 6 (2.3%) 252 (97.7%) 
Total 37 (5.4%) 652 (94.6%) 
Source: Data from European Social Survey (ESS) Round 5 (2012) and is based on cross tabulations of 
variables: pbldmn: Have you taken part in a lawful public demonstration in last 12 months? and prtclcua 
Which party do you feel closer to? 
Note: Pearson Chi-Square=17.303 (df=4, N=689), p<0.01. 
 
Next, I look at the expected probability of protesting based on proximity to 
different parties.192 Based on the variable Party you feel closer to in the 2012 survey, I 
created a series of dichotomous variables indicating if respondents feel closer to one of 
five parties.193  I excluded the dummy variable created from the proximity to the largest 
Party of Regions. The results of the logistic regression for the relationship between 
party proximity and participation in public demonstrations are presented in Table 6-5. 
In addition to listing the variable coefficients along with standard errors, Table 6-5 also 
lists marginal effects for the logit coefficients. The table indicates that the supporters of 
                                                
192 Party proximity is captured by the question Which party do you feel closer to? 
193 Svoboda, CPU, BYT, Party of Regions, and Other parties 
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the populist party Svoboda are 17.5% more likely to participate in lawful public 
demonstrations compared to the supporters of Party of Regions (the excluded dummy 
variable). We also see from the table that the marginal effects for Svoboda are the 
largest compared to other parties. 
Table 6-5 Results of Logistic Regression: Party Proximity and Participation in 
Demonstrations 
 
Coefficient (S.E.) Marginal effects  
BYT/Batkivschyna .809 (.349)** .034  
Svoboda  2.100 (.519)*** .175  
CPU 1.486 (.407)*** .090  
Other parties .904 (.489)* .041 
Constant  -3.626 (.160)***  
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
a. Predictors: (Constant), Feel closer to BYT, Feel closer to Svoboda, Feel closer to CPU, Feel closer to 
other parties. Excluded variable: Feel closer to Party of Regions 
b. Dependent Variable: Participated in public demonstrations. Dependent variable is coded 1 if the 
responded participated and 0 if not.  
 
Finally, I examine the relationship between Svoboda’s vote share and contacts 
with politicians using the linear regression adjusted for robust standard errors. Again, as 
with the analysis of other forms of participation above, I use robust standard errors to 
correct for the heteroskedasticity bias. The independent variables (one independent 
variable in each model) are: Svoboda’s vote share in 2006 parliamentary election, 
Svoboda’s vote share in 2007 parliamentary election, Svoboda’s vote share in 2010 
regional election and Tyagnybok’s vote share (Svoboda’s leader) in 2010 presidential 
elections. Each independent variable – Svoboda’s vote share – is regressed individually 
on two dependent variables – 2006 turnout and 2007 turnout. Table 6-6 reports the 
regression results.  
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Table 6-6 Results of Linear Regression Adjusting for Robust Standard Errors: 
Svoboda’s Vote Share and Contacts with Politicians 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
 Variables 
Dep. variable: Contacted 
politicians in 2006 
Dep. variable: Contacted 
politicians in 2007 
 
 
S.E. Robust S.E. S.E Robust S.E 
Svoboda’s Vote Share, 2006 0.047** 0.047 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 
(0.022) (0.033) (0.025) (0.017) 
Svoboda’s Vote Share, 2007 0.035*** 0.035** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010) 
Svoboda’s Vote Share, 2010 regional 0.004** 0.004 0.005** 0.005** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
2010 presidential election  
(vote for Tyagnybok) 0.019** 0.019* 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) 
Observations 21 21 22 22 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Dependent Variable: Participation in peaceful demonstrations in 2006 - columns (1) and (2); 
Participation in peaceful demonstrations in 2012 – columns (3) and (4). 
The reduction in number of observations is due to data availability. ESS2007 did not survey Kyivska, 
Poltavska, and Khmelnitska regions; ESS 2006 did not survey Ternopilska, Khmelnitska, Cherkasska, 
and Chernovytska regions.  ESS 2012 did not survey Kyivska, Poltavska, and Khmelnitska regions. 
Source: Data on Svoboda vote share is from Central Election Commission of Ukraine, available at 
www.cvk.gov.ua. Data on participation in demonstrations is from European Social Survey (ESS) - ESS 
Round 3 (2006); ESS Round 4 (2008); ESS Round 5 (2010).  
Q: Have you contacted politician in last 12 months? Participation rates are calculated based on means of 
levels of participation in each region (oblast). 
 
When adjusting the robust standard errors, the relationship between the 
dependent variable (contacts with politicians in 2006) and the independent variables 
(Svoboda vote share during several election cycles) loses significance. In other words, 
heteroskedasticity discovered in the data was driving some of the significance. On the 
other hand, the relationships between Contacts with politicians in 2007 and Svoboda 
vote share remains significant at the same level even after adjustment for 
heteroskedasticity. Overall, the evidence suggests strong statistically significant 
relationship between Svoboda’s vote share and citizens’ contacts with politicians. On 
average, regions in which voters contacted politicians more frequently were more likely 
to show higher support for Svoboda. 
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Both Table 6-3 and Table 6-6 display the relationship between regional averages 
of Svoboda’s vote share and political participation, rather than between individual voter 
preferences. Looking at several types of political participation across Ukrainian regions, 
I find that high degrees of participation are positively correlated with Svoboda’s 
electoral support. In Western Ukraine, where Svoboda has enjoyed high levels of 
electoral support, the levels of political participation are also high. This pattern is 
consistent across several types of participation, as Svoboda’s vote share is positively 
associated with electoral turnouts, participation in demonstrations and contacts with 
politicians. The positive relationship is also consistent over time and over several 
election cycles. Whereas the data supports the hypothesis about the relationship 
between populism and mobilization, it is important to be careful about populism’s 
causal effect. It is possible that higher degree of participation is a function of structural 
factors and path dependency, rather than Svoboda’s mobilization activities. Political 
activity has been historically higher in Western Ukraine, where Svoboda received most 
of its votes. In order to link higher levels of participation with Svoboda’s mobilization 
activities, I analyze specific type of participation – protest activities.  
Mobilization and Protest Activity   
The correlation analysis presented in the previous section indicates the presence 
of positive relationship between several forms of political participation and the support 
for a populist party. One way to interpret this relationship is to suggest that Svoboda’s 
mobilization activities led to higher levels of political participation. To link Svoboda’s 
mobilization to participation rates, I analyze the frequency and types of protest activities 
using the data from the Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data (UPCD) project run by the 
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Center for Society Research. The question then becomes what participation in protest 
activities tells us about democratic quality. Does populist mobilization represent a 
constructive or destructive dimension of democratic quality? 
Svoboda’s most significant impact on democratic quality can be found in its 
mobilization activities. Table 6-7 and Table 6-8 provide the data on protest activities in 
Ukraine by a type of organization sponsoring the protest (Table 6-7) and frequency of 
protests organized by political parties (Table 6-8). 
Table 6-7 Protest Activities in Ukraine, October 2009-December 2011 
Protesting group Total Share of total number of protests 
Political parties  1721 21.9 
NGOs 1356 17.3 
Citizens 608 7.7 
Business associations, businesses 420 5.3 
Unions 459 5.8 
Total194 7860 100 
Source: Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data (UPCD) project administered by the Center for Society 
Research. Data available at http://cedos.org.ua/.  
 
Table 6-8 Protest Activities Among Political Parties in Ukraine, October 2009-
December 2011 
Political Party 
Protest 
activities 
As a share of all protests 
organized by parties 
Svoboda (co-sponsored and solo) 625 36.3 
Svoboda (as a single organizer) 348 20.2 
Communist Party (CPU) 262 15.2 
Fatherland, BYT (Tymoshenko) 299 17.3 
Front Zmin (Yatsenyuk) 140 8.2 
Party of Regions 162 9.4 
People's Party (Lytvyn) 21 1.2 
Our Ukraine (Yuschenko) 48 2.8 
Total party-organized protests 1721  
Source: Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data (UPCD) project administered by the Center for Society 
Research. Data available at http://cedos.org.ua/.  
 
Table 6-7 demonstrates that political parties are the most active organizers of protests, 
whereas Table 6-8 shows that Svoboda is the most active party among them. Between 
                                                
194 The total number of protests for 2009-2011 was 7862. However, the sum of protests among five 
protesting groups listed in the table exceeds 7862 because many protests were organized/sponsored by 
more than one group.  
207 
October 2009 and December 2011, Svoboda organized 20.2% of protests as a single 
protester. For a small regionally based party that has no seats in the national parliament, 
such a scope of activity is extraordinary. Svoboda organized more than a third protests 
(36.3%) alone or in cooperation with other political parties and social actors – more 
than twice the amount of protests organized (or co-organized) by any other party.  
Cooperation in protest activities with other political and social organizations is 
important because it gives Svoboda higher legitimacy making populists one of the 
central ideological political powers. Svoboda’s appeals have allowed the party to enjoy 
regional popularity until now, primarily in Western Ukraine. Whereas its nationalist 
discourse was highly successful in the West, it has had limited success in the rest of the 
country. Other regions associate Svoboda with radicalism and have quite negative 
attitudes towards its activities and leaders. In other words, it is largely seen a non-
mainstream political entity, located at the margins of the party system. As Svoboda 
collaborates with other opposition political actors in campaigns directed against the 
established power of Party of Regions and president Yanukovych, it has strong capacity 
to become a significant right-wing party rather than a regional peripheral entity. 
Moreover, Svoboda’s activists and citizens mobilized by them have been characterized 
as highly devoted, disciplined and principled, whereas many pro-government protesters 
were reported to have been paid to show up at rallies.195  
As far as geography of protests is concerned, the most active regions of 
Svoboda’s protests were the capital and Western Ukrainian regions – Ivano-Frankivska, 
Lvivska, and Ternopilska regions. It is not a coincidence that most protests were 
organized by Svoboda in these regions, as they provide the highest level of electoral 
                                                
195 Ibid. 
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support for the populist party. Table 6-9 shows bivariate correlations between 
Svoboda’s vote share over several election cycles and the share of protests organized by 
Svoboda. The results indicate a strong positive relationship between Svoboda’s share of 
protest activity and the populist party’s electoral support in the 2010 regional election, 
although the rest of coefficients are not statistically significant.  
Table 6-9 Bivariate Correlations Between the Share of Protests Organized by 
Svoboda and Svoboda’s Electoral Support 
Svoboda’s Vote Share by Region Protests organized by 
Svoboda by region, 
10/2009-12/2011 
2006 national election 0.108 
2007 national election 0.113 
2010 regional election     0.510** 
2010 presidential election (vote for Tyagnybok)  0.097 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source: The protest data is from Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data (UPCD) project administered by 
the Center for Society Research. Data is available at http://cedos.org.ua/. Data on Svoboda vote share is 
from Central Election Commission of Ukraine, available at www.cvk.gov.ua. 
 
The data indicates that regions where Svoboda organized more protest events were 
likely to show higher electoral support in the 2010 election. Again, as was the case with 
other types of participation, the cause-and-effect relationship in this case is not certain. 
The data does not allow us to establish a clear causal relationship between protests and 
electoral support for Svoboda. However, we can argue that political protests were used 
by Svoboda as a tool of mobilization. Three out of four regions with highest share of 
protests organized by Svoboda, also gave the party the highest vote share (Figure 6-
3)196. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
196 Having tested the data for homogeneity we can see that there is a heteroskedastic relationship in the 
data. I ran bivariate regression weighting for the local population size. The coefficients’ magnitude and 
significance are similar with and without weighting for the population. 
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Figure 6-3 Regional Differences in Protest Activities and Electoral Support 
 
Source: The protest data is from Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data (UPCD) project administered by 
the Center for Society Research. Data is available at http://cedos.org.ua/. Data on Svoboda vote share is 
from Central Election Commission of Ukraine, available at www.cvk.gov.ua. 
 
Having detected the presence of heteroskedasticity in the sample, I used robust standard 
errors to correct for this bias. Table 6-10 lists the change in standard errors when 
adjusting for heteroskedasticity. The first column reports non-heteroskedastic standard 
errors and it shows higher degree of significance (at the 1% level). When adjusting for 
heteroskedastic robust standard errors, the correlation remains significance but at the 
lower, 10% level. 
Table 6-10 Linear Regression Results with Estimated and Robust Standard Errors 
Variable 
Svoboda vote share  
in 2010 regional election 
Svoboda vote share  
in 2010 regional election 
 
S.E. Robust S.E. 
Share of protests organized by Svoboda 0.328*** 0.328* 
 
(0.115) (0.188) 
Constant 0.623 0.623 
 
(2.144) (1.625) 
Observations 25 25 
R-squared 0.261 0.261 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Based on the number of protests sponsored alone or co-sponsored, Svoboda is 
clearly more active in its protest activities than other political parties. A relevant 
question can be raised about the impact of these protests on government and citizens. If 
government seeks to crack down protests organized by populist Svoboda, this may 
signal the effectiveness of populist appeals. In other words, despite the small size of the 
populist party and relatively weak nation-wide representation, it may create undesirable 
pressure on government, constraining its actions and policies. The data on government’s 
coercive capacity indicates that Svoboda-organized protests are cracked down more 
frequently (25%) than protests organized by other parties and organizations (18%). It is 
plausible that Svoboda’s mobilization based on the nationalist sentiment is posing a 
threat to ruling Party of Regions and therefore the government seeks to suppress 
populist protests more actively. Populist mobilization then seems to be a positive and 
constructive element of democratic quality.  
However, some experts have suggested that populist Svoboda was used by the 
ruling Party of Regions to dilute the nationalist vote and mobilize its pro-Russian 
eastern regions. There is unconfirmed evidence that Party of Regions was promoting 
Svoboda by offering substantial TV airtime and financial support. According to Umland 
“[i]t was part and parcel of a ‘political technology’ that tried to split the ukrainophile 
national vote, and to reduce the elections result of the main opposition group, 
Tymoshenko's ‘Batkivshchyna’ party. Perhaps this was why Tyahnybok and Co. 
appeared so often on the Inter and TRK Ukraina channels, which are in the sphere of 
influence of oligarchs close to the Party of Regions.”197 If this assessment is correct, 
then populist mobilization is quite ephemeral and its increased influence in Western 
                                                
197 Umland (2011). 
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Ukraine represents manipulations of democratic procedures rather than a constructive 
and positive dimension of democratic quality.  
Alternatively, government’s actions directed at cracking down on populist 
protests may be a function of higher degree of violence associated with Svoboda’s 
protests. Table 6-11 shows the breakdown of protest events by the level of conflict. 
Svoboda sponsored the highest number of confrontational/violent protests in absolute 
numbers (54) and higher than average share of protests (9.5% versus 8.5% for all 
parties). Only the governing Party of Regions organized higher share of violent protests 
(13.3%), compared to that of Svoboda. 
Table 6-11 Peaceful and Confrontational/Violent Protest Events in Ukraine 
Party 
Total 
number  
of protests 
Peaceful 
events 
Confrontational/ 
violent events  
Svoboda 625 571 54 (9.5%) 
CPU 262 241 21 (8.7%) 
Batkivschyna 299 283 16 (5.7%) 
Front Zmin 140 139 1 (0.7%) 
Party of Regions 162 143 19 (13.3%) 
NUNS 48 46 2 (4.3%) 
People’s Party 21 20 1 (0.05%) 
Other 403 368 35 (9.5%) 
Total among parties  1721 1574 147 (8.5%) 
Total among all protest events 7860 6297 1563 (19.9%) 
Source: Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data (UPCD) project administered by the Center for Society 
Research. Data is available at http://cedos.org.ua/. 
 
What does the data on violence used in protests mean for democracy and 
democratic quality? As far as the participatory dimension of democratic quality is 
concerned, Svoboda’s mobilization is a positive sign of populism’s impact on 
democratic quality. By organizing pickets, demonstrations and rallies, the party helps 
aggregate collective grievances and create a constructive challenge to the unconstrained 
dominance of ruling Party of Regions. However, higher number of violent protests 
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organized by Svoboda shows the negative impact of populism. The overwhelming 
majority of Svoboda’s violent protests (34 out of 54) were ideological having to do with 
radical right, nationalist identity of the populist party – issues related to World War II, 
Soviet legacy, the role of Communism in modern Ukraine’s life, and anti-Russian 
discourse. For example, on May 9, 2010, during the Victory Day parade, Svoboda 
activists were reported to have thrown stones in WWII veterans; on November 7, 2011, 
Svoboda supporters attacked the representatives of the Communist Party and burned 
former Soviet flags; on January 3, 2010, Svoboda members along with parishioners of 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church affiliated with Kiev Patriarchy sought to break the door and 
occupy the Ukrainian Orthodox church affiliated with Moscow Patriarchy.  
These several instances of politically motivated violence reflect the nature of the 
nationalist populist party and its goals to guard for Ukrainian national identity, history 
and language. The literature suggests that democracies with records of political violence 
cannot fully guarantee the whole population to effectively practice their rights (Altman 
and Perez Linan 2002). Schedler (2001, 71) also criticizes violence used by political 
actors, as it “subverts the universal validity of democratic rules.” Overall, none of the 
54 violent protests organized by populist Svoboda can be qualified as having a positive 
impact on democratic quality. The violent protests were used to fuel discord and 
criticism among various political and social groups instead of creating constructive 
challenge to the governing party bringing higher level of accountability and 
responsiveness.  
What can the protest central themes tell us about democratic quality? Table 6-12 
outlines the data on protest activities organized by Svoboda by central themes of 
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protests. It shows that ideological protests as a share of total number of protests 
dominate (41.2%), followed by socioeconomic protests (25.1%). The relatively large 
share of socioeconomic protests organized by Svoboda is important because unlike 
ideological issues (language, relationships with Russia, Soviet heritage, etc.), which are 
quite symbolic, controversial and often region-specific, socioeconomic protests 
represent criticism of specific government policies. For instance, Svoboda mobilized 
constituencies to challenge and criticize controversial education policies and Minister of 
Education, Dmytro Tabachnyk; they protested against the new legislation on tax reform, 
pension reform, and land reform; they criticized gas and electricity price increases. 
These were quite concrete protests organized by Svoboda representing socioeconomic 
concerns of the citizens against the power of the state, representing a check on 
government and acting as a mechanism of accountability. 
Table 6-12 Protest Activities Organized by Svoboda by Central Themes, 2009-2011 
Protest themes 
Share of  
Svoboda’s 
protests  
Average for all 
parties 
Share of confrontational/ 
violent protests by 
Svoboda 
Ideology 252 (41.2%) 34.1% 34 (63%) 
Socioeconomic 157 (25.1%) 26.3% 9 (16.7%) 
Power struggle  115 (18.4%) 27.9% 8 (14.8%) 
Civil rights 100 (16.0%) 11.4 3 (5.6%) 
Other 1 (0.2%) 0.3% - 
Total 625 (100%) 100% 54 (100%) 
Source: Ukrainian Protest and Coercion Data (UPCD) project administered by the Center for Society 
Research. Data is available at http://cedos.org.ua/. 
 
Protests related to power struggle include criticism of the national government, 
the president and local authorities. This category accounts for 18.4% of Svoboda’s total 
number of protests, less than the average for all parties (27.9%). Most of the power 
struggle protests included protests against or in support of government or particular 
politicians at the national or local level but they were not very specific in their demands 
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or the purpose of a protest. Rather, they were a display of general criticism of elites. For 
example, widespread were demonstrations against president Yanukovych with outcries 
against his government’s policies; they included criticism in multiple areas – foreign 
policy, justice, etc., but did not focus on specific policy or aspect of an event. 
Table 6-12 also provides the data on the share of Svoboda’s 
confrontational/violent protests by central theme, revealing that it is ideological protests 
that are highly confrontational. More than 60% of ideological protests organized by 
Svoboda are violent, suggesting that populism in combination with radical right 
nationalism is likely to produce higher level of conflict over ideological themes such as 
language, national identity, history and religion. 
In sum, by looking at protest activities organized by populist Svoboda, we are 
learning about both constructive and destructive dimensions of populism. First, most of 
the protests organized by populist Svoboda are ideological. Only the Communist Party’s 
share of ideological protests is higher than that of Svoboda’s. Ideological protests are 
more symbolic in nature, while power struggle and socioeconomic protests imply more 
constructive because they are more concrete examples of criticism of the authorities. At 
the same time, ideological protests are more likely to be confrontational. Despite 
relative dominance of ideological protests, Svoboda also mobilized citizens to criticize 
the government in the socioeconomic area. The evidence suggests that populism in 
Ukraine has both symbolic and constructive dimension. The symbolic discourse in 
political protest dominates and it is quite often more violent than other type of 
discourse, but populism uses political protest more constructively to challenge the 
governing party, thus becoming an important agent of accountability.  
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Second, cooperation with other organizations and political parties for protest 
mobilization is a positive sign of populism for democratic quality. Cooperation suggests 
that despite a radical nature of Svoboda and presence of extreme discourse, the party is 
an accepted partner in protest against government.  
Third, Svoboda shows the highest absolute number of violent protests among 
political parties, showing destructive impact of populism on democratic quality. The 
democratic literature is critical about political violence suggesting that violence 
represents a subversion of democratic rules and violation of citizen rights. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the relationship between populism and mobilization 
using the example of radical right populist party Svoboda in Ukraine. More specifically, 
I focused on three types of participation. First, using bivariate correlation analysis, I 
examined voter turnout and how populist vote is connected to the levels of voter 
turnout. Second, I explored the relationship between populist support and frequency of 
citizen contacts with politicians. Finally, turning to more concrete examples of protest 
politics, I looked at how populism affected the rates of participation in lawful 
demonstrations and protests. I used the data on protest events in Ukraine in 2009-2011 
to determine whether and how strikes, demonstrations and other forms of contentious 
politics mobilize citizens and create pressure on government, bringing higher 
accountability and responsiveness; to establish whether there are differences in the ways 
a populist party uses political protest; whether protests organized by populists are used 
in ways constructive or destructive for democratic quality.  
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The two-by-two framework table presented in Chapter 3 outlined a number of 
hypotheses specifying conditions when populism has a more pronounced effect on 
democratic quality. Svoboda occupies the top-left quadrant (radical right/left populism - 
in opposition). By looking at the nature of protest activities engaged in by the populist 
party, I sought to uncover the areas of democratic quality where populism’s impact is 
more pronounced. Based on the data presented, I argue that this type of populism has a 
strong potential to effect mobilization and participation in voting (electoral turnout) and 
non-voting activities, such as contacts with politicians and participation in protests and 
demonstrations. The ability of populism to mobilize resources for organization of 
protest activities is especially striking. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests 
that populist Svoboda has used street protests as a type of mobilization in both 
constructive and destructive ways.  
Constructively, the populist party organized protests more frequently than any 
other major political party or organization, protesting primarily against the usurpation of 
power by the ruling Party of Regions and president Yanukovych. Svoboda used street 
protests to oppose government’s policies in foreign affairs (relationships with Russia), 
education policies, political appointments  (challenging the appointments of Minister of 
Education criticizing him for anti-Ukrainian policies), and controversies over Ukrainian 
language. Svoboda often organized political protests in collaboration with other social 
actors and political parties, which sends an important signal to voters suggesting that 
even radical right populist parties may be viable partners for mainstream parties when it 
comes to challenging the unconstrained power of government.  
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Street demonstrations and protests against government actions are a valuable 
channel of public expression. Most protests organized by radical right populist parties 
have a strong nationalist flavor. Rather than challenging the government for its corrupt 
activities, most of the protests by Svoboda in Ukraine are an expression of unvoiced 
attitudes related to language, identity, national history and national pride. These 
protests, while important, are more symbolic, less concrete than socioeconomic or 
power struggle protests which are more constructive and represent concrete examples of 
criticism of the authorities.  
Destructively, Svoboda engaged in the largest number of violent protests, 
primarily on ideological grounds over issues about national identity, relationships with 
Russia, Soviet heritage and national memory. The largest share of protests organized by 
Svoboda was ideological and more than half of those were violent. 
Strong positive correlations between Svoboda’s vote share and citizen 
participation signals potentially positive impact of Svoboda on political participation 
although the bivariate correlation analysis does not imply necessarily causal impact of 
populism on participation. The correlation analysis indicates that the level of electoral 
support for Svoboda is positively associated with higher participation in protests and 
demonstrations. Svoboda’s electoral support is also positively associated with frequency 
of contacts with politicians. This data does not necessarily imply that higher levels of 
protest activity and contacts with politicians are a direct cause of Svoboda’s discourse 
and electoral campaigning. It is plausible that the relationship is endogenous, i.e. protest 
activity and higher frequency of contacts with politicians are recorded in Western 
Ukraine - regions that have historically been more politically active. Western Ukraine 
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has been home to multiple attempts of nation building, revival of national culture and 
nationalism as well as Ukrainian dissident movements. Whereas Ukraine in general has 
recorder high levels of distrust of politicians and state institutions, this has less been the 
case in Western Ukraine (Aberg 2000, 295–317). If Western Ukrainians exhibit higher 
levels of interest in politics and political participation, then Svoboda’s nationalist 
discourse may be a consequence of regional particularities and path dependence rather 
than a cause of protest and political activity. However, it is no coincidence that Svoboda 
emerged and enjoys higher popularity among voters in Western Ukraine, which 
represents more conducive areas for mobilization based on nationalist appeals.  
High level of Svoboda’s political activity compared to other political parties and 
nationalist discourse combined with higher potential for mobilization seems to indicate 
a positive impact of populism on democratic quality in Ukraine. Svoboda successfully 
mobilized citizens based on the nationalist attitudes dominant in Western Ukraine. The 
failure of other nationalist political forces – Our Ukraine bloc or BYT – to represent 
these attitudes were exploited by populist Svoboda. Svoboda’s impact on democratic 
quality has yet to be seen and it largely depends on whether the party is able to advance 
to the national-level politics and move from vote-seeking to office-seeking strategy. As 
is the case with other populist parties, Svoboda’s success and ability to impact national 
politics will depend on its strength and transformation to a more programmatic and less 
critical party, especially if it generates enough votes to participate in the coalition 
government. 
Svoboda can clearly take credit for representing and mobilizing public’s 
attention around previously silenced attitudes, such as lustration. It has actively 
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exploited xenophobic – anti-Russian and anti-Jewish – sentiments using negative 
discourse. Similar to other radical right populist parties, Svoboda has advocated the 
tools of direct democracy, suggesting to hold referenda on lustration and institutional 
design. These activities represent unvoiced attitudes rather than a threat to or a benefit 
for democracy per se.  
The literature on political protest is divided on whether active citizen 
participation strengthens of undermines democratic quality. Huntington (1968) warned 
against protests, strikes and demonstrations that could lead to excessive pressures on 
governments, ineffective policy-making, and political instability. On the other hand, 
proponents of political activism suggest that participation in its various forms is 
beneficial for democracy. Active participation allows groups of citizens to express 
collective grievances, teaches citizens civil skills, contributes to creation of a more 
vibrant civil society, and most importantly, challenges governments and holds them 
accountable for their policies (Norris 2006). Political protest is often considered 
dangerous for the health of democracy if it undermines political authority, incapacitates 
the government and brings instability. However, the evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that populist Svoboda uses protests for ideological reasons more prominently 
than other political parties championing unvoiced questions and problems related to 
nationalism, the use of the Ukrainian language, and national identity. Symbolic and 
general protest is mixed with more direct and purposeful types of protest. The 
correlation analysis also shows that higher voter turnout, contacts with politicians and 
participation in demonstrations is associated with Svoboda’s mobilization.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion  
 
How does populism effect democratic quality? What is the impact of populist 
parties on various dimensions of democratic quality, such as electoral participation, 
democratic responsiveness, and protest mobilization? Under what conditions do 
populist parties have a constructive and destructive impact on democratic quality? The 
primary goal of this dissertation is to address these research questions in response to the 
literature on populism discussing its positive and negative impact on democracy. This 
study is not intended to identify all possible factors affecting the quality of democracy 
in the post-Communist countries. Rather, the scope of the study is limited to a specific 
relationship between populism and quality of democracy, a relationship often 
overlooked in the literature. More specifically, this dissertation looks at the effects of 
populist parties on participation in Poland, on responsiveness in the Czech Republic, 
and on protest mobilization in Ukraine.  
One of the central contributions of this dissertation has to do with the dependent 
variable, namely the democratic quality. Many previous studies have examined 
populism’s general impact on democracy without specifying the exact dimensions of 
this impact. Moreover, the concept of democracy has been used interchangeably with 
that of the quality of democracy. In this dissertation, I attempted to clearly delineate 
what constitutes democracy and how it differs from democratic quality. Disaggregation 
of democratic quality into individual dimensions helps create a more complex, yet 
nuanced account of populism’s impact.  
This dissertation shows that the effects of populism on democratic quality range 
from positive to negative and may also be indistinguishable from those of other political 
221 
parties. Three empirical chapters focusing on individual case studies indicate quite a 
mixed record. The general reflection on the conditions under which populism has a 
pronounced impact on three dimensions of democratic quality leads back to populism’s 
type, its strength and relationship to government. Previous studies have shown that the 
power of populist forces – whether populist parties are kept in opposition or join the 
government – will determine how much potential they have to impact democracy. 
Rovira Kalwasser and Mudde (2012) find evidence that populism in opposition does not 
have much influence on the quality of democracy; rather, their impact is limited to 
advancing unvoiced attitudes and concerns and challenging the mainstream parties to 
address these attitudes. The evidence presented in this study indicates that populism in 
opposition has stronger influence on some dimensions of democratic quality than 
Rovira Kaltwasser and Mudde (2012) predict. Indeed, populist parties in opposition do 
not have much leverage to influence the policy agenda. However, when it comes to 
specific dimensions of democratic quality – for example, political participation and 
mobilization, populists show high levels of impact compared to other parties. Table 7.1 
provides a summary of the dissertation’s findings. It details the varying effect of 
populism on three dimensions of democratic quality based on populism’s relationship to 
government and populism’s type (radical right/left or centrist). 
Populism in Opposition 
The evidence from the Polish case study indicates that Law and Justice, Self 
Defense and League of Polish Families successfully politicized the anti-corruption 
issue, firmly placing it on the public agenda and making it one the central campaign 
issues in 2005. When populist parties initially came to prominence in 2001, they 
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expanded the presence of marginal groups by bringing into politics a large share of 
provincial politicians, farmers, and blue-collar workers of politicians. These groups had 
not participated in political life in the past and were able to get representation in the 
parliament thanks to the effort of populist parties. Populist parties also deserve credit for 
giving a voice to new and possibly disenchanted in the past voters. In 2005, two Polish 
populist parties – Self Defense and League of Polish Families – mobilized new voters at 
a higher rate compared to other parties: about a third of their voters were citizens who 
did not participate in the previous election.  
Similarly, Ukrainian populism in opposition shows a strong potential to have an 
impact on protest mobilization and participation. The bivariate correlation analysis 
indicates a strong positive correlation between electoral support for populist Svoboda 
and higher electoral turnout, contacts with politicians, and participation in 
demonstrations. For example, according to the survey data, citizens feeling closer to 
Svoboda were 12.5% more likely to participate in public demonstrations than those 
feeling closer to other parties. Ukrainian populism has an impressive record of 
mobilizing citizens to participate in protest activities, especially taking into account 
relatively small size of Svoboda and limited national electoral success of the party.198 In 
other words, populist constituencies are more likely to be politically active citizens. In a 
country where citizens in general are quite skeptical about the role of political 
institutions in democratic process and their own political efficacy, the ability of a 
populist party to mobilize citizens and elevate the level of political engagement is a 
positive aspect of populism’s impact.  
                                                
198 Svoboda received 10.4% of the vote, an unprecedented level of support, in the Ukrainian 
parliamentary election held on October 28, 2012. By then, this research has been completed.   
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Table 7-1 Summary of Findings 
 Populism’s 
Type 
Government or 
Opposition? 
Impact on Democratic Quality 
Poland  
Law and Justice 
 
Centrist populism 
 
Opposition 
 
On inclusion: increased the presence 
of marginal groups in politics 
(provincial politicians, farmers, blue-
collar workers) 
 
On participation: Mobilized new 
voters  
Self Defense  Radical left populism 
League of 
Polish Families 
Radical right populism 
Law and Justice Centrist populism Government 
 
On turnout (unintended 
consequences):  
30% turnout increase due to negative 
discourse, confrontational policies, and 
attacks on institutions of liberal 
democracy.  
Self Defense  Radical left populism 
League of 
Polish Families  
Radical right populism 
 
Czech 
Republic  
Public Affairs 
 
 
Centrist populism 
 
 
Government  
Mandate responsiveness: Lower 
degree of ideological coherence than 
other parties but 
 
Clear/strong anti-corruption image 
among citizens 
Higher intensity of featuring corruption 
in web press releases. 
 
Increased intensity of addressing 
corruption in web press releases by 
other parties in response to populist 
scandals  
Policy responsiveness: 
Less frequent use of oral questions on 
corruption from parliament floor 
compared to other parties. Reactive use 
of oral questions in response to the 
opposition’s criticism. 
 
Legislative initiatives introduced by 
populists (Code of Ethics, Anti-
Corruption Strategy, Anti-Corruption 
Committee) 
 
Positive externalities: positive impact 
of populist anti-corruption campaign on 
discourse of other parties 
Ukraine  
Svoboda 
 
Radical right populism 
 
Opposition  
On mobilization: 
Higher electoral turnout 
Higher degree of contacts with 
politicians  
Higher rates of participation in 
demonstrations and protests 
 
Negative impact:  
High rate of violent protests 
 
224 
A specific case of successful mobilization by Svoboda is their protest activities. 
In 2009-2011, Svoboda organized protests more frequently than other political parties 
or organizations, using street protests against the ruling government headed by the pro-
presidential Party of Regions and challenging its unconstrained power. Not only did 
Svoboda mobilized citizens to participate in protest activities, but they also engaged in 
cooperation with other political parties and social actors signaling the voters its 
coalition potential, which is quite important and unusual for a radical right party. 
Ideological protests – which are more symbolic by nature – dominated Svoboda’s 
protest agenda but the populists also mobilized citizens to criticize the government in 
the area of socioeconomics. Both ideological (more symbolic) and socioeconomic 
(more constructive) protests were equally important for the populist party to challenge 
the government serving as an important agent of accountability.  
Yet, along with positive effects, populism in opposition also contributed to 
retrogressions of democratic quality, specifically in the area of violent protests. 
Svoboda’s share of violent protests was the largest compared to other parties or social 
groups. The majority of violent protests were ideological, reflecting the radical identity 
of the populist party. These protests fueled discord among various social groups instead 
of creating a constructive challenge to the ruling party. Political violence is viewed 
critically by the democratic literature that links violence to subversion of democratic 
rules and violation of citizen rights. Moreover, it is more difficult for countries 
experiencing political violence to ensure that the whole population, including 
minorities, effectively practices its rights.  
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Populism in Government  
Whereas populism in opposition positively affected participation, mobilization 
and inclusion of marginal groups in the political process, populism in government 
indicated quite mixed results, based on the evidence from Poland and the Czech 
Republic. The Polish case shows unintended consequences of negative discourse and 
radical policies exhibited by the populist government. To link populism and changes in 
electoral participation, I analyzed the dramatic change in electoral turnout between 2005 
and 2007 elections. Whereas it is difficult to establish statistically that it was populism 
that contributed to the 30 percent increase in 2007 election turnout, the interview data 
along with the analysis of the secondary sources and contextual analysis suggest that 
populist parties contributed, albeit indirectly, to the turnout increase. Through process 
tracing, I show that negativity exhibited by populist parties during their government 
tenure produced higher level of conflict in political life becoming a mobilizing factor 
for citizens. The disenchanted mobilization mechanism has the following logic. First, I 
established that the 2005 election and the new coalition government composed of three 
populist parties created “warlike political discourse” marked by negative and 
confrontational rhetoric and policies. The populist government used security services 
against its political opponents and leaked information from secret services to the media; 
orchestrated anti-corruption raids emphasizing radical break with practices of previous 
government promising to cleanse the public life from the uklad – a network of former 
communist collaborators; attacked the media for supporting and belonging to the uklad, 
thus compromising its independence; launched attacks against the Constitutional Court 
and the judicial system interfering in the process of nomination of justices; proceeded 
226 
with the lustration legislation creating an atmosphere of suspicion and fear among 
millions of Poles. Populist’s efforts in foreign policy – specifically the anti-European 
and anti-German provisions – were also highly confrontational, producing a backlash 
against the populist government. These efforts of the populist government, the newly 
created agencies, radical policies and confrontational discourse compromised the 
institutions of horizontal accountability endangering liberal democratic politics.  
Second, public opinion polls along with elite interviews conducted during the 
fieldwork indicated that political conflict was regarded as one of the most salient 
concerns among citizens. The most active groups – particularly those groups belonging 
to the middle class – mobilized to express grievances and defend liberal democratic 
values against confrontational discourse and encroachment by the governing coalition. 
Higher levels of negativity led to higher political activity of civil society and 
consequently, to higher electoral turnout. In other words, negativism produced 
unintended consequences working as a mobilizing factor for citizens who viewed the 
populist government disrespectful of liberal democratic norms, values and institutions. 
Higher electoral turnout appeared damaging to the electoral prospects of populist Self 
Defense and the League of Polish Families. Whereas their senior and less radical 
coalition partner – Law and Justice – took over the majority of radical populist 
constituents, Self Defense and the League of Polish Families failed to clear the electoral 
threshold in the snap 2007 election.  
The results of the within-case analysis indicate that negative discourse exhibited 
by populism was an important factor leading to higher awareness of political conflicts 
among the citizens. Among the most interesting findings of the analysis are the results 
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of the statistical tests which help to find evidence that citizen awareness with political 
conflicts is a statistically significant predictor of higher electoral turnout. The linear 
regression models show that respondents aware of political conflicts were 10.8% more 
likely to vote in the 2005 election than respondents aware of economic problems. 
Moreover, these results are consistent with the 2007 model. In 2007 parliamentary 
election, respondents aware of political conflicts were 18.9% more likely to vote than 
respondents aware of economic problems.  
In sum, negativism was a mobilizing factor that significantly contributed to 
higher electoral turnout between 2005 and 2007 parliamentary elections, although 
higher turnout was an unintended consequence of populism’s radical discourse. Citizens 
came to the polls because they perceived that the populist government showed 
disrespect for the rule of law and democratic norms and procedures. This conclusion is 
consistent with Markowski (2008) who argues that voters mobilize to protect 
democracy when they feel that democratic institutions are threatened.  
In addition to populism’s strength – whether it is in government or in opposition 
– its impact on democratic quality may also be a function of populism’s type. Is centrist 
populism more effective than radical right/left populism? Which type of populism has a 
more constructive impact on democratic quality? The literature does not view centrist 
populism to be a danger to liberal democracy. Rather, “benign populists” positively 
affect the party system by expanding the voters’ choice, giving a warning signal to the 
established parties and forcing them to adapt their platforms, discourse, and policies 
(Ucen 2007). On the other hand, radical populism is seen to have aversion to democracy 
(Meny and Surel 2002). 
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Centrist Populism 
The evidence presented in this study is quite mixed as for the impact of centrist 
populism. The Czech case study examined the impact of centrist populist party Public 
Affairs on mandate responsiveness and policy responsiveness. Mandate responsiveness, 
measured as citizens’ perceptions about ideological clarity, is a viable indicator of 
responsiveness because it shows the ability of populist parties to construct a clear and 
distinct party image recognized by the voters. Public Affairs shows lower degree of 
mandate responsiveness compared to other parties based on voter perceptions on 
parties’ positioning on the left-right ideological scale. Higher degree of ideological 
incoherence exhibited by the populists is a common feature of populism and therefore 
this finding is not unexpected. At the same time, when it comes to specific issue areas, 
the citizens clearly associated Public Affairs with anti-corruption campaign. Despite 
vague ideological profile, Public Affairs was able to create an image of anti-corruption 
party, indicating high mandate responsiveness in this narrow issue area.  
The implications of low mandate responsiveness may stretch beyond program 
clarity per se, as it negatively affects both the voters and the populists. Voters end up 
with fewer electoral choices which undermines democratic accountability. Populist 
parties also suffer because they will be unable to sustain their voter support longer that 
one election cycle; if they cannot clearly identify their core group of voters and promise 
something to everyone, they create “a vicious circle of undifferentiation” (Davidson-
Schmich 2004). This problem is not limited to populist parties alone, however, and the 
reasons lie in the catch-all style appeals used by modern political parties.   
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Positive impact of centrist populism is found in another aspect of mandate 
responsiveness, or in intensity of press releases related to corruption in the party’s web 
communication. Public Affairs displayed higher intensity of featuring corruption in its 
web press releases compared to other political parties. Moreover, references to 
corruption in press releases of other parties were partially a response to prominence of 
the issue in electoral campaign of Public Affairs; once the members of parliament 
affiliated with the populist party got embattled with corruption scandals, their 
mainstream opponents used their own web communication tool launching a stark 
criticism of Public Affairs whose key electoral promise was anti-corruption stance. 
Centrist populism showed lower rates of policy responsiveness compared to 
other parties, However, this finding may be due to the imperfect measure of policy 
responsiveness based on the frequency of oral questions related to corruption asked 
from the floor of the parliament. Parties of opposition use the floor of the parliament 
more frequently to question and criticize the government or individual ministers. On the 
other hand, I find evidence of positive externalities from populist anti-corruption 
campaign on discourse of other parties. Based on the number of corruption-related 
questions asked from the floor of the parliament during the previous parliament’s tenure 
(2006-2009), corruption was not a high-profile issue. After Public Affairs entered the 
parliament in 2010, its anti-corruption discourse contributed to politicization of the 
issue. Whereas during the 2006-2009 parliament tenure only 13 of 1922 (0.7%) oral 
questions focused on corruption, between May 2010 and December 2011, 39 of 707 
(5.5%) oral questions featured corruption. Corruption became a more prominent issue 
following the 2010 election campaign in response to a continued emphasis on the issue 
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by the populist party. The ability of Czech populists to stick to their central electoral 
promise – addressing corruption – along with anti-corruption policy initiatives indicate 
positive record in policy responsiveness by Public Affairs.  
Overall, the examination of three elements of responsiveness in the Czech case 
does not unequivocally reveal absolutely negative aspects of populism’s impact. 
Centrist populism in government largely shows positive effects. In instances when 
populist Public Affairs exhibits lower levels of responsiveness compared to mainstream 
parties, this does not necessarily mean erosion of democratic quality. But at the same 
time, populism’s criticism of the elites for corrupt practices, low responsiveness and 
low accountability does not guarantee to fix these shortcomings, even after populism 
ascends to government. As the Czech and the Polish cases show, new parties building 
their programs on anti-corruption appeals do not remain unaffected by corruption 
themselves for long, as corruption scandals involving Czech Public Affairs and Polish 
Self Defense have shown. The inability of new parties to avoid corruption scandals may 
not be a consequence of populist characteristics per se but it is usually populism that 
politicizes corruption and builds electoral support using this issue. 
Radical Populism 
The impact of radical populism on democratic quality does not only reveal its 
“aversion to democracy,” as suggested by Meny and Surel (2002). The Polish case 
provides evidence of positive impact of radical populism on mobilization of new and 
disenchanted voters and expansion of the role of provincial politicians in positions of 
power. Polish populism did seek to restore power to the people but frequently used the 
tools incompatible with liberal democracies. Populists were fighting for the right cause 
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using wrong tools, as they went too far in challenging the liberal democratic institutions 
and undermining the system of checks and balances. It seems that skepticism and 
frustration with liberal democratic institutions may open the path for radical parties. In 
the Polish case, frustration with the establishment, endemic corruption problems 
combined with uncertainties about joining the European Union contributed to lower 
electoral turnout, which in turn opened political space to populism. Populist parties 
were willing to move from the streets to the halls of the parliament but they showed 
their illiberal face once they failed to follow the democratic rules of the game. 
Continued radical discourse and negativity does not appear to be a successful long-term 
strategy for populist parties. When they find themselves in government, they have to 
pacify their discourse and learn how to follow the democratic rules and procedures. 
Citizens, on the other hand, having realized the danger of radical populism to liberal 
democratic institutions, mobilized and participated in the 2007 election more actively. 
They stepped up to defend democratic rules and institutions when the latter were 
threatened by radicalism, as the Polish case has demonstrated.  
Generalizability of Results 
While this dissertation focuses on specific countries in post-Communist Europe 
and specific dimensions of democratic quality, the implications can be extended to other 
geographical contexts. This is the case because populists in various countries commonly 
criticize the established parties or politicians whereas the central themes of their critical 
stance may differ. For instance, there are ample reasons to expect positive impact from 
populism’s emphasize to increase inclusion of un(der)represented groups into the 
political process and expand the role of the groups that were unable to elevate to the 
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positions of power. This carries a danger of bringing to the political office “politicians 
like you” – those who will lack the skills of day-to-day politics of compromise which 
may result in legislative deadlock, confrontational style of politics and consequent 
public disengagement from politics.  
We can also expect certain issues to be “owned” by populist challengers and the 
range of these issues will transcend geographical boundaries. Among them are appeals 
to eliminate corruption or increase accountability, responsiveness, and rule of law. 
Although populists will not be able to use similar appeals more than once and will have 
to recreate themselves – by focusing on issues other than anti-elite appeals – in order to 
remain politically relevant. Overall, the ability of populism to politicize issues which 
are ignored by the mainstream elites is one of the strongest potentials of populism to 
have a positive impact on democracy. The interviews conducted during the fieldwork 
along with other evidence demonstrate how populists placed specific issues at the center 
of political debate. Both centrist and radical right/left populism was able to politicize 
corruption and build electoral campaign around this social problem.  
Haughton and Deegan-Krause (2011, 401) suggest, “no party in power can 
remain uncorrupted for long.” The Polish and the Czech cases examined in this study 
also suggest that populist parties building their support on anti-corruption platforms can 
become victims of their own success. They may eventually face corruption accusations 
themselves, which will undermine their anti-corruption credibility and their opponents 
will use their own [populist] campaign slogans against the populists. With regard to this 
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speculation, it would be interesting to follow the anti-corruption trajectory of Ukrainian 
Svoboda, if they have enough mandates to join the coalition government.199 
Avenues for Further Research 
This study sought to analyze the impact of populism on democratic quality in 
three post-Communist countries. Initially, prior to conducting the fieldwork in Central 
and Eastern Europe, I planned to use a more encompassing definition of democratic 
quality and include in this concept such elements as vertical accountability, horizontal 
accountability, rule of law, and party competition, following Diamond and Morlino’s 
(2005) study. I also intended to investigate populism’s impact on each of these 
dimensions in each of the three case studies. However, the interview data collected 
during the fieldwork outlined the general effects of populism on participation in Poland, 
on responsiveness in the Czech Republic and protest mobilization in Ukraine. The 
interview data thus served as a motivation for identifying possible dimensions of 
democratic quality affected by populist parties in three cases. Such as narrow analysis 
does not imply that populism has no impact on responsiveness in Poland and Ukraine or 
on participation and mobilization in the Czech Republic. Rather, the choice of 
examining the effect of populism on a single dimension for each of the three cases was 
a result of the interview cues as well as the data availability. The future research project 
would benefit from a more encompassing evaluation of populism’s impact on the 
dimensions of democratic quality that will include but will not be limited to the three 
                                                
199 During the parliamentary election held on October 28, 2012, Svoboda won 10.4% in proportional 
representation tier of the election and 12 single-member districts. Overall, Svoboda won 37 seats in a 
450-seat parliament. As of early November 2012, the election results do not indicate that three opposition 
parties have enough seats to create a coalition government.   
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dimensions examined in this dissertation. This approach will help extend the within-
case analysis to a more encompassing comparative analysis.  
Another direction for future research is the topic that many scholarly works 
studied in isolation: conceptual categories compatible and incompatible with populism. 
The literature on populism in Latin America focused on populism’s relationship with 
neoliberalism. Roberts (1995) and Weyland (1996) argued that neoliberal economic 
policies are compatible with populist policies and Weyland (2001) extended this 
argument in his comparative analysis of Latin America and Eastern Europe. Significant 
attention has been paid to how populism is combined with nationalism. Deegan-Krause 
(2012) highlights populism’s affinity with nationalism and argues that populism needs a 
partner ideology, especially when it is in office. Kenney (2008) and Levitsky and 
Loxton (2012) analyzed populism’s relationship to delegative democracy and 
competitive authoritarianism, respectively. At the same time, populist movements, 
parties and leaders evolve and transform themselves shifting from one conceptual form 
to another. A more integrative framework will help examine populism’s relationship to 
other political and economic ideologies, concepts and forms, such as nationalism, 
neoliberalism, delegative democracy, and competitive authoritarianism, to name a few. 
Finally, survey research focusing on the demand side of populism in Eastern and 
Central Europe has been limited so far. If, according to Roberts (2000), populism 
“emerges in contexts where substantial sectors of the lower classes are available for 
political mobilization,” we should expect to see a distinct group of voters described as 
populist. Do citizens voting for populist parties exhibit a certain degree of affinity? Do 
populist voters exhibit higher levels of disappointment with elites and democratic 
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institutions or they are indistinguishable compared to other political parties. Survey 
research should be able to help examine the correspondence of populist programs and 
appeals to citizen protest attitudes. The presence of a consistent group of protest voters 
who “migrate” from one populist party to another may represent a danger to the quality 
of democracy, as inconsistent voting patterns make the process of consolidation of the 
party system problematic. However, these voters may also represent a constructive 
challenge for democratic systems by opening space for new politicians and political 
parties. 
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Appendix A: Elite Interview Questions 
Date of Interview:  Number of Interview:  
Country:   Location:  
Male  Female  
 
1. What is the main objective of political parties in political life?  
2. What was the main hurdle for your party to receive more votes in the last 
election? 
3. Do you think some political parties should be excluded from participating in the 
parliamentary elections? 
4. How did parties seek to attract voters in the last election? Was your political 
platform influenced by criticism from citizens or other parties? 
5. How often (if ever) do parties invite spokes-persons from competing parties, 
interest groups, or social movements to discuss the drafting of laws? 
6. How does your party respond when a particular argument or appeal to voters 
does not seem to be effective?  Do parties reconsider their positions or try to 
find another approach to conveying the same message? 
7. Is strong ideology – focus on issues such as religion, nation identity, and 
ethnicity – more important than expertise to govern for your party? 
8. How do parties react/respond to the citizen needs and concerns? How often do 
citizens make requests through party offices? 
9. Which parties do you consider to be populist? How does the presence of these 
parties affect policies and other parties’ justification for policies? How do 
parties respond to the criticism expressed by populists? Do other parties feel a 
necessity to adapt to the agenda and programs of populists?  
10. Populist parties often accuse the parties of government in corruption and low 
accountability. Do you feel that the programs of populist parties force the parties 
of government to focus attention on such issues as corruption and low 
accountability? 
11. What is your perception of populism and other major parties? Which parties do 
you perceive as necessary for responding to citizens’ needs and concerns? 
12. Do you feel there exists a crisis of representation of citizen interests? Which 
interests do parties represent today? 
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Appendix B: List of Acronyms 
Acronym Party name in English Party name in native language 
Czech parties     
ČSSD Social Democratic Party Česká strana sociálně demokratická 
KDU/ KDU-ČSL The Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party  
Křesťanská a demokratická unie – 
Československá strana lidová 
KSČM Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy 
ODS Civic Democratic Party Občanská demokratická strana 
SZ The Green Party Strana zelených 
TOP09 Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09 Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita 09 
VV Public Affairs Veci Verejne 
      
Polish parties     
AWS Solidarity Electoral Action Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność 
LPR League of Polish Families Liga Polskich Rodzin 
PiS Law and Justice Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 
PO Civic Platform Platforma Obywatelska 
PSL Polish People’s Party Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 
ROP Movement for Reconstruction of Poland Ruch Odbudowy Polski 
SLD Democratic Left Alliance Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej 
SO Self Defense Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej 
UP Labor Union Unia Pracy 
UW Freedom Union Unia Wolności 
      
Ukrainian 
parties     
Batkivschyna Fatherland (Tymoshenko) Батькивщина 
BYT Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko Блок Юлии Тимошенко 
CPU Communist Party of Ukraine Коммунистическая партия 
Front Zmin Front of Change Фронт Змiн 
Lytvyn Lytvyn’s Bloc Блок Литвина 
NUNS People’s Union Our Ukraine (Our Ukraine) Национальный союз - Наша Украина 
Our Ukraine Our Ukraine Наша Украина 
People’s Party People’s Party (Lytvyn) Народная партия 
PSPU Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine Прогрессивно-социалистическая партия 
Regions Party of Regions Партия Регионов 
Rukh/ 
Narodniy Rukh Movement/People’s Movement Рух/Народный рух 
SPU Socialist Party of Ukraine Социалистическая партия Украины 
Svoboda All Ukrainian Union Freedom Всеукраинское объединение Свобода 
      
Misceleneous     
PM Prime minister   
MP Member of parliament   
ESS European Social Survey   
CBA Central Anti-corruption Bureau Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne 
CBOS Public Opinion Research Center Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej 
PGSW Polish National Election Study Polskie Generalne Studium Wyborcze 
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